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  Abstract	  	  	   This dissertation offers a phenomenology of that mode of self-interpretation in 
which it becomes possible for an interpreter to intentionally participate in the production 
of moral norms to which the interpreter himself or herself feels bound.  Part One draws 
on Richard Rorty’s notion of the “ironist” in order to thematize the phenomenon I call 
“moral friction”; a condition in which an interpreter becomes explicitly aware of the 
historical and cultural contingencies of their own moral vocabularies, practices, and 
concerns and as a result find themselves incapable of feeling the normative weight 
implicit in these.  Part Two draws on Heidegger’s existential analytic of human being, 
Gadamer’s development of Hermeneutic Phenomenology, and Hegel’s notion of 
“sublation” in order to map how novel interpretations can irreversibly displace the 
coherence of older interpretations. I call this form of interpretation “moral 
phenomenology.”  Finally, in Part Three, I utilize a selective phenomenology of musical 
improvisation to plot the unique temporal orientation of self-interpretation that results 
from intentionally deploying this irreversible displacement of older interpretations that 
involve normative moral implications. I call the form of life that is marked by this 
hermeneutic mode the “improviser.”  The result is a description of a form of life in 
which it becomes possible to explicitly participate in the production of moral norms 
within a historical and culturally contingent context that nevertheless preserves 
	  	  	   iv	  
standards of rational justification for normative moral judgment without the need for 
atemporal first principles.  The availability of this mode of self-interpretation displaces 
the sharp distinction between non-normative descriptive phenomenology and normative 
moral reasoning by placing the latter within a non-teleological historical practice that 
engages in the production of interpretations which irreversibly displace older 
interpretations--a practice that is governed by the critical cultivation of contingent moral 
norms within the open investigation into the good life for human being. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation offers a phenomenology of that mode of self-interpretation in 
which it becomes possible for an interpreter to intentionally participate in the production 
of moral norms to which the interpreter himself or herself feels bound.  The very idea of 
such a mode of self-interpretation presupposes two prior theses.  First, it presupposes 
that moral norms are contingently produced in the constellation of ideas, practices, 
habits, institutions, and material conditions of a culture as it develops through time.  I 
will use the term “moral norms” in the standard but broad sense to indicate principles 
that guide or restrict those human activities that involve, at some level, reflective 
decision-making.  Defined in this way, the phrase “moral norms” does not merely name 
that narrow range of human behavior that is directly governed by reflective decisions, 
but rather includes the far wider range of tacit cultural patterns of meaning and practice 
that, while remaining largely unconsidered as the background conditions which enable 
and frame ordinary everyday concerns, practices, and institutions, can nevertheless be 
brought forward for moral reflection, criticism, and decision. The second presupposition 
of this mode of self-interpretation suggests that it is somehow problematic when, under 
certain conditions, human beings are able to reflect upon these largely hidden backdrop 
norms in such a way that it undermines the “force” or “claim” that they would otherwise 
exert on their own reflective decision-making.  Although I will make clear what the first 
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of these presuppositions involves, I will not here explicitly defend it.  It is a thesis rooted 
in the history of Western metaphysics and epistemology and I will rely on the 
achievements of that philosophical discourse stemming primarily from Hegel, Nietzsche 
and Heidegger to motivate and frame the central thesis of this investigation.  The second 
presupposition, however, requires a specific thematization in order to motivate the need 
for a mode of self-interpretation that makes it possible to explicitly participate in the 
production of moral norms that can, once produced, exert sufficient force to effectively 
guide our everyday decision-making.  Part One, which develops the concept of “moral 
friction,” provides an account of this problem, and serves to anticipate the need for a 
phenomenological thematization of this mode of self-interpretation, the method for 
which I developed in Part Two.  In Part Three, I define the term “improvisation” to 
indicate this mode of interpretation, and the term “improviser” to indicate the character 
who operates in this mode.   
In order to key into this peculiar mode of self-interpretation, and to show why it 
is a topic worthy of phenomenological investigation, I want to draw attention to what 
Richard Rorty, in his 1998 monograph Contingency, irony, and solidarity, calls the 
character of the “ironist.”  According to his account, this character is one who explicitly 
accepts that in the course of everyday life she must articulate her life, to herself and to 
others, in words that are ultimately grounded in what Rorty calls a “final vocabulary”; 
i.e., that vocabulary which articulates the ultimate “court of appeal” for determining 
what is worth doing, saying, what goals are worth having or achieving, and what is 
worth avoiding or condemning.  In the process of working out these normative 
judgments in the course of his or her own thoughts, intentions, and actions, which unfold 
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in relationship to the practical context of everyday judgments, the ironist effectively 
treats her own final vocabulary “as if” it had some ultimate warrant in her comportment.  
Yet what is most distinctive about the ironist is the fact that she also explicitly admits 
that no such warrant can be found to have the sort of universal or necessary legitimacy 
that her comportment suggests.   The ironist then is in the awkward position in which 
she must accept and not accept her final vocabulary.  That is, she is in the position of 
talking, thinking and acting in a way that suggests that her beliefs and judgments have 
normative warrant, while believing herself to exist in an epistemic condition that 
undermines the ultimate legitimacy of those beliefs and judgments.   
In this account, Rorty preserves the central meaning of the concept of “irony” 
that comes to us from Quintilian; i.e., a figure of speech or trope “in which something 
contrary to what is said is to be understood.” (Contrarium ei quod dicitur intelligendum 
est).1 One might be tempted to think at first gloss that this definition suggests there to be 
a sort of self-deception going on; as if the ironist talks and acts in a way that intends to 
conceal from herself or others her own “true belief.”  Yet this is clearly not what Rorty 
has in mind.  Rather, the ironist takes the stance she does primarily because she finds 
herself in the awkward position of facing a world in everyday life that demands that she 
make value judgments while at the same time that she finds herself lacking the 
epistemological recourses to ground those judgments in such a way that could secure 
them against conflicting judgments made by others.  Far from a sort of deception, the 
ironist is best thought of as one who finds herself unable to honestly endorse even her 
own deepest held values as if they had a sound foundation that she does not believe them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Institutio Oratorica 9.22.44.  Cited in Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 21, 
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in fact to have.  From the ironist point of view, irony is the only intellectually honest 
disposition to have.  
There is, nevertheless, at least one “face value” message that Rorty suggests 
ironists are likely to endorse; and it comes as a result of their own ironic attitude about 
their deepest held values. It is a message advocating the liberal embrace of institutions 
that provide the greatest degree of private freedoms; and this means embracing the sort 
of negative liberty that rationally suggests the embrace—or at least tolerance—of 
difference and diversity between oneself and others and between communities.  Only in 
such a society is the liberal ironist freed for the greatest degree of private self-
interpretation.  This rather un-ironic message can be put in the following way:  since no 
one can demonstrate that her own final vocabulary and value judgments have ultimate 
legitimacy, no one has the intellectual or moral right to impose her judgments on others 
unless doing so impinges on the negative liberty of others.  Rorty of course admits that a 
thoroughgoing ironist is not in a position to argue for a solidarity regarding the 
preferability of a liberal society—if “preferable” is meant to convey the idea that it is 
legitimated by some extra-linguistic, universal and necessary standard.  Yet he does 
think that it is the most choice-worthy for the ironist, as it provides for the least amount 
of violence and maximizes space for personal creativity.   But even if we grant that this 
un-ironic conclusion is consistent with the sort of freedom for self-expression or self-
interpretation that an ironist might seek for herself, unconstrained as it is by a belief in 
any ultimate ground for moral norms, it nevertheless leaves unexplored the 
psychological and sociological tensions that adopting such an ironist attitude involve.   
	  	  	   5	  
In order to give an indication of what I think remains unsaid in Rorty’s account 
of the ironist, it is worth first considering the structure of irony as a mere figure of 
speech.  Doing so will help make clear why a phenomenology of improvisation can 
clarify and diffuse the seemingly awkward psychological and sociological tensions—
and the seeming practical contradiction that accounts for those tensions—that lie at the 
heart of the ironist’s form of life.    
Taken as a mere feature of communication, irony always involves two meanings: 
the “face value” of what is said and the “hidden” meaning that is thought to be the real 
intention of the communication.  And yet, again, to call the intended communication 
“hidden” is not to say that irony involves a sort of deception.   On the contrary, the “real 
meaning” of the communication is “hidden” in the open, so to speak.  When speaking 
ironically, the hidden meaning is intended to shine through, albeit in a peculiar way that 
leaves the “real” meaning open to interpretation.  The essence of irony, then, consists 
not in a form of deception, but in communicating multiple meanings simultaneously 
which together produce an effect of meaning that could not be communicated otherwise.   
In irony, something like a straightforward “assertion” is held back precisely in order to 
suggest other possible interpretations in a mode of open-ended consideration that could 
not be indicated in any other way.   Irony therefore need be neither a form of deception 
nor of intentional obscurantism.  Rather, there is something in the juxtaposition of 
meanings produced in the ironic modality that exhibits what is communicated in a light 
that the un-ironic, face-value assertions of the various possible interpretations cannot.  
There is, in other words, an essential openness at the heart of irony that cannot allow the 
mind to rest in one interpretation as the “right one” or the “intended one.”  To the extent 
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that one looks at a statement solely as a means of communicating an already worked-out 
meaning, irony is likely to be seen as conveying a sense of insincerity.  But this very 
expectation that all communication aims at an earnest conveyance of well worked-out 
ideas is what covers over, I will argue, what irony might accomplish.   
 In order to develop this hidden potential in irony, I want to draw on an example 
used by Gregory Vlastos in his monograph Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 
which he uses to make a similar point to the one I intend here.  He entertains the 
response that Mae West is said to have given upon receiving President Gerald Ford’s 
invitation to a state dinner at the White house:  “It’s an awful long way to go for just one 
meal.”  As Vlastos points out, her response is indicating something like: “if you are not 
an utter fool you’ll know this isn’t my real reason.  Try guessing what that might be.”2 
Mae West is offering a sort of riddle that runs the risk of being misunderstood only if it 
is taken at face value.  But it is clear that she is making a pointed joke.  As Vlastos 
suggests, her real meaning seems to be not just humor but disinterest, if not outright 
disregard.  This is a joke that works only because one should not be deceived into 
thinking that she intends the meaning to be taken at face value.  But then what is the 
value in the irony here?  Is it merely humor?  Perhaps.  In this case, it is probably safe to 
leave the joke as simply something amusing. One would likely miss what is valuable in 
the statement, i.e., its humor, if one spent too much time inquiring into the “real 
meaning.”  But is it the case that the value in the ambiguity of irony is always humor?  I 
think not.   
 In Rorty’s account of the ironist, we seem to be left with few options other than 
to be ironic with ourselves, about what is most important to us, i.e., our ability to make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Vlastos, Socrates, 21-22. 
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evaluations of different moral ideas, practices, and concerns that both shape and 
motivate our lives.  His message, however, is not “lighten up and laugh at it all.”  And 
yet he still concludes that we cannot take our deepest held beliefs about what is worth 
doing and saying too “seriously.”  One might feel as a result that the options consist of 
either taking things too seriously or not seriously enough—and that one would be 
somehow in the wrong either way.  I want to suggest that this bifurcation is the result of 
failing to appreciate another possible value in the openness implicit in the ambiguity of 
irony: the role that irony plays in the production or transformation of both the meaning 
and value distinctions that structure our final vocabularies.   
If we expect that an ironic statement is a communication of already understood 
and intended meanings, then the ironic form of speech can only be understood as a 
statement of mockery or dissembling.  But if what we expect in the ironic 
communication is a playful space in which new meaning is produced, then irony can be 
understood as a creative movement; a sort of “play” of meaning that takes the face value 
of well understood ideas, practices, and concerns and alienates them in such a way as to 
make them accessible as “objects” of reflection.  Irony has the power to dislodge us 
from what seems obvious so that we might explicitly consider it as something to again 
get clear about.  Irony, in other words, has the ability to reveal that we are not now clear 
about what we once uncritically took to be clear and unproblematic; and thereby it opens 
up for us, often for the first time, the task of getting clear about the ideas that we usually 
have simply uncritically inherited from our tradition.  The crucial feature of this turn of 
thought is its ability to open up a playful space in which we can consider multiple 
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meanings simultaneously without committing to any one of them in advance of the 
inquiry.   
To anyone who is intent upon uncovering the “right” or “intended” meaning of a 
statement—that is, one who believes that communication consists in making one’s own 
already well-understood ideas clear to others—such free play will inevitably seem 
dishonest or frivolous; and this sense may be made more acute when it is employed in 
discourse about what is most important to us.  This is the sort of complaint that 
Thrasymachus charges against Socrates in Plato’s Republic when Socrates inquires into 
the meaning of the most basic and crucially important moral ideas held by his 
interlocutors without offering his own understanding of these ideas.    
“Heracles!” Thrasymachus exclaims in frustration. “This is Socrates’ 
habitual shamming.  I had predicted to these people that you would refuse 
to answer and would sham and would do anything but answer if the 
question were put to you.”3   
 
Thrasymachus cannot seem to fathom that one might challenge the deepest held moral 
commitments of others without a presumed “knowing for oneself” what the “right” 
answer is in advance of doing so.  The fact that Socrates denies that he has such 
knowledge seems deliberately dishonest to Thrasymachus.  To him, Socrates seems to 
be proceeding as if he knew what the “right” answer is, while simultaneously denying 
that he has such knowledge to offer; and this seems to him simply dishonest.  What 
Thrasymachus does not seem to grasp is that Socrates can engage in dialogue in order to 
come to have the right understanding.  The dialogue itself is not a speech act aimed at 
the communication of already worked out clarity, but is a speech act aimed at arriving at 
such clarity.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Plato, Republic, 337a.  Quoted in Vlastos, Socrates, 24.  
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What makes such “playful” speech about the most important matters valuable in 
the context of Plato’s Socratic dialogues is the belief that knowledge of such matters is 
indeed possible but not yet obtained, and that playing in the ambiguity will help reveal 
the truth.  But Rorty’s ironist does not have this sort of hope.  The ironist, in advance of 
this play, does not anticipate that a final answer is possible.  If there is no prior belief 
that knowledge about the most important moral determinations in life is in principle 
accessible, then it does raise a second sort of challenge:  what is the value in being ironic 
about these most basic and determinative moral beliefs if not irony’s role in the pursuit 
of knowledge?  
The course of everyday human life does seem to demand that we make value 
judgments and often these have far reaching consequences both for our own lives and 
for the lives of others.  And if one believes in advance of any inquiry into such matters 
that the conclusion regarding these judgments cannot be legitimated by some extra-
linguistic “truth” that could ultimately determine our opinions as the right ones, then 
such playful inquiry seems to produce two sorts of dispositions.  Either one tends to 
reject such inquiry as frivolous talk that makes a mockery of the most serious of matters, 
or one must embrace such inquiry for its own sake as somehow ultimately valuable (if 
for no other reason than to ward off the evils of ignorance).  The former option regards 
life as better off with a potentially unwarranted “belief,” whereas the latter embraces the 
idea that it is better to be in a perpetual state of criticisms and potential confusion than to 
uncritically believe what cannot be demonstrated to be true.  That is, one either simply 
decides what value judgments and moral norms are to be endorsed without 
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demonstrating a knowledge that they are the right judgments, or one adopt a suspicious 
attitude towards any value judgments held by oneself or others.   
What this bifurcation overlooks is the possibility that ideas can legitimately 
displace other ideas without themselves being demonstrably “true.”  But in what could 
such legitimacy consist?  I want to draw on Hegel’s idea of “sublation” here to suggest 
that new ideas can arise out of the conflict between two or more competing meanings 
and that once these new ideas become available, they render it impossible to believe in 
the “face value” of older meanings.  I will be arguing that irony provides a space of the 
“free play” of meaning that can let new understanding arise, but where the substance of 
this new understanding cannot be anticipated in advance of engaging in that playful 
inquiry.  According to the view I am advancing here, the space of free play opened in 
the structural ambiguity of irony is productive—it provides the opportunity for new 
ideas to be born that, once “alive,” reveal older ways of thinking in such a way that they 
can now only seem to have been “leading to” or “approximating” these new ideas.  The 
crucial idea here is that when these new meanings arise, it is impossible to return to the 
face value meaning of older ideas.   Thought of in this way, the ironist is not one who is 
“backed into the corner of irony,” so to speak, but one who is enabled to actively engage 
in disclosing our most precious evaluations in an open space of questionability with the 
anticipation of uncovering ways of seeing that are “better” or “more choice-worthy.”  
These new ways of seeing are not “better” because they correspond to some extra-
linguistic, atemporal, universal and necessary truths, but rather they are “better” because 
of what might be thought of as a “contingent necessity” produced by the irreversibility 
in a temporal development in meaning when new ideas press upon us in such a way that 
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they render it impossible to revert to the “face value” understanding of the older ideas 
that gave birth to them.  
Thought of in this way, we can mark out two distinct modes of being an ironist, 
one active and one passive.  Rorty spends much of his efforts in a polemic against the 
point of view of one who thinks that knowledge about moral matters is in principle 
obtainable.  As a result, the picture we get is predominantly reactive—the effort is spent 
on introducing suspicion to those, and regarding those, who uncritically and un-
ironically pursue “truth.”  What is less evident in Rorty are clues to what being an active 
ironist would practically involve.  This is the possibility I intend to clarify here. In order 
to distinguish the predominantly reactive picture of the ironist painted by Rorty from the 
form of life of an active ironist, I will call the latter an “improviser.”   
Although both are epistemological ironists, they are so for crucially different 
reasons.  I do not want merely to lay out these two ironist forms of life side by side as 
two merely possible dispositions, nor do I want to argue that one ought to be preferred 
over the other. Rather I want to argue for the stronger thesis that once fully thematized, 
the form of life of an improviser sublates that of a reactive ironist.  In order to begin 
developing this thesis, I want to give a brief account of the origins of this idea.   
This project began with the vague insight that the dynamics of musical 
improvisation might serve as an analogy by which to thematize a distinctive mode of 
self-interpretation appropriate to contemporary Western life; a mode of self-
interpretation that, despite this seeming suitability, is not presently available in the 
repertoire of familiar themes of self-understanding.  By “improvisation,” with regard to 
self-interpretation, I mean a dynamic interplay between meaningful actions in the 
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context of an incomplete understanding of the horizon of significance that makes the act 
possible, on the one hand, and the constitution and preservation of that horizon of 
significance partially accomplished by those very acts on the other.  The idea here is that 
intentional action can only be taken in relation to some horizon of meaning.  Intentional 
actions, in turn, preserve or sustain that horizon of meaning.  By the phrase “horizon of 
meaning,” I intend a more or less well-organized configuration of ideas, practices, 
institutions, and concerns that “hang together” and mutually support each other in a 
particular configuration or coherence.  If, however, the horizon of meaning is 
“incomplete,” contains internal contradictions, or is simply open to the possibility of 
revision, then every intentional action always presents the possibility that it might 
confirm the expected configuration of meaning, it might reveal some contradictions, or it 
might simply open up new possibilities of coherence that could not be anticipated prior 
to a particular event.  As a result, intentional action is charged with the possibility that it 
might either sustain or modify the horizon of meaning that motivated it.  
Understood in this way, one might expect examples of improvisational 
interpretation to be readily available; and to varying degrees, and in different 
circumstances, it is true that everybody engages in the sort of interpretation that loosely 
resembles the particular dynamic relationship between attention, time, and contextual 
reframing in terms of which I will be characterizing the improviser.   But my original 
intuition led beyond the applicability of the metaphor of improvisation as a descriptive 
tool to account for how individuals comport themselves in the face of a break-down in 
meaning within a particular horizon of meaning; rather, the intuition suggested that 
musical improvisation possessed clues to characterizing a mode of interpretation that 
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might be explicitly embraced—a disposition that characterized a mode of comportment 
that characterized the crucial feature of a form of life.  And more than being a mere 
alternative mode of interpretation that might add to the cultural repertoire, I sensed that 
there was something singularly appropriate, perhaps even necessary, about this 
improvisational mode for contemporary Western culture.    
Examples of situations that called for a whole form of life represented by the 
improviser metaphor were not so obvious however, and as a result it was not obvious 
how or even why such a normative intuition should be discharged.  While it seems 
relatively unproblematic to think of particular situations in which an improvisational 
mode could be more effective, given the motivations of the agents involved,4 it is not 
clear what could motivate adopting improvisation as a clue to a mode of interpretation 
appropriate to contemporary life in the Western world generally.  What was needed to 
sound out this intuition was some definite problem unique to contemporary Western life 
to which an improvisational mode of interpretation might be generally applicable.  A 
problem, in other words, which could serve as a frame, not only to motivate the 
investigation, but also to guide and structure its thematization.   What I had at the outset 
then, in effect, was an intuition regarding a solution that was in need of a well-
articulated problem.     
The relevant “problem” became apparent quite independently in the course of 
reflecting on Richard Rorty’s notion of the “ironist.”   Here again I had an intuition that 
there was something practically problematic about the form of life that Rorty was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For example, a situation in which there is no adequate precedence to guide interpretation in the face of 
an unanticipated event in the course of an expected ordered temporal sequence such as a musical score, a 
narrative, or a building plan—or, more concretely, such as when one is faced with the task of building, 
say, a wooden desk without the proper tools and is thus put in a position of “seeing” other tools not 
intended for the task at hand in new ways that render them as resource for accomplishing the task. 
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advocating.   I agree with Rorty that the history of metaphysics has left us with the 
epistemic situation that produces the ironist’s form of life, a condition that seems 
unavoidable given the condition of knowledge in the contemporary Western world.  I 
concur with Rorty’s strong claim that when properly understood, intellectual honesty 
would draw any thinker into the basic condition that underwrites the ironist orientation; 
or to put it in another way, the claim that whether one runs into that condition willingly 
or reluctantly fights against it, the condition involves a sort of “gravity” from which it is 
very difficult to escape once one fully appreciates the intellectual and cultural forces that 
produced it.   Thought of in this way, the character of the “ironist” is not a disposition to 
be argued for—it is not the way we ought to live—but rather it names a form of life 
from which it is seemingly impossible to escape.  It is not a matter of being “right,” but a 
matter of being unable to return to a previous form of thinking.  The condition has the 
character of the relationship between the “experienced” and the “naïve” points of view.  
Whether one enjoys or regrets the “experienced” position, it is impossible to 
unproblematically return to the naïve position.  Whichever the case, however, there is 
something incoherent in the form of life that expresses an explicit appreciation of this 
condition.  I will argue in Part One that it is extraordinarily difficult to sustain an ironist 
form of life; difficult, that is, not only from a personal point of view, but also with 
regard to the sustainability of a culture as a whole.    
In order to thematize what is problematic in the Ironist’s form of life, I will 
introduce the concept of “moral friction.”  This notion is intended to name the practical 
contradiction that results from the explicit recognition that one’s own vocabulary, 
values, and practices are the product of historical contingency on the one hand, and the 
	  	  	   15	  
necessity, on the other hand, of presupposing the normative weight implicit in these 
values and practices as they are used in the course of navigating everyday situations.  
This “practical contradiction” can be thematized phenomenologically by drawing 
attention to experiences that are ordinarily addressed by disciplines such as psychology 
and sociology.5  In the course of thematizing moral friction, however, it quickly became 
clear that the familiar psychological and sociological vocabulary that we commonly 
employ to discuss the relevant human phenomena are systematically inadequate to the 
task of properly identifying moral friction.   These inadequacies are due to the 
ontological and epistemological presuppositions built into the vocabulary of the human 
sciences, a vocabulary that produces both (1) a sharp distinction between morally neutral 
empirical descriptions and normative moral descriptions, and (2) a sharp distinction 
between “inner” psychological phenomena and “outer” sociological phenomena.   The 
thematization of moral friction required an ontological and methodological shift even 
before the phenomenon can be properly indicated.  Yet once these conceptual 
difficulties are neutralized, a clear connection can be made between the ironist form of 
life and phenomena such as depression (a traditionally “inner” phenomenon) and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For my propose, I will use the terms “psychology” and “sociology” in the simple sense of dividing the 
human sciences into accounts devoted to illuminating “inner” vs. “outer” human phenomena.   This 
distinction, although it has some historical basis, is a crude characterization given the rich theoretical 
complexity within the self-understanding of these disciplines. Moreover, characterizing the division 
between these two topics according to “inner” and “outer” phenomena also fails to capture the diverse 
approaches offered by other disciplines within the human sciences (e.g., history, literature, anthropology, 
etc.).  My intention in drawing this distinction, however, will be to show how the division itself tends to 
pre-categorize phenomena as falling either into a domain appropriate to one or the other; and this 
categorization, predicated as it is upon ontological presuppositions, covers over the possibility of making a 
connection between familiar problematic phenomena and the cultural and epistemic conditions that lead to 
an ironist’s form of life.  As a result, in order to thematize moral friction phenomenologically, this 
ontological presupposition must be diffused such that familiar phenomena can be observed as instances of 
moral friction.  For this purpose, this simplification regarding the sciences of psychology and sociology is 
rhetorically useful in order to capture this basic division.   
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loss of the depth and complexity of social roles (traditionally “outer” phenomenon such 
as, for example, “friendship,” “marriage,” “citizenship,” or “professionalism).   
This conclusion, once supported phenomenologically, provides the occasion for 
introducing improvisation as a form of life appropriate to the contemporary Western 
condition.   The dynamics of improvisation, in other words, provides a clue to a form of 
life that does not fall prey to the practical contradiction—moral friction—that is 
characteristic of the ironist’s form of life.  Yet even if improvisation can be shown to be 
a form of life distinct from that of the ironist’s, it is nevertheless not enough for my 
purposes to demonstrate that improvisation is merely a potentially preferable alternative.  
I intend to defend the stronger claim that once properly understood, not only is the 
improviser a form of life distinct from that of the ironist, it also names a transformation 
that, once occurring, makes it impossible to return to a reactive ironist point of view.  
Although, as suggested above, the character I will be calling the “improviser” utilizes 
the peculiar semantic relationships of irony, the aim of this utilization is fundamentally 
different from that of the ironist.  The ironist largely aims to escape the confines of the 
illegitimate claim of moral norms—or, in another way that I will be arguing below, aims 
to escape uncertainty by rejecting the need for rationally justifying moral norms while 
nevertheless embracing them.  The improviser, in contrast, seeks to participate in the 
production of new norms that have binding force.   
In order to defend these claims, I will introduce in Part Two a method of inquiry 
called “moral phenomenology.” This notion draws a connection between hermeneutic 
phenomenology and Hegel’s notion of “sublation,” and is intended to characterize an 
active inquiry into the availability of novel interpretations that can dissolve the 
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contradictions that provide occasion for the hermeneutic itself.  When applied at the 
most general level, this methodology undercuts the practical contradictions within the 
ironist form of life that lead to moral friction.  A simple example can illustrate the 
central idea.   
The reinterpretation of what it is to be in a marriage after a practical 
contradiction has arisen in the course of a particular life can provide the context under 
which the older meaning of marriage looks “naïve.”  One may understand perfectly well 
what one once understood marriage to be, but given an interpretation that dissolves a 
practical contradiction while preserving other essential features of the practice, it 
becomes impossible to unproblematically embrace the “naive” meaning.  The new 
meaning might yet still be recognizably incomplete, but what is essential here is that the 
new meaning is more coherent then the previous meaning.  Moreover, once one begins 
to understand this novel meaning in relation to other social roles, practices, and ideas, 
and begins to modify these to accommodate the new meaning of marriage, the older 
meaning of “marriage” increasingly diverges from what now seems like “common 
sense.”  Eventually, the “problem” or contradiction that gave rise to the new meaning 
begins to fade to such a degree that it is hard to “feel” the weightiness that “motivated” 
or “occasioned” the birth of the contemporary meaning.  Crucially important to notice in 
this process is the normative transformations that accompany the transition from the old 
to the new meaning.  When the meaning of “marriage” changes, so too does the 
normative claims it makes on us when we self-identify as “being married.”  I use the 
phrase “moral phenomenology” to capture both the ontological development in what it is 
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to “be married” and the normative development regarding how someone who is married 
understands that he or she “ought act.”   
To say that moral phenomenology is an “active inquiry” is to differentiate it from 
the passive participation in the historical development of cultural meanings and 
practices.  It is this “active” or “intentional” participation that marks the crucial 
difference between the ironist and the improviser.   It is one thing to let the meaning of 
particular social roles and practices more or less passively develop through one’s own 
life experiences, it is another to attentively embrace the task of doing so.  For reasons 
that will be developed in detail in Part One, the ironist is not in a position to take this 
active stance toward the development of meaning, and “moral friction” names the 
contradiction that accompanies this lack of ability.   
Moral phenomenology plays the dual role of revealing both how the resolution of 
moral friction in the improviser’s form of life makes it impossible to uncritically return 
to that of a reactive form of ironist life as well as provides a formal account of the sort of 
necessity involved in the dynamics of improvisational interpretation itself.  It is for this 
reason that the notion of “moral phenomenology” is worth developing systematically 
wherein the relationship between the ironist and the improviser is a special case.  By 
developing moral phenomenology as an independent mode of inquiry it can then be 
deployed simultaneously as the method of this investigation and as a formal account of 
the structural relationships of necessity within the temporal unfolding of the 
improvisational hermeneutics of self that work to produce the historical forms of moral 
advance appropriate to the contemporary Western condition.  
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The concept of “improvisation,” as I intend to employ it, can initially be 
understood as a mode of comportment in which one intentionally takes responsibility for 
the development of the implicit normative moral claims that emerge from the dynamitic 
interaction between various social roles, practices, ideas and concerns which, taken 
together in any particular situation, compose the whole of one’s own self-understanding.  
Two key movements mark this particular form of self-interpretation.  First, it requires 
attentive listening for (or readiness for) dissonant events within otherwise familiar 
situations—a dissonance that upon reflection can be resolved into conceptual 
contradiction.  It is the disposition of irony that allows us to entertain the schism that 
gives rise to multiple interpretations without committing to one of them prior to the 
investigation.  And second, this form of self-interpretation is accomplished by actively 
looking for and recognizing new interpretations that reframe the context of significance 
in which the interpretive situation is enveloped; and in such a way as to simultaneously 
dissolve and appropriate the contradiction.   An improviser then, refers to one who is 
disposed to intentionally attend to ambiguous occurrences in the course of a particular 
instance of familiar sorts of situations, and to see them as opportunities for reframing the 
meaning of the situation in general. 
Once improvisation is taken up as a form of life, the relationship between the 
improviser and the ironist can be seen to mirror the kind of irreversible transition that 
exists between the form of life of the ironist and what Rorty calls the “metaphysician;” 
where this latter term indicates one who believes in advance of the investigation that an 
ultimate and epistemologically warranted truth can be found for moral judgments.  
Again, the idea here is that one need not argue that it is “right” to be an “ironist” and that 
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one ought to embrace all that that form of life entails, but rather, one simply needs to 
show that it is no longer possible to be a metaphysician in the old ways of being so.  In 
the same way, the form of life of an improviser that I am proposing renders the form of 
life of an ironist no longer appropriate.   
It is of course always possible to transform the meaning of “metaphysician,” or 
“ironist”—just as it is possible to transform the meaning of “marriage”—in order to 
preserve continuity with the past; but this runs the risk of covering over the sort of 
profound transformations of meaning that have occurred.  On the other hand, 
introducing new vocabulary runs the risk of suggesting that there is no essential 
relationship to the past; both results are misleading.  What is crucial, then, is to track the 
shifts as best as one can in order to keep in view the sort of activity one is engaged in 
when actively taking up the improvisational form of life.   
The improviser always “improvises” with something received.  In the case of 
self-interpretation it is with traditional or received ideas, practices and concerns and the 
particular place within that constellation that one occupies.  Some dimensions may be 
highly relevant to one’s positioning within the cultural horizon of meaning (e.g., gender, 
skin color, socio-economic class) and others far less so (e.g., eye color, tastes)—
although it is telling to note that almost no points of noticeable difference are devoid of 
any meaning.   
Seeing the task of the improviser in this light, it becomes clear that the 
improviser can fail in either of two ways.  One misstep would be to resolve upon a 
particular interpretation as if it could never be developed any further, and the other 
would be to think that one could make a radical break with the past and start as if from 
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nothing.  In this same way, the heart of my argument lies in the strong claim that once 
one understands what is entailed in being an “improviser” it is no longer possible to 
return to and sustain the sort of passivity of a reactive ironist entanglement with the 
inadequacies of older, more “metaphysical,” ideas, practices, and concerns of Western 
thinking.  If the argument is successful, what is right not only about the ironist’s 
position, but also that of the metaphysician, are preserved and transformed.  And yet at 
the same time, what is practically contradictory about the ironist’s form of life—what I 
am calling “moral friction”—is defused and transcended.  
Part Three begins with “clues” to the phenomenon of moral friction, which both 
retrodictively confirms the thematization of “moral friction” and anticipates the 
sublation of this core problematical feature of the ironist form of life in the form of life 
of the improviser.  In other words, these clues accomplish this sublation from two 
distinct directions: (a) from the direction of what we already find problematic in familiar 
phenomena that are reinterpreted under the theme of moral friction, and (b) from the 
direction of how this tension can be resolved via the theme of improvisation.   
Part Three concludes with an account of the central temporal dynamics of what I 
will call an “improvisational hermeneutics.”  To accomplish this, I will utilize a 
selective phenomenology of musical improvisation in order to isolate the distinctive 
structural features of its temporal orientation.  When the dynamics of this phenomenon 
are applied to the movement of self-interpretation, it provides a powerful analogy by 
which to characterize a form of life that dissolves moral friction while simultaneously 
preserving the open creative and critical space of irony.   
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Part One  |  Moral Friction 
 
The aim of this first of three parts is to indicate and thematize a phenomenon that 
I will identify with the phrase “moral friction.”  The concept is intended to capture a 
practical contradiction within the form of life characteristic of late modernity and is 
intended to prepare the ground, by way of providing the necessary ideas and tensions, 
for disclosing a form of life that defuses and transforms what is practically problematic 
in the phenomenon of moral friction.  The form of life that I have in mind, the disclosure 
of which constitutes the ultimate aim of this project, cannot be thematized without a 
prior hermeneutic of more familiar themes.  My intention here is to provide a conceptual 
bridge from these more familiar discourses to the primary topic in such a way as to at 
once motivate and anticipate the characterization of the from of life I will call the 
“improviser.”  
A first approximation of what the phrase “moral friction” is intended to indicate 
would be to say that it names a phenomenon in which situations as such “lose energy”; 
or in another way, that it names how it is that situations in general can involve a 
“diminishing enthusiasm or passion”; or, in yet another way, that it points to the fact that 
situations might simply become “uninteresting.”  Just as some instances of a particular 
sort of situation might “capture one’s attention” or “keep one’s interest,” and yet not in 
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other cases, I want to suggest that under certain conditions, “situations” as such can 
exhibit a generalized loss of energy, a diminishing enthusiasm, or a loss of interest.   
This is a coarse and vague description; but it is necessarily so. Even the 
phenomenological clues that I mean to draw attention to cannot be directly indicated 
utilizing familiar concepts from much of contemporary philosophical discourse. This is 
so because these discourses tend to involve certain basic metaphysical presuppositions 
built into the every language that governs the way we talk about the relevant phenomena 
that correspond to this rough description, and these presuppositions work, by virtue of 
these prior epistemological and ontological commitments, to conceal moral friction.  
Specifically, such phenomena are usually approached empirically by the human sciences 
as either psychological or sociological events.  Both approaches build in a similar set of 
prejudices regarding how we see the relevant phenomena prior to any actual 
investigation.  The situation can perhaps best be illustrated by analogy; and it is worth 
beginning with an elaboration of this analogy even before an initial exposition of the 
meaning of moral friction.  Doing so has the advantage of signaling how the concept is 
to be understood in contrast to more familiar ideas and methods that must be drawn 
upon in the task of sounding out this provisional indication of moral friction.   
 
§1.1 | The Difficulty of Indicating Moral Friction 
Since the concept of “moral friction” names a phenomenon, it is natural to 
suppose that the first task of making the concept clear ought begin by simply indicating 
instances of the phenomenon.  The difficulty that arises even before this most basic step, 
however, is not unlike the difficulties one might encounter in an attempt to show an 
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instance of electromagnetism to—let us suppose—a well educated scholar who has 
neither encountered the concept nor any related subordinate concepts.  No matter how 
acute, such a scholar would simply lack the necessary conceptual framework to notice 
the relevant array of very different “looking” phenomena as instances of 
electromagnetism prior to mastering a range of new concepts, relations, and questions.  
Only after this new conceptual framework has become available to the scholar would it 
be possible to see familiar phenomenon such as lightning, the interaction of lodestone 
and iron, and visible light as instances of the same kind of phenomena.   
What is worse however is that such a scholar is unlikely even to be in a position 
to consider that there is something lacking in the basic commonsense understanding of 
the phenomena that she already possesses—at least not lacking in such a way that the 
sudden availability of the theory of classical electromagnetism might somehow 
illuminate the misgivings that she does happen to harbor in regards to these phenomena.  
In other words, because a very specific set of questions need to be asked in order to 
arrive at the theory of classical electromagnetism, a scholar not troubled by this specific 
set of questions is unlikely even to have the requisite concerns that could serve to 
motivate a consideration of the theory; and this is so precisely because it is an answer to 
a problem that she is not yet in a position to enquire about.  Indicating the phenomenon 
of moral friction is not unlike the above example in that it involves the awkward 
communication that results from attempting to develop an “answer” for an audience that 
has not yet been troubled by the relevant form of the “question.”    To anyone who has 
not yet framed the “question” in this novel form, such an “answer” would undoubtedly 
seem puzzling and unnecessary at first glance.  Much must be said in order to make the 
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concept of “moral friction” familiar, not only before its adequacy can be evaluated, but 
even before a good reason can be given for its consideration.   
To extend this analogy a bit further, like with electromagnetism, instances of 
moral friction are readily available once properly thematized,  However, just as in the 
attempt to indicate instances of electromagnetism before the proper conceptual 
frameworks and concerns are available, simply enumerating familiar phenomena that are 
to be re-described as instances of moral friction will do little to illuminate the concept 
itself or motivate a consideration of it; e.g., it is of no help whatsoever to simply point to 
lightning, to the movement of a lodestone compass, or to sunlight in order to indicate 
instances of electromagnetism prior to knowing anything about the problem space in 
which the theory of classical electromagnetism moves.  What is needed first of all is a 
method that at once transforms what are initially seen to be very different sorts of 
phenomena into a single unified phenomenon in such a way that it also carries with it the 
motivation to carry the investigation through.     
And yet, just as it would be necessary to baldly insist upon an initially opaque 
relationship between very different familiar phenomena in order to indicate “the place to 
look for” electromagnetic phenomena, the indication and thematization of moral friction 
must include some provisional bearings within a range of familiar ideas and concerns.  
That is, the indication of moral friction must begin with a provisional set of recognizable 
phenomena that can serve to mark-out the basic terrain in which moral friction is to be 
thematized.  
Although there are a number of familiar phenomena that correspond to the vague 
description “a generalized loss of interest, diminishing enthusiasm, or loss of energy” 
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(the most familiar of which is undoubtedly the phenomenon understood by the 
psychological concept of “depression”) these phenomena have traditionally been 
accounted for in the terms that are native to theoretically distinct and often incompatible 
lines of inquiry (e.g., by psychology, sociology, moral theory, political science, etc.).  
The epistemological barriers that separate these disciplines, and most importantly, the 
ontological presuppositions that determine their proper subject matter, have had the 
effect of covering over any opportunity for understanding this particular sort of 
“generalized loss of energy in all situations” as an aspect of a single unified 
phenomenon.   
 
§1.1.2  |  How Moral Friction is Ontologically Obscured 
By saying that moral friction is a “unified phenomenon,” I mean to say that there 
is a description under which it is possible to express both inner psychological states and 
outer sociological relations as aspects of one sort of phenomenon; aspects, that is, that 
are conceptually interdependent rather than empirically interdependent.  Empirically 
dependent relations between phenomena—such as causal relations—always involve a 
multiplicity of distinct “things” that stand as the relata of a relation.  Conceptually 
dependent aspects of a phenomenon, on the other hand, are analyzed components of a 
single sort of phenomenon.  In other words, an account of a phenomenon—a 
phenomenology—aims at disclosing what are initially hidden aspects of a single sort of 
phenomenon.  What is revealed in the phenomenology cannot be understood as the 
initially concealed parts standing in a causal relationship to each other in such a way that 
they “add up” to a phenomenon at a greater level of abstraction.  It is not the kind of 
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investigation that seeks to reduce some whole to the component parts and the relations 
that stand between them, which together, once made plain, compose and explain the 
interactions of parts that compose the whole.  To say that moral friction is a unified 
phenomenon, then, is not to say that there is some “whole” that has somehow been 
“missed” or “obscured” in the past because we have only been focusing on the parts; as 
if there were some possible “whole” that had both inner psychological parts and outer 
sociological parts.  Rather, I want to argue that the very distinction between inner and 
outer is precisely what has made the phenomenon inaccessible for thematization.   
In the current investigation, the task is to show how a particular phenomenon—
moral friction—has been hidden by the dominant ontological biases of the Western 
tradition.   It is “hidden,” that is, by the tradition’s tendency to explicate the ordinary 
ways in which moral friction does show up to us by imposing—prior to the concept 
which picks out and frames a phenomenon and prior to any actual subsequent 
investigation—two ontological classes into which the relevant phenomena are sorted.  
Once so sorted, those phenomena are at best only causally related (as if to say that some 
aspects of psychological states are caused by sociological phenomena and vice versa).  
When this ontological bias is removed, however, what initially looked like two separate 
kinds of causally related phenomena is now revealed as two aspects of one phenomenon.  
Analogously, just as with the example of lighting and the movement of a lodestone 
compass, the unified phenomenon of electromagnetism is obscured or hidden so long as 
one clings to the “fact” that one is an electrical phenomenon and the other a magnetic 
phenomenon (and the fact that the movement of a compass is affected during a 
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lightening storm is a mere causal curiosity yet to be explained).6   This analogy works to 
outline the basic move that I want to make.  Nevertheless, it is also limited because the 
ontological bias that obscures moral friction is far deeper than the prejudices that 
obscures scientific theories.  
It is the very ontological division between “subjects of knowing” and “objects of 
knowledge”—the characteristic ontological framework in the Western intellectual 
tradition since Descartes—that obscures moral friction.  Given the ontological 
presuppositions of the human sciences, and to the extent that psychological and 
sociological phenomena mark a distinction between subject matter relating to “inner 
mental states” and “outer social relations,” these sciences are not capable of unifying 
psychological and sociological aspects of a single phenomenon.  The phenomenon I am 
calling moral fiction demands just such unification.  To the extent that an investigation 
begins as an empirical psychological or sociological inquiry, then, the ontological 
presuppositions concerning the being of the subject matter of these sciences (i.e., human 
beings) render the phenomenon of moral friction inaccessible from the start.  
 
§1.1.3  |  How Moral Friction is Epistemically Obscured 
There is a second problem with the approach taken by the human sciences that 
covers over moral friction; and it lies in the nature of empirical investigation itself.  One 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Again, by analogy, if like Newton one presumes that “space,” “time,” “body,” and “force” are the basic 
concepts that articulate the ontology of all physical phenomena—a presupposition that inclines one to 
understand light as discrete entities possessed of kinetic energy, a finite velocity, and a linear trajectory—
an inquiry into the nature of light is unlikely to reveal any underlying identity between magnetism and 
optics.  Rather, noticing such an identity, historically, required something of a “gestalt shift” whereby 
optical phenomena come to be understood in terms of waves.  Only in virtue of this alternative view was it 
possible for James Clark Maxwell to be in the position to notice the fact that the propagation of an 
electromagnetic wave was approximately the same as the speed of light—a fact that could not be 
reasonably dismissed as coincidence. 
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of the hallmarks of modern science is its epistemic division between normative moral 
claims and empirical factual claims.  The third-personal “objective” frame of reference 
of empirical investigation conveys no normative moral force.  This means that third-
personal empirical descriptions cannot in principle provide normative conditions that 
guide willful or deliberative human activity.  The empirical descriptions of phenomena 
by the human sciences, as part of the modern scientific project generally, intentionally 
exclude normative moral content.  On this view, simply concluding something is the 
case about some human phenomenon from a third-personal point of view does not 
inform the one making the judgment how they or others ought subsequently to act in 
light of the judgment.  One would have to add the idea of an “ought” to a purely third 
personal empirical descriptive claim (a description that is composed of “facts”) and this 
subsequent addition is understood as a merely first personal value judgment. The 
concept of moral friction that I want to develop here, in contrast, is a third personal 
description that carries morally normative content.  Moral friction names a condition in 
which situations as such, and not individuals or particular situations, “lose energy or 
vitality” or become “uninteresting.”  A concept like “uninteresting” is not value free.  To 
say that a situation as such can become uninteresting is to give a third personal (the 
situation itself is uninteresting, not my idiosyncratic perception of it) descriptive claim 
which is value laden.  It is, what Bernard Williams calls a “thick concept.”  
One way to make this idea more clear is to see how Williams’ notion of a “thick 
concept” corresponds to what I called above, a “morally normative description.”  The 
latter phrase indicates descriptions that carry the evaluative content that governs a field 
of possible reflective judgments that yield deliberative actions—a description, in other 
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words, that construes a situation in such a way that one might reflect upon it, deliberate 
about possible alternatives, and decide upon a course of action.  “Thick concepts”, to use 
Williams’ own way of putting things, are notions such as: 
…treachery and promise and brutality and courage, which seem to 
express a union of fact and value. The way these notions are applied is 
determined by what the world is like (for instance, by how someone has 
behaved), and yet, at the same time, their application usually involves a 
certain valuation of the situation, of persons or actions.  Moreover, they 
usually (though not necessarily directly) provide reasons for action…It is 
essential to this account that the specific or “thick” character of these 
terms is given in the descriptive element.  The value part is expressed 
[only] under analysis, by the all-purpose term ought.7  
 
Morally normative descriptions of situations given in the first person are unproblematic.  
It is uncontroversial to assume that first personal deliberative action is motivated by a 
value-laden understanding of a situation (an understanding which could in principle be 
made explicit with a morally normative description) and that those motivations can be 
expressed in terms of value distinctions imbedded within that understanding.  It is 
unproblematic, that is, because the “ought” is thought to be supplied by the subject and 
so caries no legitimate “objective” normative weight.8   
Modern empirical science, including the human sciences, utilizes a third personal 
grammar in the account of phenomena (or it translates first person accounts into third 
personal generalizations) that strips out the valorized language that could present the 
situation in terms that mark out the value distinctions within the situation that could 
provide the opportunity for exercising reflective choice.  A claim like “she did such and 
such” can be part of a third personal empirical description, but a claim like “she ought 
not to have done such and such” cannot.  As a result of this distinction, for example, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 129-130. 
8 See Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 2002 
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employment of the value neutral vocabulary native to empirical science as a normative 
source in first personal deliberative activity always runs the risk of distorting the 
experience by committing the naturalistic fallacy.  It does so precisely because it tries to 
justify first personal choice (and the value distinctions that make that choice possible) by 
reference to third personal descriptions that are taken to be “true” or “right” or to 
“accurately reflect the world.”    
Nevertheless, reflective deliberative actions require that there be some normative 
components in the explicit understanding of a particular situation.  If one was to strip 
away any legitimate source for a normative component, the “action” can only be 
described via a value neutral third personal empirical description.  For example, the 
phrase “Benjamin is sailing,” when understood as an empirical description, is of no help 
whatsoever for informing me what I ought to be doing when sailing.  I go beyond the 
empirical description if I say, “because I am sailing, I ought try to catch the wind.” Or 
worse, if I say: because it is a beautiful day, I ought go sailing.  Because the third 
personal descriptions of empirical science carry no such normative force, they cannot 
properly account for the first personal experience of taking action.  In contrast, if I say, 
“I go to the beach,” then I am saying that I have chosen this course of action.9  Implicit 
in that statement is the possibility that I could have done something other than go to the 
beach.  Because I have chosen to go to the beach, I must understand my choices in terms 
of contrasting values.  That is, to the extent that it was a choice, I must—at least in 
principle—be able to give some reason why I have gone the beach instead of, say, out on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 First personal grammar that is phrased as an active voice always implies choice.  However, when using 
the passive voice, it is possible to phrase first personal statements that do not imply choice.  I can say, for 
example, that “my heart beats,” but I cannot say “I beat my heart.”  For the purposes of this analysis, when 
I refer to “first personal grammar” I will always assume an active voice.   
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a sailboat.  I must be able to say, in other words, that under the circumstances it is better 
to go to the beach.10   If the same event was described from a third person point of view 
in value neutral empirical terms, no such normative component is required to understand 
the description.  The phrase, “he goes to the beach” does not imply that in going to the 
beach I have chosen it.  I could, after all, have been asleep when I was taken to the 
beach.    
This distinction between the first personal deliberative vantage point and the 
third personal empirical vantage point is a familiar one.  Unlike G. E. Moore’s 
conception of the naturalistic fallacy, however, a notion that cuts between empirical and 
moral inquiries, the concept of “moral friction” might be said to cut across this 
epistemological divide.  As such, it is precisely the epistemological prejudice, which is 
neatly captured in the idea of the “naturalistic fallacy,” that makes moral friction initially 
inaccessible.    
Now that these obscuring presuppositions have been roughly sketched out, I want 
to provide a provisional indication of the problem of moral friction in order to provide 
the basic “bearings” of the exposition before elaborating further on how both these 
presuppositions obscures moral friction.  I call this account “provisional” because it 
must employ the very deceptive language that obscures moral friction.  To achieve this 
interim or transitional account, I want to draw attention to what can initially be thought 
of as three interdependent dimensions of moral friction:  an epistemological element 
concerning the legitimacy of moral judgments or evaluations, a sociological element 
regarding the public meaning of social roles (an “outer” or “public” dimension), and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 A truly capricious “act” is no more an action—a product of deliberation—then a physical reflex is an 
action.   
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psychological element concerning first personal experience of taking over these social 
roles (“inner” or “private” dimension).   
 
§1.2 | The Moral/Epistemic Dimension 
The moral/epistemic axis of this provisional account of moral friction concerns 
the conditions under which it becomes impossible to experience making what Charles 
Taylor has called “strong evaluations” in such a way that the result of the evaluation 
makes an unavoidable first personal normative claim on one’s own willful activity.   
That is, it names a way of thinking in which it becomes impossible to experience those 
standards of moral evaluation that enable discriminations between “right or wrong, 
better or worse, higher or lower,” etc., as making a claim on one’s own moral judgment 
and will; a claim, that is, which must either be heeded, rebuked, or strategically avoided, 
but which it is impossible to ignore.  The kind of evaluations that Taylor intends to 
indicate by the phrase “strong evaluations” are those, as he puts it, “which are not 
rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent 
of these and offer standards by which they can be judged.”11  These are evaluations that 
have “normative force.”  They are claims that take the form of an imperative—“I must 
do this because it is right,” or “you must live this way because it is better to do so,” or, 
in another way, assertions like, “that is a lower form of life that I ought not to peruse.”   
One way to understand why it might become impossible to feel the imperative 
implicit in strong evaluations is to consider situations in which the “normative question” 
(why ought I be moral?) exerts a force on just those occasions when a strong evaluation 
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Taylor, Sources of the Self, 4.	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might have otherwise unreflectively exerted its normative force.  Situations, in other 
words, in which the question, “what justifies the claims that morality makes on [me],”12 
arises in just those instances when one would otherwise simply “feel” the force of a 
moral imperative—one in which that force is expressed via the strong evaluation itself.   
If I were to find myself in a situation in which I am inclined to lie, but yet at the 
same moment also inclined to think that it would be wrong to do so, I might respond to 
the situation in one of three ways.  I might respond to the conflict by reflectively 
endorsing the strong evaluation that “it is wrong to lie” and subsequently act in accord 
with that judgment. Alternatively, I might also respond—either explicitly or implicitly—
by doubting the validity of this particular moral inclination (that it is “wrong to lie in this 
situation”); and passing though this doubt, conclude that either it is permissible to lie in 
general, or that it is permissible to lie in this particular case.  Either way the doubt is 
concerning assertions regarding which occasions or under what conditions it is wrong to 
lie. The resolution of this doubt, whatever it may be or however it is achieved, itself 
constitutes a strong evaluation and assumes the implicit force of that evaluation.   
A third way in which I might respond involves a more universal doubt 
concerning the validity of the kind of claim I would be endorsing if I were to come to 
any conclusion regarding the appropriateness of a lie in any given situation.   In other 
words, I might both be inclined to think that in general there is something wrong about 
lying, agree with this intuition upon reflection and, moreover, I might find no good 
reason why a given situation might warrant a justifiable exception to this rule, and yet, I 
may nonetheless be hesitant to endorse this evaluation because of the kind of evaluation 
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 Korsgaard, Sources of Normatively, 9-10.  Korsgaard’s emphasis.	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it is.  I might hesitate precisely because I harbor misgivings about endorsing the 
normative force implicit in a strong evaluation as such.  It is just this sort of “misgiving” 
that amounts to the kind of explicit doubt that motivates the “normative question.”  The 
question as to why ought I to heed the normative force implicit in a strong evaluation 
just amounts to—when made explicit and generalized—the question, “why ought I be 
moral?”   The first person experience of doubt at this level involves a kind of 
“hesitation” or “break” in the continuity of the otherwise smooth flow from our moral 
intuition, to the explicit critical assessment of that intuition, to finally a considered 
evaluation and subsequent action.  
However, it is reasonable to protest that any such practical “hesitation” which 
manifests as the result of such a doubt is only a possible “psychological” result of what 
is strictly speaking a purely epistemological issue.  The question “what justifies the 
claims that morality makes on me” is only contingently related, the objection might go, 
to any psychological effects it might or might not have.   One can imagine, of course, 
entertaining the normative question in “controlled academic settings” and yet 
experiencing no corresponding “hesitation” when it comes to actually making strong 
evaluations in the course of everyday life.  The situation is different, however, if we add 
to this state of affairs the considered conclusion that the normative question cannot, in 
principle, have a decisive answer.  
If we are under the presumption that the normative question cannot be answered 
(setting aside for the moment the question of whether or not this presumption is 
justified), if we presume, that is, that there is no compelling reason to be moral 
regardless of the particular moral intuitions or ideas one happens to have—which 
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amounts to saying that there is no good reason to heed the force implicit in the strong 
evaluations I find myself inclined to make—then the very idea of thinking about 
evaluation in “strong evaluative terms” begins to look wrong-headed.  What is left, for 
all practical purposes, are evaluations based on non-normative claims such as “tastes,” 
“feelings,” or “inclinations”; i.e., what in Taylor’s terminology are “weak evaluations.”   
Rorty’s notion of the “ironist” is helpful here in getting clear about what a life 
governed by such a conclusion regarding the normative question might look like, and it 
can serve as a kind of shorthand to indicate that form of thinking that developed after the 
historical transformation which Nietzsche thematized as that historical “moment” in 
which it became possible to articulate a natural and social order without reference to an 
absolute (God, nature, history, etc.)—an absolute, that is, that could ground and motivate 
the normative force in a strong evaluation.  But more than this, it also helps clarify the 
form of life that emerges in that historical moment when it became possible to entertain 
the idea that even the vocabulary in which we articulate our deepest ethical and 
metaphysical commitments—an idea Rorty captures in the notion of a “final 
vocabulary”—might be inextricably confined to the historically contingent constellation 
of ideas, practices, and concerns of the particular people we happen to find ourselves 
with.  If it is the case that our final vocabularies, and the commitments that they 
articulate, are at the deepest level radically historically contingent—that they are 
constrained by the horizon of a particular cultural context—then it becomes impossible 
to give a metaphysically grounded answer to the normative question.  
The idea here is that human beings always make evaluations in the terms of some 
final vocabulary or other, and because we cannot get outside our final vocabulary in 
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order to legitimate it (and delegitimize others) via a comparison with an extralinguistic, 
non-contextualized, and atemporal standard, the only intellectually responsible attitude 
to take in relation to one’s own final vocabulary is an ironic one.  In accord with this 
attitude, Rorty articulates the character of one who takes the effects of this 
historicization of final vocabularies seriously in this way:  
…an “ironist” is someone who fulfills three conditions: (1) She has radical and 
continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has 
been impressed by other vocabularies… (2) she realizes that argument phrases in 
her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) 
insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her 
vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not 
herself.  Ironists, who are inclined to philosophize see the choice between 
vocabularies as made neither within a neutral and universal metavocabulary nor 
by an attempt to fight one’s way past appearances to the real, but simply by 
playing the new off against the old.13 
  
Understood in this way, it becomes clear how it is that one might reasonably become 
skeptical about the legitimacy of strong evaluations as such.  From the vantage point of 
the ironist, the question of how one is to interpret or respond to the force that strong 
evaluations make on us is far from clear.  Given that criteria of moral judgment and 
evaluation are always articulated in some final vocabulary or other, if vocabularies are 
historically contingent, then any given moral theory will itself only ever have a finite 
relevance for the range of concerns and intuitions of a particular historical people.   The 
ironist cannot get sufficiently outside her final vocabulary to legitimate it.   
Occupying this “in between” position (in between a particular culturally 
contingent inheritance and the explicit recognition of that contingency) makes it possible 
for one both to fully understand what weight a strong evaluation is supposed to exert 
given a proper understanding of it’s meaning within one’s own final vocabulary and yet 	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Rorty, Richard. Contingency, irony, and solidarity, 73.	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to not feel the imperative that that meaning is clearly supposed to exert.  In other words, 
for the ironist, a gap exists between understanding the “force” conveyed in a strong 
evaluation on the one hand, and actually feeling that “force” in practical deliberation.  
This moral/epistemic gap can be seen to manifest itself in two sorts of human 
phenomena: an “outer” social phenomenon and an “inner” psychological phenomenon.  
I will discuses these in turn over the next two sections.  
 
§1.3 | The Sociological Dimension 
The phenomenon of moral friction can be initially indicated with reference to the 
sociological process commonly identified as “normalization.”  In the sense that I want to 
use the term, the idea refers to the human tendency to censor their own behavior in 
relation to a shared set of cultural norms.  The unmodified sociological concept is a third 
personal empirical description of human social behavior.  The social phenomenon I want 
to draw attention to, on the other hand, although it includes this third personal 
descriptive orientation, also involves a valorization of the phenomenon in such a way as 
to make it capable of functioning as a normative description; i.e., as a “thick” concept.  
Third personal normative descriptions include, for example, all ancient cosmologies 
wherein nature is thought to express its own inherent value (as opposed to being 
assigned value by human beings).  It is worth reflecting on these third personal 
normative descriptions in order to highlight a few key features that are lost in this 
peculiar development in the modern Western worldview.  According to these older 
cosmological views, simply by indicating what something is evokes a host of implicit 
strong evaluations.  I can say, for example, “that coupled is married,” and in doing so, if 
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I understood marriage to be a “sacramental gift of God and part of a divinely intended 
cosmic order,” for example, I would not only be indicating a fact about the state of 
affairs, but rather I would also be indicating how the couple ought act.  Even though in 
this example I have phrased the description in the third person, doing so has not 
diminished the strong evaluative content implicitly conveyed by the description.  Simply 
“being married” involves a set of strong evaluations that provide the value contrasts in 
terms of which one might succeed or fail to achieve harmony with a prior “proper 
order.”  In the case of pre-modern cosmologies, the force of the strong evaluations 
implicit in marriage practices is grounded in the role that these practices play in the 
larger cosmic order of things.  It is this metaphysical grounding that makes such claims, 
whether expressed in the first or third person, capable of carrying normative force.   
The third personal normative descriptive term that indicates the sociological 
dimension of moral friction, on the other hand, is not grounded in the metaphysics of 
pre-modern cosmology.  Rather, the normative force that distinguishes third person 
morally normative descriptions from mere third person empirical descriptions is 
grounded merely by how we come to understand the situations we are in.  Since the 
distinction between “empirical” investigations and “moral” investigations must be 
blurred in order to point to the sociological dimension of moral friction, it will be useful 
to introduce at this point a vocabulary that does not so much cut across the 
empirical/moral divide but rather diffuses it via a more radical ontological reorientation.  
The idea here is that if human understanding is thought to be at the center of ontological 
thought, the metaphysical basis for a morally neutral third personal vantage point is 
dissolved. 
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§1.3.2  |  Levelling 
In order to introduce the sociological dimension of moral friction, I want to draw 
on Heidegger’s concept of “averageness” (Durchschnittlichkeit) and his concept of 
“levelling” (Einebnung).14  Heidegger describes averageness as a process whereby 
“[e]very kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed…everything that is primordial gets 
glossed over as something that has long been well known…every secret loses its 
force.”15 This way of putting things exhibits how what at one level can be understood as 
a purely factual account expressed from a third personal empirical vantage point, can at 
another level express a valorized understanding involving a negative estimation.  That is, 
on the one hand, the account is merely describing how it is that human beings tend to 
understand and evaluate ideas, practices, and concerns over time; the great passions, 
wisdom, and hard fought achievements of one generation get displaced and devalued as 
“obvious” by the next.  Yet on the other hand, it is also clear that there is something 
objectionable about “leveling.”  It expresses a sense of loss regarding something 
important to us.  For Heidegger, the concepts of  “averageness” and “levelling” bear 
both a neutral and a valorized sense.  My intention here however is not to critically 
appropriate these two Heideggerian concepts by way of commenting on Heidegger’s 
intended meaning.   Rather, I will use the term “levelling” simply to name the 
sociological dimension of the phenomenon of moral friction.   
Nevertheless, it is worth elaborating on how these concepts work for Heidegger 
in order to make plain the particular sense in which they can give insight into the 
sociological dimension of moral friction.  Heidegger employs these two concepts in the 	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context of what he identifies as necessary structural features of human existence in 
general.  One way to understand these terms is as an ontologically prioritized sense of  
“normalization.”  That is, a sense in which “normalization” is not understood as an 
empirical concept indicating a process whereby individual “rational animals” tend 
towards uniformity, but rather is to be understood as a concept that indicates an 
ontological structure of human being that is the condition for the possibility of the 
existence of a background horizon of meaning against which human beings can first 
discover themselves as individuated entities.16  Heidegger uses the term “das Man”17 
(sometimes translated as “the Anyone” or “the They”) to indicate this ontologically 
prioritized sense of normalization.  On this view, the directionality implied by the term 
“normalization” is ontologically misleading.  The term communicates that there is first a 
diversity that is then normalized.  Das Man, on the other hand, is to be understood as a 
structural item of human being that provides for the background of meaning and norms 
that enables the horizon of significance in terms of which any particular deviation from 
the norm can first come into focus.   
The idea of “das Man,” even if initially ontologically exotic, is grammatically 
very familiar.  If we ask, “what does one do in this situation,” or if we assert, “one ought 
do such and such,” we are drawing upon the background understanding against which 
our ideas can be registered as “same” or “deviant.”  Ontologically, to say that das Man is 
primary, is to say that human being (Dasein) is always already “normalized” or 
“thrown” into an ongoing horizon of significance in terms of which it is first possible for 
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17 BT, 164 I choose here to leave “das Man” untranslated.  There are no obvious English equivalent and 
translating the term into “the Anyone” or “the They” is at least as, if not more, awkward as leaving the 
term in the original German.  
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one to find oneself; and against (or for) which one might achieve a sense of 
individuation.  It is only in relation to the norms within this horizon that one can achieve 
distinction—achieve individuation.   In this way, das Man is as ontologically “original” 
or “primary” as the individuated human being.  Individual human beings, as beings that 
understand themselves in relation to the world and to others, can be individuated only 
within the shared “normalized” backdrop understanding of das Man.   Moreover, when 
individuated, one does not leave the horizon of understanding that is das Man.  Rather, 
every possibility for being something (a father, mother, citizen, professional, sports fan, 
etc) is part of das Man.  Thought in this way, das Man is not a culturally confining 
“prison,” so to speak, from which individuals can never escape, but rather, das Man is 
the ultimate enabling condition making possible any identity or self-understanding 
possible whatsoever.   On this view, the individual human, is to be understood as an 
instance of das Man.  
Heidegger suggests that there is an “authentic” and “inauthentic” mode of 
comporting oneself as an “instance” or “expression” or “mode” of das Man.  An 
authentic mode of comporting oneself involves explicitly recognizing and taking 
ownership of a historical/cultural matrix of norms that populate and organize the ways 
of life that one would ordinarily be unreflectively realizing in the course of everyday 
activates and events.  This public “cultural” matrix is nothing other than the 
understanding of das Man, and authenticity involves an alteration of the typical way in 
which we comport ourselves in the world as an instance of das Man.  Typically, that is, 
human beings are “lost” in the business of realizing a life governed by public norms, a 
condition Heidegger calls “fallenness” (Verfallenheit).  By contrast, an authentic mode 
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of comportment involves first of all explicitly “finding oneself” as that being who is 
realizing these norms—or in other words, explicitly finding oneself as an instance of das 
Man.  We discover, for example, that “we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as Man 
[anyone] takes pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as Man sees and 
judges; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as Man shrinks back; we find 
‘shocking’ what Man finds shocking.  Das Man, which is nothing definite, and which all 
are, though not as the sum, prescribes…”18 and “articulates the referential context of 
significance”19 for any individuation or difference.   
But this explicit “finding” of oneself as an instance, expression, or mode of das 
Man also involves being alienated from the smooth flow of ordinary everyday worldly 
engagements.  Heidegger suggests that anxiety is the mood that marks this alienation.  
He writes: 
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein [human being] its Being towards its 
own most potentiality-for-being—that is, its Being-free for the freedom of 
choosing itself and taking hold of itself.  Anxiety brings Dasein face to 
face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being, and for this 
authenticity as a possibility which it always is.20  
 
As I mean to use the term here, “alienation” indicates the sense in which an individual 
can become not “at home in” the particular content of their familiar life world.  This 
happens when one comes “face to face” with her freedom for “choosing and taking hold 
of her self” as that being which she always already is in her everyday dealings in the 
world.  The distance between this authentic “taking hold of oneself” on the one hand, 
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and that factual being that is taken hold of on the other, discloses an essential “lack” or 
“nullity” (Nichtigkeit)21 in human being as a being thrown into the world.   
Thought in this way, it is easy to be drawn to the conclusion that human ontology 
involves two essential aspects: on the one hand, a self that is seen or described (i.e., 
utilizing everyday worldly self-identifications such as “woman,” “father”, “citizen,” an 
“academic,” etc.) and on the other hand, the self that is doing the seeing or describing.  
Or to put this distinction in another way, one may be inclined to see the self as 
composed of both an “objectivity” that can be described and a “subjectivity” that gives 
the description.  This is the sort of conclusion that Sartre comes to, for example, when 
he accounts for the human predicament with reference to two essential aspects: 
“facticity” and “transcendence.”  Heidegger, however, maintains that this is the wrong 
way to understand the essential “lack” or “nullity” that makes authenticity possible.   
The term that Heidegger uses to indicate the mode of worldly comportment 
whereby one can come to explicitly recognize one’s own involvement in everyday 
affairs is “resoluteness” (Entschlossekiet).22  The idea of “resoluteness” contrasts with 
the Sartrean emphasis on the radical freedom of transcendence—a freedom in the sense 
that I am free to choose a different life then the one I am currently leading.  Rather than 
choosing the description I give of myself, Heidegger suggests that authenticity involves 
recognizing or being “free for” the possibility of taking “ownership” for what I already 
am.  In other words, unlike the notion of “transcendence” or “subjectivity,” the notion of 
“authenticity” does not indicate an irreducible “part” my being—as if the very capacity 
for reflection has made my true “subjective” nature visible.  “Resoluteness,” Heidegger 	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writes, “as authentic Being-one’s-self, does not separate Dasein from its world, nor does 
it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating ‘I’.”23  But rather, authenticity is a 
modification of how I comport myself towards the ordinary everyday activities that 
reflects the constellation of self-identifications or social roles (e.g., being a “man,” a 
“philosopher,” a “friend,” a “lover,” etc.) that I have already been realizing as an 
instance of das Man.  In fact, in Heidegger’s account, it would be a category mistake to 
think that becoming authentic involves doing anything outwardly different in my 
everyday activities.  Rather, being authentic involves what Nietzsche meant by the 
dictum: “become who you are.”24 Being authentic involves “owning up to,” “taking 
over,” or “taking responsibility for” what I have already become in terms of the public 
norms I have already been expressing in everyday worldly engagements.  On this view, 
for example, it is possible for me to be an “authentic scientists;” but as “authentic,” I do 
not thereby do something different from what I might otherwise do—as if to employ a 
different method than an “inauthentic scientist”—rather, what would make me authentic 
in this case is a mode of comportment in which I “take up” or “take ownership of” the 
constellation of norms, practices, and concerns that constituted my understanding of 
what being a self-identified “scientist” is all about.  
An inauthentic mode of comportment, in contrast, involves a kind of refusal in 
the face of this “call” for an explicit recognition of oneself by engaging in a kind of 
“turning away” (Abkehr) or a “fleeing” (Fliehen) into the everyday business of realizing 
a life governed by public norms.25  “Averageness” and “levelling,” when understood in 
the valorized sense, name the consequences (or even the goal) of this fleeing.  In the 	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non-valorized sense, regardless of whether I am in an authentic or an inauthentic mode, 
being human just involves being continuously drawn back or “falling” (Verfallen) into 
the life-world that constitutes and frames who I understand myself to be, and what I 
understand myself to be “up to” (i.e., the life-world of das Man).  To be human just 
means being inextricably immersed in public norms and ideas—what Heidegger calls 
“fallenness.”  However, what makes “averageness” and “levelling” potentially 
pernicious—what gives the terms a negatively valorized meaning—are those situations 
in which I “actively fall” or “flee” into averageness or “mediocrity” in order to escape 
the call to explicitly “take over” the forms of life I find myself always already realizing.  
Just as authenticity involves being attentively immersed in everyday affairs, 
inauthenticity involves escaping that “explicit attentive immersion” by fleeing into those 
same everyday affairs; that is, fleeing in such a way that I cover-over and become 
inattentive to my immersion.  Averageness and levelling are “problematical” when they 
become ends that are projected for the purpose of turning away from the task of 
explicitly “owning up to” who one already is.  It is this last possibility that provides 
entrance into the sociological dimension of moral friction. 
 
§1.3.3  |  Levelling as a Product of Contradiction 
I want to introduce a way of understanding “averaging” and “levelling” that 
builds on Heidegger’s suggestion that “being average” can itself become an aim or goal 
in an attempt to actively escape the “awareness” of one’s “throwness” into a historical 
cultural horizon of meaning.   The sense in which I want to appropriate the idea, in other 
words, shares the negatively valorized assessment of a motivated inauthentic willful 
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dispersion or “fleeing” into the everyday public life world.  However, my appropriation 
of “averaging” and “leveling” is not built out of the relationship between the 
ontologically co-primordial background understanding of das Man and the possibility of 
authentic individuation via the essential “lack” or “nullity” built into being “thrown.”  
Rather, the notion I want to work with is the product of the relationship between two 
historically contingent sets of ideas that together partly compose the contemporary 
Western forms of life (two ideas that were expressed above in a different form in the 
discussion of Rorty’s conception of the Ironist):  (1) The actual constellation of ideas, 
practices, concerns and institutions that compose the life world in which we come to 
understand ourselves, and in terms of which we comport ourselves in everyday activity 
as willful “individuals” or as “selves” and (2) the idea that the possibility of being an 
“individual” or “self” is itself a historically contingent form of life.  
If both (1) and (2) are unavoidable ideas imbedded in the modes of life 
characteristic of the modern Western, then there exists a basic contradiction that is 
expressed phenomenologically in a way closely related to Heidegger’s notions of 
“averageness” and “levelling.”  The concept of “levelling,” as I will appropriate it, is 
here understood as a condition of culture in which there is a generalized loss of interest, 
passion, or energy for realizing a life governed by a particular set of historically 
contingent social roles.   The idea here is that because the form of life of an individual or 
self is understood to be only one historical possibility among others, there is a 
contradiction at the heart of modern Western forms of life that consists in recognizing 
that the norms involved in being an individual are both unavoidable and yet historically 
contingent.  The response to this contradiction is generally to turn away (or “flee”) into 
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the everyday activities of realizing a life that conforms to the norm of being an 
individual.   Just like in Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic 
modes of comportment, the difference does not consist in doing something different 
when realizing the life of an individual, but rather, in how, on the one hand, one can be 
“free for” taking up and intentionally realizing the life of an individual, and on the other 
hand, how one can “flee” into the those same norms that compose the life of an 
individual.  My aim here is to point out important impediments to realizing the first 
possibility and a negative consequence in realizing the latter possibility.   
The technical sense in which I want to appropriate the term “levelling,” will be to 
indicate a state of affairs that results from an interaction between two finite, temporal, 
and contingent social/cultural ideas that together produce a way of life which inherently 
displaces the possibility of the moral force in a normative description of that life and yet 
at the same time leaves no possibility other than to realize a life that is shaped and 
constrained by that very description.  Levelling is the product of valorizing an active 
“turning away” from an explicit recognition of this contradiction and where the norms of 
the culture involve individuals “fleeing” or “escaping” into the business of realizing the 
life of “being an individual.”  In order to see what this “inauthentic” escape into the 
everyday life of being an individual produces, it is worth starting from two ineffective 
attempts at what in Heidegger’s language would correspond to “authentic” modes.   
There are two forms which an “authentic” response might take to the 
contradiction between (1) and (2) cited above.  Each response however is ultimately 
incapable of effectively resolving the contradiction and as a result, each response must 
eventually resort to a form of inauthentic fleeing in order for the form of life to be 
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practically sustained.  And this means that both authentic modes, along with the 
inauthentic mode, ultimately result in what I am here calling “levelling.”  Observing 
exactly how these “authentic” attempts fail can reveal the everyday commonsense 
phenomenological manifestation of levelling.  
  First, one might respond to the practical contradiction between (1) and (2) by 
decisively choosing a “final” set of values—or a “final vocabulary”—that can serve as a 
basis for a structure under which one can subordinate all other normative descriptions.  
Let us call one who adopts this option a “decisionist.”  This option can be further 
divided into a first personal normative language or a third personal normative language.  
The first person normative description requires no claim to universality; it is intelligible 
to say, for example, “these are my values, but yours may be different.”  On this option, a 
third personal normative description is used, but it is not intended to exert a normative 
force for anyone except the one giving the description.  An example similar to, but not 
identical with, this option is Kierkegaard’s notion of Religiousness B.  In this cases, a 
“defining relation” with a “personal absolute” fixes one’s sense of self by providing an 
ultimate context for any act of will.  A “personal absolute” functions in much the same 
way as an “absolute” by providing a moral force behind our strong evaluations, but 
without drawing on a universal normative force.   
Kierkegaard’s conception of a personal absolute involves being claimed by some 
experience in such a way that that particular event becomes definitive of one’s life as a 
whole.  It is an experience that happens to one, rather than a personal absolute that one 
chooses.  In contrast, the difficulty with deciding upon something like a “personal 
absolute” is that barring some profound event that happens to a person, which of course 
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is not a matter of decision, it takes a great deal of energy to sustain a commitment to 
one’s chosen final vocabulary in the face of the inevitable practical contradictions and 
inconsistencies that arise in the course of implementing any value system over the span 
of a life.   
The third personal intentional description suffers from the same problem, but this 
effect is amplified by the fact that such descriptions are up for public rational scrutiny.  
Because the force that the absolute is supposed to exert is “normative” in the proper 
objective sense, which is to say that it holds for you just as much as it holds for me, the 
absolute itself must be in principle universally acceptable.  However, not only do 
practical contradictions arise in the course of one’s own life, but also, a fortiori, they 
arise for all.  An absolute requires universal justification, and it is just this kind of 
confirmation that Nietzsche so poignantly observed is no longer possible.    
When one’s own decision, and thus one’s will, is explicitly implicated in 
accepting the legitimacy of a value system, the tendency is to revert to an inauthentic 
mode in everyday life—to flee from the responsibility involved in such an endorsement.  
One thereby covers-over and escapes those practical contradictions by finding refuge in 
the day-to-day activities of realizing a life articulated by those same values that one 
would otherwise have to take responsibility for.  By fleeing into the mundane day-to-day 
affairs of life one can more easily avoid taking responsibility for resolving the practical 
contradictions that arise in the course of sustaining a final vocabulary; contradictions 
which threaten the legitimacy of that vocabulary.  As these contradictions mount in the 
face of continued avoidance, this tendency to fall back into an inauthentic mode of 
comportment ultimately leads to levelling in the decisionist form of life.  The once 
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“thick” meaning of the terms in which a strong evaluation is articulated becomes 
increasingly thin and begins to take on the quality of a façade that covers over an 
increasingly incoherent form of life.   
The second authentic mode of confronting the contradiction between (1) and (2) 
is a form of life I will identify as the “suspicionist.”  By the use of this term, I mean to 
indicate someone who is inclined to question the motives behind human action 
regardless of the stated intention.  Unlike the decisionist who can be thought of as a sort 
of covert or reluctant ironist (in the sense that Rorty uses the term), the suspicionist is an 
overt ironist and as such, rejects the idea that there can be any legitimate ultimate final 
vocabulary that can express a “final” set of values.  Moreover, in contrast to the 
decisionist, the suspicionist confronts the contradiction between (1) and (2) head-on; but 
she does not thereby resolve the contradiction.  The result, rather, is a bifurcation 
between what can be called the rhetoric of “liberation” from the oppressive final 
vocabularies (“oppressive” in the sense that they are serving the interests of others than 
oneself) of traditional cultural institutions, on the one hand and, on the other, the 
necessity of operating within the horizon of those vocabularies in order to negotiate 
everyday life.   What the suspicionist cannot do is effectively articulate an alternative 
mode of comportment that could replace the vocabulary about which they are 
suspicious.  The problem is that the rejection of oppressive traditional final vocabularies 
is predicated upon the idea that a dominant group within a culture adopts these 
vocabularies for self-serving purposes and that such motivations are illegitimate.  
However, any resistance to these vocabularies must also be understood as being 
motivated for the self-serving purposes of the oppressed group.  The result is that either 
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one must accept that it is ok to explicitly endorse a self-serving final vocabulary and 
thereby undermine the rational justification for resistance, or one must reject such 
motives and thereby undermine the only available source or ground of resistance.  As a 
result of this condition, with regard to everyday life, the suspicionist must reluctantly 
flee into the very cultural norms of which they are suspicious when it comes to matters 
of making every day life choices (e.g., in one’s profession, one’s political participation, 
family life, or—in a more particularly way, for example—in being a consumer).  This 
“reluctance” is a sort of war against oneself that is produced by the contradiction 
between (1) and (2); and this war is impossible to sustain in a generalized way.  One 
must, even if only episodically, fall into the everyday norms of the society simply to 
cope with life.  The suspicionist too falls into a way of life characterized by levelling.   
From the suspicionist point of view, levelling corresponds to common everyday 
intuitions that suggest that expressing “too much excitement” or “too much enthusiasm” 
about one’s projects is a signal that one does not “rightly” or “fully” understand the 
irony of their situation.  This intuition suggests how levelling is phenomenologically 
encountered.  If being an “individual”—which means adopting a concern for “freedom,” 
“responsibility,” and with participation in institutions such as liberal democratic forms 
of government, for example—is thought in advance to be historically contingent, then 
actively adopting such concerns and participating in such institutions will be revealed to 
have no more significance than any other particular way of life to which we happen to 
conform in the modern West.  And thus, to take being an “individual” seriously—taking 
on the values and responsibilities of being an individual without the mediation of an 
ironic attitude—looks like a naïve form of conformism.  From the suspicionist’s point of 
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view, making an “exception of oneself” or “being an individual” in an unreflective or 
non-ironic way must be evaluated negatively. 
Levelling is a social phenomenon that results from a practical contradiction 
between the fact that our modern form of life is shot through with the ideas, practices, 
concerns and institutions that articulate human life in terms of being autonomous 
individuals on the one hand, and the recognition that this form of life is only a 
historically contingent possibility on the other.  The concept of “levelling” is a third 
personal normative descriptive term that at once articulates a particular state of human 
affairs, but yet is also value laden.  Like the concept of depression, which I will discuss 
in the next section, it is an inherently objectionable state of affairs.  And it is so precisely 
because realizing the life of an “individual” by fleeing or escaping into the everyday 
activity of being an individual is motivated by an escape to the norm rather than by an 
explicit embrace of the form of life as one’s own.  In the inauthentic mode, the value in 
being an “individual” is extrinsic to the strong evaluations that compose what it means 
to live a life as an individual; its value lies, rather, in being the place of escape.  In 
contrast, an authentic form of being an individual would have to involve directly 
embraces the strong evaluations implicit in the meaning of being an individual as 
intrinsically valuable; something the suspicionist cannot do.    
The result of an inauthentic appropriation of being an “individual” is to “thin” 
the form of life.  By “thin” or “thinning,” I mean to indicate that the possible practical 
expressions of what is to be an individual become fewer and fewer; and subsequently the 
contradictions between these possible expressions also diminishes.   However, it is 
precisely in the act of resolving such contradictions that the form of life of being an 
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individual is cultivated, sustained and transformed.  This “thinning” is nothing other 
than what I have been calling the phenomenon identified by the term “levelling.”   
In contrast, a “thick” notion of “individual” must involve, first of all, taking this 
description over for oneself, i.e., in taking ownership of it.  It is only under the condition 
that one works toward an integrity with regard to being an “individual” by comporting 
oneself in such a way that one is constantly in the process of “figuring out” what it 
means to realize a life as an individual, that the form of life we call “being an 
individual” can be sustained in the face of practical contradictions.  Without the aim of 
the integrity involved in an authentic mode of comportment, the creativity involved in 
resolving practical contradictions has no motivating force.  The inauthentic mode simply 
lets what it means to be an individual erode.  The sociological manifestation of moral 
friction is, therefore, a “leveling” of the diversity that exists as each person appropriates 
being an individual as his or her form of life.  This lack of diversity can be thought of as 
a “deadening” of the form of life; or, put in another way, it names the loss of vitality that 
is expressed in the strong evaluations that are implicit in the form of life itself.  
 
§1.4 | The Psychological Dimension 
With the groundwork laid in the previous section, the introduction of the 
psychological dimension of moral friction can be easily displayed.  This dimension of 
moral friction is best exhibited by linking it to the familiar psychological concept of 
“depression.”  Like the concept of “levelling,” depression is a third personal description 
that carries normative force.  Unlike the notion of “normalization,” however, it already 
blurs the line between morally normative descriptions and empirical descriptions 
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because of its use as a clinical term in therapeutic practice.   Nevertheless, precisely 
because of common familiarity with the concept, it is also just as likely to conceal moral 
friction as much as it is useful as a provisionally useful concept in the indication of 
moral friction.  
In order to distinguish the usage of the term “depression” from the start, I want to 
begin by associating it with another term familiarly understood as psychological, 
“anxiety.”  However I want to distinguish my meaning from the start by associating it 
with Heidegger’s usage of the term discussed in the previous section. “Anxiety” names 
the mood associated with coming face-to-face with the essential nullity within human 
being as “thrown” into an ongoing life world.  Making this association has the advantage 
of dissociating the term from the idea that anxiety names a particular internal subjective 
psychological state.  Nevertheless, I will not be appropriating Heidegger’s technical 
usage of the term directly; rather I will be employing it in a relatively non-technical 
sense to indicate the general state of being “unsettled” in what would otherwise be a 
familiar situation.  That is, it indicates instances in which one feels that the situation one 
is in has, for no recognizable reason (that is to say, not because of an identifiable lack of 
understanding in the situation), becomes “alien” or “uncanny.”  In anxiety, we “lose 
step” with the life-world we ordinarily competently navigate, whether that navigation 
involves explicit reflection on our situation or a simple tacit immersion in it.   The 
concept of “depression” can be understood as a generalized “loss of energy” that is 
accompanied by anxiety regardless of the particular situation they happen to be in.  As 
a third personal descriptive concept, “depression” names a description under which one 
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encounters all situations in the mode of anxiety that is accompanied by a generalized 
loss of energy, enthusiasm, or interest for being in any particular situation.  
Nowadays the terms “anxiety” and “depression,” when uttered in the context of a 
philosophical discussion, undoubtedly sounds an immediate ironic tone.  It calls to mind 
a distinct set of historical polemics against the first-person experience of the modernist 
ideals of “subjectivity” and “individualism” (as pictured by Kant, for example); these 
ways of talking have collectively been gathered, in a “textbook” sort of way, under the 
heading of “existentialism.”  The most common complaint against this “textbook” 
characterization of the existentialist’s problematic is that it failed to fully appreciate the 
contingency of “subjectivity.”  In other words, the idea is that those who railed against 
the enlightenment ideals because they produced feelings of alienation, anxiety, and 
depression, did so only because they took themselves (their own subjectivity) too 
seriously—they were not sufficiently ironist.  From the ironist’s point of view, getting 
too worked-up about such essentially subjective experiences is unwarranted because, as 
effects, they are no more necessary than the cause; and subjectivity, it is thought, is 
nothing more than an historically contingent possibility for self-understanding.  The idea 
seems to be that this recognition itself has some therapeutic value; that by recognizing 
that there is nothing necessary about understating myself to be a “free individual 
responsible for the course of my own life,” the anxiety and depression that might result 
from such an understanding in combination with the fact that there are no objectively 
verifiable moral norms, can be “disowned.”  On one view, these experiences are further 
reason for rejecting “subjectivity” and “individualism” because they are thought to be 
the product of this enlightenment notion of self.  On another view, which comes to the 
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same rejection, these enlightenment notions are thought to be inherently violent to other 
historically contingent forms of life because it imposes an unwarranted privilege to the 
ideals of subjectivity and individualism.   
The meaning of “depression,” then, can be understood as the disempowerment 
that comes with both understanding that being an individual self is inextricably entwined 
with particular historically contingent cultural practices, ideas, concerns and institutions 
while at the same time recognizing that these very contingencies are necessary for the 
recognition of the contingency itself.  It is hard to experience enthusiasm for a form of 
life that is the condition for the possibility of recognizing the contingency of that very 
form of life; one has necessity without certainty and contingency without freedom.  
 
§1.5 | Moral Friction as a Unified Phenomenon 
A tentative link can be made between these moral/epistemic, sociological, and 
psychological dimensions by pointing to how it is that we might experience levelling as 
depressing (generalized anxiety) when we are prevented from comporting ourselves 
toward a norm in such a way that it “has weight” or “pull” on our attention.  I have been 
suggesting thus far that this deficiency might be produced when the epistemic legitimacy 
of moral judgments generally, and strong evaluations in particular, are explicitly in 
question; or in other words, when the “normative question” becomes pressing in 
precisely those instances when we are called upon to actually make strong evaluations in 
the course of every day activity.  I want now to make this suggestion more explicit.  
  To say that a moral judgment or evaluation is “in question,” is to say—in 
temporal terms—that there is a kind of “delay” or “suspension” in how we would have 
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ordinarily comported ourselves tacitly towards what is now explicitly “in question.”   
The question itself is this delay. If the legitimacy of moral judgments and evaluations as 
such are “in question,” we might expect to see a definite phenomenological attestation—
by way of a suspension—in how we comport ourselves in any situation—all of which 
involve strong evaluative distinctions.   
However, we might reasonably expect such a “delay” or “hesitation” in moral 
judgments and evaluations to be a purely theoretical affair.  We might think, in other 
words, that for the most part the suspension of judgments does not effect most practical 
situations—and are thus not “hesitations” in the practical or behavioral sense.  It is 
reasonable to think, for example, that in the standard sense, practical considerations may 
force us to act prior to resolving our hesitation; and that mere action in such cases does 
not constitute a moral judgment in the relevant sense.  We often act on our “best 
judgment” at the moment; and thereby acknowledge that our “real” or “considered” 
judgment on the matter is still in suspension.  In this way, cognitive events like moral 
judgments may not be expected to directly impact our normal everyday worldly dealings 
in anything close to a pervasive way.  According to this objection, it can be expected 
that we can be practically engaged in everyday, life-world decisions with competence 
regardless of the state of our considered judgment concerning a relevant strong 
evaluation.  What this separation between “theoretical” and “practical” contexts 
presupposes, however, is that moral judgments and evaluations are only about resolving 
conflicts between competing ideas or intuitions concerning right actions in a given 
situation.  Although this is a useful way of understanding the relationship between moral 
judgment and practice—and it is for the most part the proper understanding for moral 
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theory—this understanding tends to cover over a deeper relationship between our 
understanding of the situations we find ourselves in and the moral judgments and 
evaluations that we make.    
I will be arguing that the very ability to understand oneself—which is to say, find 
oneself in a situation—as such and such, and doing such and such, essentially involves 
strong evaluative distinctions.  The very ability to understand a situation—and therefore, 
to be in a situation—involves a familiarity with, and competency in navigating, a 
particular set of strong evaluative distinctions.  If I do not understand, for example, how 
a romantic dinner might go well or go poorly, it is hard to imaging what it would mean 
to say that I understand what a romantic dinner is.  It is a matter of practical necessity 
that I acknowledge the strong evaluative distinctions imbedded in situations like 
romantic dinners—by either being for or against them—if I am to negotiate a world that 
includes romantic dinners.  Understood in this way, it becomes clear how a suspension 
concerning moral judgments generally, and strong evaluations as such in particular, 
might have a dramatic practical impact on how we comport ourselves in our everyday 
lives.  It is one thing for us to suspend a judgment or evaluation concerning a 
discrepancy between two understandings of “what is to be done” in a particular 
situation; however it is a fundamentally different condition when what is suspended is 
the force of strong evaluative themselves—i.e., a suspension in the motivational force 
behind any decision along the distinctions which work to partly constitute our 
understanding of the situation we are in.  In the latter case, such a “suspension” in 
judgment could not but affect how we comport ourselves in all ordinary everyday 
situations.  
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If epistemic concerns regarding the legitimacy of moral judgments and strong 
evaluations can have an effect on our comportment in situations as such (and so long as 
we are awake and minimally attentive, we are always already in one situation or another) 
we would expect a phenomenological confirmation of these effects.  If we consider that 
doubts about the legitimacy of moral judgments and strong evaluations involve a 
reflective “stance” or “orientation” towards something we ordinarily “do” in a pre-
reflective fashion (one would actually make strong evaluations about better and worse 
actions in the context of demonstrating one’s understanding of what a romantic dinner is 
simply in virtue of participating in the situation) then we should expect that what gets 
“suspended” in our doubt is not only our judgment (a reflective cognitive event) but also 
something in how one practically comports oneself in one’s ordinary worldly 
engagements.  In other words, since strong evaluations are built into the tacit 
background understanding that enables our comportment in everyday life, doubts 
concerning the legitimacy of strong evaluative distinctions as such are going to impact 
that comportment generally. This practical suspension occurs because this “reflective 
stance” concerning the legitimacy of moral judgments and evaluations amounts to a kind 
of “foreknowledge”—or perhaps “view from an alienated vantage point”— which shows 
that one is always acting in accordance with “questionable” evaluations.  A clue to how 
this “foreknowledge” might manifest in familiar phenomena might be found in an 
analogy with dance.   
Suppose that I can demonstrate my knowledge of a particular dance in virtue of 
an ability to actually execute a prescribed sequence of steps; as such, I am a minimally 
competent judge as to how well I am doing when I am actually performing the dance.  
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To say that I am a “competent judge,” simply means that I have access to criteria that 
could be used to judge how well I am actually dancing.  Suppose also that for one reason 
or another, I have come to doubt the legitimacy of making such judgments or 
assessments in dance; i.e., with regard to the legitimacy of the standards and norms of 
dance.  “After all,” I might think to myself, “there are many kinds of dances; and 
moreover, each dancer brings their own style to any given dance.”  To insist upon the 
evaluative criteria that I happen to employ given my understanding of the dance and the 
ideal “style” of its execution, might seem to me nothing more than a kind of sheer 
stubbornness.  So it might seem reasonable to suspend my judgment concerning “how 
well I am doing.”  Yet because I am the one dancing—and unless I take this occasion to 
“sit this one out,” I must continue dancing—this suspension in judgment puts me in an 
awkward practical position.  I might think thoughts like, “what is the point of following 
the steps if it turns out that in doing so I would be demonstrating little more than a kind 
of stubbornness with regard to the importance of preserving the traditions of dance.” Or 
worse, I might think, “given that the most that can be said for the legitimacy of such 
standards is that they are ‘traditional,’ my insistence on such standards for myself and 
others seems to be a kind of tyranny.” “Why not,” I might conclude, “just loosen up, 
have fun, and be inclusive of different ‘styles’?”  Why not admit that my evaluations are 
grounded in nothing more than “taste”?—i.e., “weak evaluations.”  
On the other hand, if I happen to be good at the dance, I might despair with 
thoughts like, “my talent does not amount to much after all if there might be no 
ultimately legitimate criteria for evaluating good dance from bad dance.”  Even though I 
understand the relevant standards of excellence, the fact that those standards show up to 
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me as lacking any defined ground—any definite legitimacy—robs me of the “pull” that 
the achievement of excellence might have otherwise provided.  At the very least, such 
thoughts may dampen my enthusiasm in the situation.   And at worst, it might induce the 
kind of awkward self-awareness that manifests as a kind of hesitation that prevents me 
from dancing at all.  
In the same way that this kind of foreknowledge or awareness of the 
questionability concerning the legitimacy of strong evaluations amounts to explicitly 
acknowledging, in some fashion or other, that the implicit criteria for evaluation that 
shape any given situation might lack any substantive illegitimacy, such a foreknowledge 
would have the effect of dampening enthusiasm in all situations.   At worst, that is, it is a 
state of affairs that might prevent one from smoothly engaging in any activity, such that 
in order to get by at all, one must abruptly alternate between the alienated reflective 
awareness associated with acknowledging the possible illegitimacy of evaluative criteria 
on the one hand, and the unreflective presumption of those criteria that one must 
maintain in order to continue an engagement in a situation on the other.   Or in other 
words, one must “flee” the “foreknowledge” in order to get lost in—conform to—the 
“normal” just to “get by.”  We call such awkwardness and alienation in relation to the 
otherwise smooth flow of ordinary situations, “anxiety.”  States of anxiety generally are 
a normal part of everyday life that corresponds to “falling out of the flow” of particular 
situations in such a fashion that the situation itself becomes uncanny—where what was 
once familiar becomes alien—and, in the very ambiguity of this distance from what is 
familiar, often shows up as menacing.    
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But the kind of alienation and anxiety that corresponds to an epistemic concern 
with the legitimacy of moral judgments and strong evaluations as such—i.e., that 
corresponds to the thought that the normative question cannot, in principle, be 
answered—has an altogether more radical meaning.  The difference is not in the kind of 
anxiety as such, but rather the degree to which it ranges over all situations.  The anxiety 
produced by a dampened ability to smoothly comport oneself in any ordinary everyday 
situation is both more universal and more constant. Without a meaningful development 
in the epistemic status of the commonsense understanding of moral judgments and 
strong evaluations, we should expect that such a universal and persistent state of anxiety 
would lead to further drag on the enthusiasm, energy, or interest in “being in” any given 
situations; that is, enthusiasm, energy or interest that we might ordinarily expect to be 
exhibited in those situations.  This peculiar kind of generalized “drag” or “friction” on 
our ability to comport ourselves energetically or with enthusiasm in any give situation 
corresponds phenomenologically to what in psychological terms I have been calling 
“depression”.   
At the same time, this diminished energy or enthusiasm also manifests itself 
sociologically in what I have called “levelling,” whereby one has the sense of “simply 
going through the motions” of publically defined social norms and practices.  
Participation in a situation involves exhibiting an understanding of those particular 
strong evaluations and standards of excellence built-in to the meaning of the situation 
itself; and this is just to say that it is a condition for the possibility of being in a situation 
that we sensor ourselves in light of some idealized norm that corresponds to the 
paradigmatic case, or definitive idealized case, of the situation.  When we question the 
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legitimacy of strong evaluations generally and thus also the idealized norms of a given 
situation that they compose, our comportment towards those norms is “suspended” in 
the same awkward, alienated, reflective state that leads to depression—i.e., the result of 
a generalized and persistent state anxiety.  At first gloss, it might be supposed that this 
loss of energy, enthusiasm, or interest might result in a diminished adherence to all 
standards and norms.  From the vantage point of mere reflective thinking, this seems to 
be true; that is, it enables a kind of “unreflective moral relativism.”  However, with 
regard to our tacit pre-reflective everyday engagements, which demand of us that we 
take a stand on the particular strong evaluations imbedded in the situations we happen to 
find ourselves in, just the opposite occurs.   
If we consider again that all intentional human behavior occurs as participation 
in—or “being-in”—particular situations, our participation in which essentially involves 
submitting to the governance of particular publically prescribed strong evaluations 
(either by being for or against the prescription), which is to say that our participation in 
any given situation essentially involves the norms that make it the particular situation 
that it is, it becomes evident that those norms can be “pre-scribed” only because of a 
prior shared public understanding of the situation that the individual subsequently comes 
to find themselves in terms of.  In what would be in Heideggerian language, the 
understanding of das Man.  Strong evaluations can be said to be “built-in” to the 
meaning of a situation precisely because we do not constitute the meaning of those 
situations; rather, we inherit them from the social/historical matrix of norms into which 
we are born.  We can conform to those standards or we can rebel against them, but we 
are always in relation to them.   
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There is, however, another distinction regarding the modes of comportment one 
might take towards this matrix of norms, which is captured by Heidegger’s distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic appropriation of a form of life.  If one turns away 
from an explicit recognition that one is an instance of das Man in the life that he or she 
is already leading, one can only do so within that same form of life whose explicit 
recognition one seeks to escape.  That is, by busying oneself with the everyday activates 
of what it is to be a fully functioning individual in the modern Western world, one can 
cover over how those activities hang together as a whole.  The effect of this inauthentic 
mode of comportment is to render the intrinsic value distinctions as inherent strong 
evaluations within the particular situations one encounters in the course of realizing a 
form of life extrinsic to the goal.  Unlike an authentic mode of taking ownership of a 
particular form of life, which exhibits an internal pressure to unify the constitutive value 
distinctions into a coherent and consistent whole, the inauthentic mode’s externalization 
of the goal provides no such pressure.  If the goal is “being normal” rather than “being 
an individual,” then there is no internal pressure to maintain the constitutive value 
distinctions in the meaning of “being individual” as a coherent whole.   The result of this 
lack of pressure to unify or maintain the integrity of a form of life in the face of practical 
contradictions between various value judgments that arise in the course of living out that 
form of life, is the “fleeing” away in the face of these contradictions.   Resolving 
contradictions takes work, energy and interest to resolve.  But if the only reason one has 
fore taken over the form of life is to escape the call to take ownership that very form of 
life one is already living, then it makes sense that these contradictions would be passed 
	  	  	   66	  
over.  But these contradictions are precisely the moments in which these forms of life 
express their vitality.   
Consider again the example of the dancer.  Suppose that I understand and 
conform to the proper form of a particular traditional dance.  Suppose also that I have 
become good at this dance and can execute it with graceful excellence.  Now finally, 
suppose that another dancer informs me that as they understand the execution of the 
dance, how I perform a particular sequence is incorrect or not as elegant.  I could 
respond by asking other authorities.  But if I do not take tradition-for-traditions-sake too 
seriously, I would have to look to the standards internal to the dance itself to resolve this 
conflict.  Suppose that upon investigation I discover that although my way of executing 
the sequence maintains a graceful continuity of a particular form between the 
immediately preceding sequence to the one in question and to the one subsequent to it, I 
also notice that the other option provides for a more overall graceful continuity in the 
dance as a whole.  The conflict has now given rise to what I have been calling a practical 
contradiction between the expressions of a value within a particular sort of situation.  I 
could respond to this practical contradiction by simply accepting that both are equally 
valid; and leave it at that.  I simply go on dancing my way.  This is, of course, the easiest 
thing to do and if my motivation of dancing does not arise out of concern for the 
integrity of the dance itself, there really is no reason to do otherwise.  However, I might 
care about the integrity of the dance.  I might, that is, sense that something is lost by this 
multiplicity of interpretations.  I could focus on determining which one is “more right.”  
But if it is recognized that each is genuinely virtuous in its own way, then this approach 
seems only to lead to a kind of self-deception regarding the motivations I have for 
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wanting to “get it right” (e.g., pride, resentment over being corrected by another, 
avoidance of other responsibilities, etc.).    If, however, I am motivated by a desire to 
discover the most excellent form of the dance on its own terms, then this practical 
contradiction provides an opportunity for integrating what is virtuous about both 
approaches into a single, new way of executing the sequence.  Indeed, I might go so far 
as to modify other sequences in the dance to accommodate the new form of the sequence 
in order to maximize the overall excellence of the dance.  In doing this, however, it is 
important to emphasis that I am not interested in “creating” a new dance.  Rather, it is 
precisely in being open to what this particular dance calls for with regard to its most 
excellent form that motivates the alterations.  Doing all this takes energy, enthusiasm 
and an interest in the integrity and excellence of the dance on its own terms.  But if one 
accepts in advance that it is pointless to inquire into the excellence of a particular dance 
because the dance is nothing more than a contingent tradition, then it becomes clear how 
mustering this energy, enthusiasm, and interest in the integrity of the expression of the 
values intrinsic to the dance might be problematic.  Even if one were to muster the 
energy, one could only describe the activity as a particular form of “self-expression” or 
“creativity”—and ultimately, as an expression of one’s taste.   Even if one feels a “call” 
or “responsibility” to maintain the integrity and excellence of the dance on its own 
terms, it may seem impossible to respond to this “call” in the terms that directly express 
the way that the “call” is experienced.  That is, that the dance itself calls for its own 
integrity.  When I take up the dance in an authentic mode, I take it over in such a way 
that “it becomes me” or “I become it.”  This experience is not uncommon.  When we 
master the art of driving a car with a clutch, for example, it “becomes us” in such a way 
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that no distinction can be made between “my driving excellently” and the “proper or 
excellent form of shifting gears.”  However, if I take up the dance (or art of shifting 
gears) in an inauthentic mode, which means that I take up the dance simply because it is 
what one does (i.e., my aim is simply doing what one does), then reconciling the 
difference in a practical contradiction by discovering a third—most excellent—form of 
the dance seems pointless.   
But more than this, if my motivation for taking up the dance is only because it is 
“what one does,” then we would expect that performers would have no particular 
attachment to any particular expression of it.  By fleeing into the dance in an inauthentic 
mode I am drawn to dance as “anyone would dance.”  Each inauthentic dancer is drawn 
to the form expressed by every other inauthentic dancer.  The result is a kind of 
“averaging” of the differences.  
A particular dance is, of course, only a particular situation.  However, if we take 
the above example as an indication to a general inauthentic comportment in all 
situations, then the averaging of a whole form of life is the result.  When the 
opportunities for cultivating a better form of life that a practical contradiction provides is 
passed over because one has taken up the form in an inauthentic mode, the result is 
averaging and thinning of what it means to live this form of life.   That is, the form of 
life itself is averaged or “thinned” out.   
 My aim in this first part has been to thematize an internal contradiction in the 
form of life that Rorty identifies as the ironist.  This has been done in anticipation of 
disclosing a form of life that resolves this contradiction.  In order to show exactly how 
the form of life of an improviser eliminates the problem of moral friction, and thereby 
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makes the ironist form of life no longer a viable option, I will in Part Two develop an 
argument form that substantiates these claims.  Once in place, I will use this argument 
form to discharge the thesis that the improviser sublates the ironist form of life
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Part Two  |  Moral Phenomenology 
 
§2.1 | Kinds of Accounts 
Every account gets guided in advance by some expectation concerning what the 
account itself is expected to achieve.  Prima facie, modern empirical scientific 
explanation is ideally, for example, expected to provide an accurate representation of the 
causal workings behind some set of observable phenomena.  All empirical scientific 
accounts presuppose an asymmetrical relationship between what the explanation 
concerns and the terms of the explanation itself.  The explananda, in other words, are 
thought to be independent of the explanation and thus are supposed to be possessed of a 
nature in relation to which the explanation may or may not be adequate.  What is 
expected of a scientific explanation—what the account itself is supposed to 
accomplish—is an accurate mapping of explicans onto real, but otherwise hidden, 
relationships between raw empirical facts.  On this view, by contrast, the “ideal” 
scientific explanation is one that achieves a faithful model of these facts and their 
relations that together provide undistorted access to the way things “really are.”   
Thought in this way, the present investigation does not follow a “scientific” model in 
this ideal sense.   The aim here is not to develop a polemic against the mode of thinking 
that produces moral friction because it is an inaccurate representation of how things 
really are.  
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Nor is the aim to produce a polemic on normative moral grounds: as if to say that 
one ought not to adopt a mode of thinking because moral friction ought to be avoided.  
Normative moral accounts involve the production of a justifiable standard that makes a 
claim on the intentions of a free agent:  it takes the form, “one ought (or, ought not) do 
X.”  To say that one “ought” do something is at the same moment to recognize that one 
could do otherwise, but that it is “right,” or “proper,” and so on, to do X.   Although a 
normative moral argument may involve description in its supplementary reasoning, its 
conclusion always goes beyond an explanation of facts.  Even if an argument comes 
from the idea of “natural law,” and suggests that: “you ought to do X because you are 
human and human beings naturally do X,” the implication is that “being properly 
human” is optional, and that one ought to choose to be properly human. If successful 
then, a normative argument is expected to shape how a free agent makes choices. On the 
other hand, if one could not do otherwise, then the claim would be tantamount to an 
empirical description concerning how things are rather than a claim about how things 
ought to be.  Again, understood in this way, the diagnosis of moral friction is not part of 
a larger polemic that aims to produce compelling claims on the will of a free agent.  The 
aim, that is, does not involve the anticipation of a conclusion that passes judgment on a 
form of life, and on that basis, recommends an alternative.   
Rather, the theme of moral friction is intended to make explicit the practical 
contradictions that would otherwise remain implicit within a particular historically 
contingent form of life.  Putting it this way reveals that the form of its task is primarily 
descriptive.  However, it’s “guiding expectation” concerning what is to be achieved by 
that description also involves the anticipation of a change in how something happens—
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as opposed to a change in what description we believe to be “true”—and this aspect of 
the “anticipation” of what is to be achieved by the argument is not passive.  But if not in 
the relation between account and reality, or between proper and improper, on what does 
the “necessity” of this active aspect turn?  
Both the passive and active elements of this sort of account come into relief if the 
descriptive account itself is understood to participate in an irrevocable change in how we 
think about what is being described in the account.  A task of this sort must be 
understood to operate within a historical and developmental cultural matrix of ideas, 
practices, concerns, institutions, etc.  Unlike an empirical scientific account, and unlike a 
morally normative argument, both of which operate within a temporally neutral 
conceptual field, the sort of argument I want to produce here understands itself to be part 
of a dynamic, or unfolding, cultural context of significance.  The character of what it 
anticipates, then, should be understood in terms of how it impacts that context.  I 
propose that the character of what is to be achieved in virtue of the present account can 
provisionally be characterized as “practical.”   
The vague usage of the term “practical” here is useful because it indicates that 
both the sort of argumentative strategy characteristic of the methodologies and aims of 
modern science on the one hand, and of normative moral arguments proper to ethical 
and political strategies on the other, may be inadequate for the task of addressing the 
matter at hand.  Since these are the most common argumentative strategies in systematic 
investigations, it will be crucial to lay out the aim and strategy of this investigation in 
formal terms in order to properly develop the thematic of moral friction and 
subsequently of improvisation.   
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Both aim and strategy can efficiently be indicated by reference to two 
constitutive conceptual elements: “hermeneutic phenomenology” and Hegel’s notion of 
“sublation.”    Together, these ideas form a distinctive kind of investigation that I will 
call “moral phenomenology.”  The aim of such an inquiry is first to disclose 
contradictions within our own modern Western form of life (i.e., our own context of 
significance composed of ideas, practices, intuitions, institutions, concerns, etc.) and 
second, to disclose a form of life that at once appropriates and diffuses what is 
practically problematic about those contradictions.  Understood in this way, “moral 
friction” names a contradiction within the ironist’s form of life and the “improviser” 
names a form of life that transcends/resolves (appropriates and diffuses) these 
contradictions.   
§2.2 | Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
Broadly conceived, phenomenology is the attempt to give carful description of 
phenomena as they are encountered prior to the reflective influence of theoretical 
concepts.  The aim is to provide a description of how things looked before one reflects, 
applies concepts, and makes judgments.  The worry that phenomenology attempts to 
address concerns the potential distortion that theoretical concepts and judgments might 
introduce when they sink to the level of commonsense presuppositions that color how 
we talk about those entities and events that are to be explained even before any actual 
investigation.  The aim, then, is to get out from underneath these presuppositions in 
order to get an undistorted view of things—to get at “the things themselves” (where this 
phrase now means how things “appear” or “show themselves” prior to theoretical 
reflection).  What is essential here―what makes phenomenology categorically different 
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from all empirical sciences as they are ordinarily conceived―is the idea that there exists 
an undissolvable relationship between the condition of the observer and the nature of the 
entity that shows up to her.  Phenomenology attempts to describe how things are 
encountered in ordinary, everyday lived experience.  Unlike an empirical scientific 
method, which attempts to get past how things merely appear in order to get a “true” 
picture of how things are independent of an observer, phenomenology begins from the 
intuition that what things are—in themselves—is nothing other than how they “show 
up” prior to reflection; and as such, the “essence” of things (what they are) is 
inextricably entwined with the condition of the being who encounters them.   As an 
event of “seeing” or “encountering,” a phenomenon as such involves both that which is 
seen and the being that is seeing.  Understood in this way, a “phenomenon” is 
ontologically co-primordial with both what shows itself in appearance and the being 
who encounters that which appears.  In this way, the science of phenomenology rejects 
the metaphysics implicit in the standard empirical scientific account that considers a 
description to be the derivative reflection of an independent (non-linguistic) reality to 
which it must, if true, correspond.  In contrast, according to a phenomenological 
account, rather than being dependent on a degree of correspondence, the adequacy of a 
description is tied to the degree to which it is faithful to how things looked prior to the 
reflective application of theoretical constructs.   
 This way of understanding phenomenology derives from Edmond Husserl’s 
adoption of the term; and it is worth briefly rehearsing some key features of Husserl's 
“transcendental phenomenology” as a backdrop against which to foreground 
“hermeneutic phenomenology.”    As Husserl understood it, phenomenology promises to 
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be a new science of being that can serve as an epistemic foundation for modern science 
generally.  Husserl, in the same spirit as Descartes, considered the essence of modern 
science—and, as the “all-inclusive science,” the essence of philosophy itself— to consist 
in the promise of apodictically certain knowledge.26 Unlike Descartes, however (but in 
basic accord with Kant’s epistemic “Copernican revolution”), Husserl considers this 
certainty to be achievable only for a “transcendental subjectivity.”  It is to this universal 
“transcendental subjectivity” that the essence of a thing is tied and not to the individual 
“thinking, doubting thing.”   In other words, although an understanding of the essence of 
a thing necessarily involves understanding something about the being for whom those 
thing appears, since this “necessity” is derived transcendentally―as the condition of 
experience―it is attached only to those features common to all experiencing subjects; 
what Husserl calls a “transcendental ego.”  Or to put the point a third way, the answer to 
the question of “who” it is that stands in an insoluble relationship to the essence of 
things is not “the experiencing subject” (with all its psychological idiosyncrasies), but is 
rather the “transcendental subject” or the “transcendental ego.”  It is this universality 
that provides the epistemic guarantee that phenomenology can ground the sciences by 
defusing the subjectivism that might otherwise plague any attempt to understand the 
essence of things as tied to how they appear to a subject. 
In contrast to Husserl’s view, hermeneutic (or interpretive) phenomenology 
rejects the idea of a “transcendental subjectivity.”  It denies the possibility of occupying 
a presuppositionless vantage point that would render the science of phenomenology a 
merely descriptive activity.   On this view, everything that is to be described by a 	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 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 1-5.  Also see Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and 
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phenomenology always comes to us already interpreted in some fashion or other.  And 
as such, a theory of interpretation—a hermeneutics—must be incorporated into the 
phenomenological method from the start.  However, the rejection of transcendental 
subjectivity does not commit hermeneutic phenomenology to a psychological-
subjectivism.  On the contrary, hermeneutic phenomenology involves its own limiting 
features that insure an “intersubjective” vantage point that stands in an insoluble 
relationship with the essence of things.   
Heidegger’s concept of das Man provides for this “intersubjective” vantage 
point.  Das Man is the subject indicated, for example, in phrases such as: “What does 
one do in this situation?” Or, “one ought not to lie.”  It is the vantage point composed of 
that set of normative standards of a culture in terms of which any articulation or 
understanding of “self” is achieved.  On this view, all self-understandings or self-
interpretations are interpretations or commentaries on (and by) das Man.  What it is to 
be human does not involve being an “individual” (where the term “individual” is 
understood to involve a primary set of individuating features that are uniquely attached 
to some ontologically primitive and independent underlying substance.)  On the 
contrary, to be human is first of all to have taken up a particular way of life composed of 
public ideas, practices, concerns, etc.  The idea here is that prior to any theoretical 
reflection, we encounter entities (including ourselves) and events in the course of 
realizing a particular self-interpretation.  I encounter a book as something to be read 
because I understand myself to be an academic.  Or I understand a tree to be a resource 
for building because I have some understanding of what it would mean to be a builder or 
a carpenter.  The key idea is that both the role of an academic and a carpenter are 
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essentially public.  I can understand what it would be like to be a carpenter (even if it is 
only a vague sense) because what it means to be a “carpenter” is wholly circumscribed 
by public ideas, practices, concerns, institutions, etc.  It is, for example, always open to 
me to drop the life of an academic and take up the life of a carpenter.  According to the 
normative phrases offered above, then, it is because “one” does (or, ought to do) such 
and such, that I also (should) do such and such.  It indicates that this standard is 
independent of, and prior to, any idiosyncratic subjective self-knowing, as it is only via 
an interpretation of myself that involves being either for or against what Man would do 
that I can be anything at all.   
However, unlike the presuppositionless transcendental ego, das Man is defined 
as a particular set of presuppositions or prejudices.  According to this view, absent the 
constellation of prejudices (ideas, practices, intuitions, concerns, institutions, methods, 
and so on) that constitute the horizon of context within which any particular entity or 
event can “show up” meaningfully for das Man, there could be no phenomena.   In this 
sense, it is appropriate to understand das Man as a “formal” condition for the possibility 
of any phenomena whatsoever, and is thus transcendental in a similar fashion to 
Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology.  The difference, however, concerns “what” 
constitutes those conditions.   For Heidegger the ultimate horizon of meaning and the 
ground for any transcendental conditions for the possibility of significance (and thus the 
condition of possibility for phenomena) is das Man—a historically contingent being—
whereas on Husserl’s account, it is transcendental subjectivity—an ahistorical non-
contingent being.    
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In Heidegger’s account, human beings are distinctive (among other entities) in 
that they have an understanding of, and care about, their own being.  I care about what 
my life amounts to as a whole; where the “quantity” of “wholeness” is marked off in a 
determinate way by the bookends of birth and death.  To say that I care about my life as 
a “whole,” then, is to say that I care about the meaning of my life as it unfolds 
temporally and teleologically; I am always projecting towards a completed life, some 
stable configuration of meaning that makes sense of the events that compose my life as a 
whole.  I might ask, “am I realizing the life of a ‘philosopher’ or of an ‘academic,’ am I 
a ‘family man’ or a ‘professional’?”  The idea here is that at any given moment my 
actions are intelligible precisely because, if I reflect on it, each action I perform makes 
sense in the context of some set of projected goals.  I sit down at the computer to write 
in order to organize and archive my thoughts.  This goal in turn may be in order to think 
clearly about some topic.  But ultimately, all these actions are done for the sake of 
realizing the life of a “philosopher” or an “academic.”   
To say that I care about my life as a finished meaningful totality is not to say that 
in focusing on “becoming something” I am attentive to what I am up to in a way that, 
say, a more “relaxed person” might fail to be.  Rather, that we care about who we are is 
a structural feature of what makes human beings distinctive.  My intention to “take it 
easy” or “enjoy the moment” makes sense only because I project the idea of being a 
“relaxed person” as constituting part of how my life will turn out as a whole.  Being a 
“relaxed person,” that is, is itself a form of life that we might care to realize.  According 
to Heidegger’s view, the “care structure” of human existence is the formal condition for 
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the possibility of meaning generally; and this is just to say that the being of things are 
determined within the horizon of some intentional meaningful totality or other.   
The essence of entities is tied to this teleological dimension of human life 
because it is in realizing a particular form of life—or constellation of roles that I project 
myself to be “in the end” and as a whole—that entities can show up for us in 
determinant ways.  Heidegger expresses this idea by suggesting that entities have the 
character of “equipment.”  I use things in the course of particular activities that are in 
turn governed by the form of life I am in the process of realizing.  It is because I project 
the meaning of my life (which, to put it another way, I take on the “identity” of) being 
an “academic” or an “intellectual” that I buy and read books in the way that I do (that is, 
rather than buying books for entertainment, to the have a pretentious book collection, or, 
in another way, to use as paper weights or as tinder to start a fire).  And, in turn, it is in 
order to organize and protect my books, for example, that I have bookcases.  It is only 
because of the role of being an “academic,” “intellectual” and alike, that “bookcases” 
have the qualities they do.  The essence of what it is to be a “bookcase” is inexorably 
tied to a particular set of possibilities for self-understanding that are available in a 
particular community and at a particular time.  It is only because I participate in a world 
(the “world of academia”) that involves the use of books as reference material that 
having a bookcase that protects and organizes those books becomes important.  In the 
same way, a book can show up to me as “something to read”—rather than as a “paper 
weight” or “an oversized coaster”—because one use it as something to be read in the 
course of acting and thinking as one who participates in a world in which books are 
read.  
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But as mentioned above, it is not to a psychologically idiosyncratic individual 
subject that the essence of entities are tied, but to das Man.   The social roles that I might 
take up—either explicitly or by simply falling into them—and project for my life as a 
whole are not of my making.  Rather, these social roles together constitute the ultimate 
range of possible self-understandings available to a particular people at a particular time.  
I am “thrown” into this range of possibilities and have always already taken up some of 
them; as it is only in projecting some particular range of possible social roles for my life 
as a whole that I can “come across” myself as anything at all.    
On this view, for example, taking on the role of a solipsistic “doubting, thinking 
thing,” far from being the only original and certain human perspective, is rather a highly 
specialized and derivative activity that is intelligible only within the framework of a 
unique set of historically contingent concerns.   In order to understand what Descartes is 
up to in his Meditations on First Philosophy, one must understand the particular kind of 
epistemic “crisis” that Descartes is attempting to avert.  Without the context of meaning 
which is itself governed by a concern for establishing epistemic certainty in the 
sciences—as well as the socio-cultural and psychological context fueling the 
enlightenment as a whole—Descartes methodological doubt seems absurd (as my 
students never fail to remind me upon their first encounter with the text).  It is not 
obvious, that is, why one should care about discovering rational and certain grounds on 
which to build the sciences.   One has to be taught why one should have this particular 
care; which is to say, that one must be educated into a form of life (a set of ideas, 
practices, concerns, and so on) in which caring about achieving absolute certainty 
matters.  If one is concerned, for example, about “replacing the superstition of religion 
	  	  	   81	  
with the promise of ‘knowledge’ offered by the empirical sciences,” or in another way, 
about “understanding the world correctly such that we can live within it properly” 
(because the welfare of our immortal soul hangs on getting this right), then it makes 
sense to care about achieving apodictic certainty; and it thus makes sense to follow 
Descartes’ Meditations through.  But one has to project being (at least methodologically) 
an “atheist” or a confirmed “theist” respectively (along with the rich complex of ideas, 
institutions, practices, intuitions, etc., that go along with realizing these social roles) in 
order for it to make any sense at all why it is important, and why it might be appropriate, 
to take on the perspective of a “doubting, thinking thing.” 
It should be clear at this point that Heidegger’s understanding of human being 
(what or “who” is under consideration, that is) is essentially (as long as we attach no 
technical ontological priority to the term “subject”) an “intersubjective” entity.  We are, 
in our concrete everyday lives, realizing what it is to be an instance of das Man; and 
respectively, das Man has no existence independent of what human beings, in their care 
for their own being, are sustaining via the lives they are in the process of actualizing.27   
As the ultimate context of significance, it would be a distortion to think that we 
are individuated organisms that, through some kind of “emergence” which has yet to be 
explained, are collectively the network of organic “hardware” on which the “software” 
of culture operates, and through which it is sustained.  Putting things this way confuses 
Heidegger’s existential analysis of human being with a kind of empirical anthropology.  	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Heidegger’s suggestion is of an altogether different sort.   This can be made clear if we 
recall that Heidegger’s analysis is aimed at disclosing transcendental conditions for the 
possibility of encountering any entity in its being whatsoever; and this includes the 
ontological presuppositions that underwrite any empirical anthropology.  The essence of 
an “organism,” of “culture,” or, in another way, of “consciousness” are all determined, 
prior to any theoretical inquiry, by some range of self-understandings available to a 
particular people as a possible way of being.    
Like Husserl, Heidegger maintains “that phenomenology is not just one 
philosophical science among others….[but] rather, the expression ‘phenomenology’ is 
the name of the method of scientific philosophy in general.”28  However, what should 
now be heard in this claim is the idea that phenomenology is the “way” of doing 
philosophy that is appropriate to the relationship between human being as an instance of 
das Man and the essence of any entity whatsoever.  Or, in other words, phenomenology 
is the proper way of doing ontology. It is the science that is appropriate to the 
determination of what it means to inquire into the being of entities; what in Being and 
Time Heidegger calls “fundamental ontology.”   
The task of fundamental ontology, as that which discloses what it means for an 
entity to be as such, must be understood to precede the findings of any empirical 
science.  But more than this, it most precede what might be called a “regional 
ontology”—whereby this phrase I mean to indicate the science which determines what 
can properly count as an entity in a particular context.  We must know, for example, 
what it is to be a “mollusk,” a “painting,” or a “ghost,” before we can get to the business 
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of studying them—lest we would not know which entities to study or how to approach 
them.   Certainly the fictional character Sherlock Holmes “exists” in some sense—i.e., 
has an essence—but we would have made a basic ontological error if we travel to 221b 
Baker Street in London to learn about him.   We must know what it is to “be” a fictional 
character before we begin our investigation into any particular fictional character.29  
According to the view outlined above, we discover the essence of a thing, not by 
sloughing off our prejudices such that we can get at the thing as it exists independent of 
us (if this were the order of investigation, an empirical investigation could never get 
under way), but rather, by being attentive to how things originally show up for us, prior 
to reflection.  What I am here calling a “regional ontology,” then, is the determination of 
what way of life it is that discloses—prior to reflection—entities such as “mollusks,” 
“paintings,” ghosts,” or “fictional characters.” Fundamental ontology, on the other hand, 
tells us that the way to conceive of these entities is as “equipment” in the unfolding of 
some particular self-understanding or other.   It is fundamental ontology that tells us 
what it means to look for the being of an entity; it tells us, that is, that there are regional 
ontologies that are determined by different contexts of equipmental use under different 
self-understandings.   “Phenomenology” names how we make these contexts explicit.  
This way of putting things opens Heidegger to a problem of reflexivity.30 The 
explicit aim of Being and Time is to “lay bare the horizon within which something like 
Being in general becomes intelligible…[that is,] to clarif[y] the possibility of having any 
understanding of being at all” 31; which means that the aim is to uncover the 
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transcendental conditions within which any understanding of being whatsoever must be 
subject.   But this aim conflicts with the findings of Heidegger’s existential analysis of 
human being in the first division of Being and Time.  If we follow those findings 
through, then doing fundamental ontology must itself be understood as a highly 
contextualized activity that makes sense only in the frame of a finite and contingent 
range of possible self-understandings available in our particular cultural context.  
One way to see how fundamental ontology can itself be contextualized, and yet 
retain its transcendental necessity, is to place it in the context of an irreversible cultural 
development.  Irreversible, that is, because Heidegger’s approach to ontology has 
fundamentally altered how we talk about what it is to be.  We cannot, that is, at least not 
without showing how Heidegger’s approach is faulty in some essential way, simply 
forget about the possibility that the essence of entities, and thus what concerns the 
foundation of any science whatsoever, is tied to the teleological projections constitutive 
of a unique and contingent range of possible self-understandings available to a particular 
people.  Although it was not Heidegger’s intention, on this way of seeing things, the fact 
that fundamental ontology is itself a historically contingent and highly contextualized 
activity is a virtue—as confirmation of its findings—rather than a failing.   But to see 
exactly how this idea works, it will be helpful to draw on Gadamer’s development of 
notion of “Bildung.”  
In his Truth and Method, Gadamer develops the concept of “Bildung” 
(cultivation, enculturation, or education) in relation to Hegel’s notion of “practical 
Bildung.” For Hegel, this phrase names the process by which one appropriates—or, is 
educated into—a set of norms or standards imbedded within a particular community.  It 
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is worth quoting Gadamer at length here. Utilizing the example of one’s profession, 
Gadamer writes: 
Practical Bildung is seen in one’s fulfilling one’s profession wholly, in all 
its aspects.  But this includes overcoming the element in it that is alien to 
the particularity which is oneself, and making it wholly one’s own.  Thus 
to give oneself to the universality of a profession is at the same time ‘to 
know how to limit oneself—i.e., to make one’s profession wholly one’s 
concern. Then it is no longer a limitation.’ [This idea] becomes completely 
clear in the idea of theoretical Bildung, for to have a theoretical stance is, 
as such, already alienation, namely to demand that one ‘deal with 
something that is not immediate, something that is alien, with something 
that belongs to memory and to thought.’ Theoretical Bildung leads beyond 
what man knows and experiences immediately. It consists in learning to 
affirm what is different from oneself and to find universal viewpoints from 
which one can grasp [things in an objective manner].  That is why 
acquiring Bildung always involves the development of theoretical 
interests, and Hegel declares the world and language of antiquity to be 
especially suitable for this, since this world is remote and alien enough to 
effect the necessary separation of ourselves from ourselves, ‘but it 
contains at the same time all the exit points and threads of the return to 
oneself, for becoming acquainted with it and for finding oneself again, but 
oneself according to a truly universal essence… To recognize one’s own 
in the alien, to become at home in it, is the basic movement of spirit, 
whose being consists only in returning to itself from what is other.  Hence 
all theoretical Bildung, even acquiring foreign languages and conceptual 
worlds, is merely the continuation of a process of Bildung that begins 
much earlier. Every single individual who raises himself out of his natural 
being to the spiritual finds in the language, customs, and institutions of his 
people a pre-given body of material which, as in learning to speak, he has 
to make his own. Thus every individual is always engaged in the process 
of Bildung.’32 
 
 On his view, rather than being part of a method for arriving at an ever more 
accurate description of the way things originally “show up,” hermeneutics is thought to 
be the basic movement of culture itself—i.e., as the movement between “individuals” 
and the vocabularies, norms, social roles, etc., they received from their cultural 
traditions; and which, in the very act of taking them over, participate in an original 	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interpretation of them. We are all always in the business of doing hermeneutics in the 
activity of learning.  Education (Bildung) itself, on this view, is from the start an 
interpretative activity.    
We can see in both Heidegger and Gadamer the formal movements of 
hermeneutical phenomenology.  This movement involves three moments or positions: 
(1) a “naïve” reception of tradition in a pre-reflective appropriation (which is itself a 
kind of unreflective interpretation); (2) an alienation from this tradition33 via a kind of 
uncanny individuation or negation with what was once familiar via (somewhat 
counterintuitively) revealing what we are in a theoretical or reflective attentiveness; and 
(3), a return to the tradition that has been explicitly interpreted and appropriated (i.e., 
through education).  Nevertheless, the return is always an arrival to a condition that has 
been altered by an explicit interpretation. “Hermeneutics” names the transmission and 
alteration of culture through the mediation of an alienated position.   
In the sense that Gadamer means it, as an essential feature of the human 
condition, hermeneutics is the movement of culture itself.  From this broad umbrella, 
fundamental ontology can find a home within that movement.  Yet imbedding it within 
the movement of culture—and here is the curial point—it does not lose any of its 
immediate necessity.  There is no way to undo the shift in thinking, and the 
corresponding cultural transformations that were precipitated by Heidegger via the 	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widespread appropriation of many of his key ideas.  Moreover, because there is no 
“outside” the hermeneutic horizon of our unique moment in history, there is no higher 
court of appeal.  The very possibility—and this simply means its intelligibility—of 
Heidegger’s account, makes the changes in thinking and culture that correspond to it as 
necessary as anything can be. 
But the framework in which this necessity is binding, of course, is itself subject 
to further development.  And this development, we would expect (although it may not), 
would bear a relationship to fundamental ontology similar to that which fundamental 
ontology has with transcendental phenomenology.  Such developments are 
accomplished, for the most part, incrementally via small but decisive shifts in how we 
think about particular problems that arise within highly contextualized environments.  
What is key to note here is that such developments are of the same kind as more 
mundane developments; such as how we think about the nature of electrical currents and 
magnetic fields, for example.  In each case, the development is accomplished by an 
alienation from the commonplace—breakdowns in the otherwise sooth flow of life.  In 
these moments of alienation, there is an opportunity to draw on the resources (the 
stockpile of ideas, practices, concerns, etc.) that reside in the backdrop of our own 
cultural horizon.   
“Moral phenomenology” then, names the practice of actively putting a received 
set of ideas, vocabularies, practices, and concerns “into question” via a carful 
description of the phenomena those concepts ordinarily “simply indicate.” The 
discrepancies between the descriptions that hermeneutic phenomenology produce, on the 
one hand, and the character of the “simple indication,” on the other, provide the 
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occasion for seeking out a new interpretation. Or in other words, it is a practice that 
utilizes carful description to alienate the received tradition such that a “gap” in meaning 
is opened, and within which it become possible to discover phenomena that would 
otherwise remain concealed—discover phenomena, that is, via an uncommon 
appropriation and deployment of other vocabularies within the same tradition.   
But to do hermeneutic phenomenology properly and consistently (that is, carry 
through with its implications), everything must swing free—every idea, practice, 
concern, institution, and so on, or any constellation of these, must be available for 
possible redescription.  Even “down” so far as to fundamental ontology itself—which 
also means the meaning of hermeneutic phenomenology.   But to say this is of course 
not to imply that everything must swing free all at once.  It is unclear what a generalized 
decontexualizaion would mean (and whatever it would mean, it would involve the 
cessation of culture and, indeed, of thinking itself).    Rather, the idea here is that 
nothing is barred in advance from a possible redescription.  As I suggested above, 
substantial cultural developments generally occur incrementally (but decisively) in 
highly contextualized situations; and on occasion, their very presence or availability 
(rather than their being demonstrably “true” or “right” according to the typical, received 
standards) have far reaching consequences for our whole historical horizon of meaning.   
My aim in the present investigation is to open up the possibility for such a 
development.   The theme of moral friction is intended to be a wedge, as it were, to 
expose fissures in the ironist’s form of life in such a way that it also anticipates a form of 
life that transcends/resolves (or, dissolves) the tensions that force those fractures.  But 
what specific arguments, one might reasonably ask, can be given to prefer the new 
	  	  	   89	  
description over the old? Is this a mere matter of preference? Or is there a necessity built 
into the movement from the one description to the other? The kind of active “force” of 
persuasion that this investigation should have can be exhibited in a technical sense via 
the Hegelian notion of “sublation.” 
 
§2.3 | Sublation 
Gadamer’s way of understanding hermeneutic phenomenology as an 
investigation into the dynamics of cultural development itself is build on a conceptual 
foundation laid by Hegel.  The pattern of cultural development embodied in the concept 
of “bildung” corresponds to the key features in the development of what, for Hegel, is 
“spirit” or “mind” (geist).  Those key ideas can be combined in this way:  Human beings 
always make sense of their lives in the terms given by a publicly articulated 
constellation of ideas, intuitions, practices, concerns, and so on.  This constellation is 
constitutive of the norms and standards that enable and govern human intentionality 
(what we project or “intend” for our lives and the lives of others in our ordinary way of 
understanding what we or others are “up to” when taking action).  Within the framework 
of his account, spirit circumscribes human understanding as the condition for the 
possibility of agency itself.  As Robert Pippin puts it, “for an action to count as mine, it 
must make a certain kind of sense to the agent, and that means it must fit intelligibly 
within a whole complex of practices and intuitions within which doing this now could 
have a coherent meaning.”34   Yet because this “complex of practices and intuitions” 
(and ideas, concerns, etc.) is not given by the agent herself, it would be incorrect to think 
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 Pippin, Hegel's Practical Philosophy, 5. Pippin’s emphasis	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of spirit as a phenomenon that can be accounted for via a reduction to the intentions of 
individual human beings.  On this view, being an individual, and having intentions that 
correspond to the recognition of oneself and others as individuals, is itself a possibility 
only because of a particular set of relationships between ideas within spirit.  The idea of 
being an individual, of having freedom, rights, and responsibilities, is a historical 
achievement for spirit and not a simple ahistorical aspect of human ontology.  It follows 
from this that accounting for spirit (and the particular relationships that exist within it at 
any one time) cannot operate within a traditional ontological dualism wherein natural 
events are distinguished from purposive or intentional events.  Spirit is not the content 
that flickers on the screen of consciousness—a consciousness possessed by an 
ontologically primitive and individuated “thinking thing.”  Properly speaking, as the 
ultimate horizon of context within which anything whatsoever can show up as 
meaningful, spirit can be accounted for only from within spirit itself.   Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit is explicitly a developmental account of spirit becoming aware 
of itself.   What is of particular interest for the present project is the way in which Hegel 
accounts for this development of spirit towards self-recognition.   
 At any given stage of development, spirit is understood to include a host of 
conflicting ideas, practices, concerns, etc., which together produce contradictions 
particular to that stage (particular to that configuration of constitutive ideas, practices, 
etc.).   Because these contradictions are in part definitive of that stage itself, they are not 
resolvable without a development of spirit as a whole.  This shift in spirit from one stage 
to the next is marked by a resolution of the contradictions that were definitive of the 
previous stage.   However, this “resolution” is not accomplished by a rejection of one of 
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the contradicting terms (idea, practice, concern, etc), but rather involves a shift in 
perspective that fundamentally transforms the meaning of those terms in such a way that 
what was contradictory about them becomes irrelevant.   
To give a contemporary example, the Marx-inspired international proletarian 
revolutions of the last century, which sought to facilitate the transition from a capitalist 
control of production to a more egalitarian (classless and stateless) social order, is 
increasingly absent from mainstream discourse in contemporary North American.  It is 
certainly not the case that the tensions that called for this revolution have been resolved, 
but rather, that the conceptual and practical coherence of both capitalist and communist 
ideologies (and the forms of life they articulate) have been blurred.  How we think and 
talk about what it is to be human, and therefore, what it means to be in a social order, 
has changed (amongst other things).  Many of the very same intellectuals who we might 
expect to have been moved by Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky are now working in a 
vocabulary informed by thinkers such as Heidegger, Derrida, and Foucault.   The 
contemporary North American leftist intellectual has no doubt retained a moral and 
political intuition concerning social justice that would have once naturally reposed 
within a Marxist inspired political vocabulary, but this intuition goes largely 
“unjustified” today—that is, robust and comprehensive arguments are seldom marshaled 
to provide a broad spectrum rational justification of these intuitions.    Nevertheless, just 
as this quasi-Marxist moral intuition has been retained, so have particular Marx-inspired 
ideas concerning the “resistance” to oppressive social norms and vocabularies, for 
example.  Despite the blurring of the conceptual coherence that give meaning to these 
ideas and intuitions, they persist by being integrated into the foundation of new ideas, 
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practices, and intuitions—as foundational to these developments, they are inextricably 
entwined in future forms of life.  Yet, at the same time, the blurring diffuses what made 
for well-formulated oppositions.  It is this movement that both diffuses oppositions and 
yet retains the terms of the opposition that provides for both a preservation and 
transcendence of a particular stage of spirit that Hegel calls the process of “sublation.” 
In its most basic form, the concept of “sublation” (Aufhebung) refers to a 
dialectical movement from an initial opposition between two contradictory ideas or set 
of ideas to a third idea or set of ideas in which what was contradictory in the initial pair 
is at once fully appropriated and preserved and yet transcended or resolved.  One way to 
make sense of how this movement works is to take note of how different “vantage 
points” operate in the development.  The movement itself has three “vantage points” or 
“positions.” First, (P1) there is a “pre-reflective” or “unmediated” position.  Next, there 
is a (P2) position in which the ideas implicit in the pre-reflective position (P1) come in 
to view via a contrast produced by the disclosure of internal contradictions within the 
ideas that compose (P1).  And there is a final position (P3) in which the opposition 
revealed at (P2) is transformed in such a way that the opposition can be viewed in terms 
of the contradiction, but which can at the same time be resolved by its inclusion in a new 
wider set of ideas that was not available at (P1) and is only anticipated or “hinted at” in 
(P2) by the contradiction itself.  The concept of sublation names this particular 
movement from (P2) to (P3).35  
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 The multiple meanings of the German word that Hegel uses to indicate this movement, “aufhaben,” can 
be instructive here.  Its most basic meaning is “to pick something up,” or “to raise” something from a 
lower position to a higher position. It can also mean “to preserve” or “to save”; as if “to pick something up 
and save it for later.” More commonly, however, it is used to mean “to cancel” or “to reverse”; in the 
sense that a prohibition or law might be “lifted.” All three meanings indicate how the movement from (2) 
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We have seen this pattern already in discussing the basic movement of 
Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics.  There we saw three 
positions:  (P1) a “naïve” or “pre-reflective” appropriation of a way of disclosing the 
world provided by the traditions of a historical people (its vocabulary, practices, 
concerns, etc.); (P2) an alienation from this initial pre-reflective mode of appropriating a 
tradition—an alienation that is occasioned by an explicitation of what now can only be 
seen as having been implicit at (P1); and (P3) an explicit appropriation of what is 
revealed at (P2) back into the tradition, albeit in a way that has been transformed. 
Although it follows a similar—though not identical—structure, one crucial 
difference between Heidegger’s ideas as developed in Being and Time on the one hand, 
and Gadamer and Hegel on the other, is that for Heidegger, the vantage point from 
(P3)—what would be the “authentic” mode—does not amount to a substantial 
development beyond the form of life that one is always already realizing at (P1).  
Rather, it is a transformation in the mode of comportment toward that same form of life 
by way of an explicit approbation of it; or in other words, by taking ownership of it.  For 
Gadamer and Hegel, on the other hand, the movement from (P2) to (P3) constitutes a 
substantial development, such that after the passage through (P2), one can no longer 
return to the same form of life as at (P1).  Or to put it another way, whereas for 
Heidegger the only difference between (P1) and (P3) is how things “look,” for Gadamer 
and Hegel, the difference between (P1) and (P3) is substantial; that is, the dialectic has 
changed the “world” itself.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to (3) involves the transcendence of the opposition (reversal) revealed at (2) while at the same time 
preserving that contradiction.	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Suppose that I, for example, were to have grown up thinking that some particular 
version of modern progressive liberal politics was the “obvious” way to see the world 
(P1) and that all other politics were simply a result of either “poor thinking” or a 
holdover from older, more “primitive,” ways of seeing the world.  And then let us also 
suppose that I was subsequently exposed to the ambiguities and contradictions (P2) 
involved in the attempt to give a coherent history which reflected a linear and rational 
development from the “primitive” to the “enlightened” way of seeing things which I had 
once thought to be “obvious.” I might, upon reflection, eventually come to affirm my 
initial political orientation at (P3), or I may come to reject it.  If I do come to reject it, 
either in part or in whole, such a rejection would not constituted a negation of the world 
I lived in at (P1); rather, it would be a rejection of how what was “obvious” or “taken for 
granted” at (P1) looks after it has been thematized and made explicit at (P2).  Likewise, 
if I was to affirm a modern progressive liberal politics at (P3), what I affirm are the 
modern progressive liberal politics as seen thought the thematic mediation accomplished 
at (P2).  On this view, the “return” at (P3) is a return to a transformed landscape.  What 
is of crucial importance for this investigation is the nature of this substantial difference 
between (P1) and (P3).   
From the vantage point of (P3), how things look from (P1) seems “naïve” or 
“unsophisticated.”  What is most interesting about this difference, however, is that it is 
impossible to willfully choose to take up the naïve position once one has passed through 
(P2).  The act of deciding upon what to affirm—which marks the transition to (P3)—is 
itself made possible by the “option” itself; and options are available only after one has 
been alienated from the undifferentiated/pre-reflective form of life at (P1).  Reversing 
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the process of alienation is impossible precisely because what was undifferentiated at 
(P1) has been transformed by the mediation of interpretation at (P2).  Only by a genuine 
lapse of memory, not only for an individual, but for all who participated in a particular 
interpretation (which is, in Heidegger’s terms, the cultural memory of das Man), could 
something like a true return (at least in principle) be achieved.36  The fact that the 
condition for the possibility of “forgetting” would necessarily involve the “collective 
forgetting” by a whole community accords with the idea that interpretations are 
essentially public.  And this implication means that the proper level of these dialectical 
developments is that of traditions, as Gadamer’s notion of Bildung suggests.  
It also means that every occasion for a hermeneutic phenomenology must 
proceed from the inadequacies of a publicly available contradiction or discrepancy 
between two elements within the “common sense” of a particular people.  In formal 
terms, the investigation must proceed along the initial steps in the thematization of the 
inadequacies of the naïve position accomplished at (P2), but it can do so only after a 
publicly accessible “prompt” which initiates the alienation by revealing a systematic 
contradiction within that form of life.  In other words, there must be some definite 
phenomenological indication that something is “amiss,” that something is calling us out 
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 We see something like an attempt at such a reversal, for example, in parents who, due to a kind of 
nostalgia for the naïve position, attempt to shelter their children from the conditions that produce the 
alienation that is occasioned by the reflection, thematization (interpretation) and choice that makes the 
naïve position unrecoverable.   The above analysis, however, would suggest that such attempts are, at best, 
futile, and at worst, crippling to the child’s ability to negotiate the “common sense” of the wider 
community.   Even in extreme attempts where a whole community isolates itself, and thereby provides the 
most practically optimal conditions for sheltering its children, it is hard to imagine that the world-view of 
the parent, which is disclosed from the position of having made a choice, could be concealed from the 
child.  There would inevitably be gaps in meaning between the world that the parents wanted the child to 
see and the world that they reveal to them though the parents own actions.  Only through a kind of 
punitive or disciplinary procedure encouraging one “not to think,” one can imagine, can these gaps of 
meaning be kept from spreading in to alienation.	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of our immersion in our everyday worldly engagements and is prompting reflection, 
questioning, and interpretation.   
 
§2.4 | Two Kinds of Clues 
I concluded the previous section by suggesting that the character of the 
transformation that is to be achieved in virtue of the account could only be identified in 
relation to a prior clue concerning what is to be addressed in the investigation.  In other 
words, a “change” or “transformation” can be anticipated in what is to be accomplished 
in virtue of the account only because there is a prior perception that something is 
“amiss,” and that it is partly constitutive of the task of giving the account to penetrate 
this perception in such a way as to resolve what is perceived to be problematic in it.  The 
particular “change” in question can only be identified in relation to what motivates the 
account.  To say that we have such a “prior perception” is to indicate that we already 
have access to the “problem” in some definite sense.  It follows then, that with regard to 
the thematic of moral friction we should already be familiar with the phenomenon in 
some determent way (even thought it might be obscured by traditional epistemic, moral, 
sociological and psychological theoretical frameworks).  
On the other hand, I began this chapter by suggesting that every account gets 
guided in advance by some expectation concerning what the account is supposed to 
achieve; and the anticipation of what is to be accomplished by the investigation guides 
an initial hermeneutic that enables us to pick out the relevant phenomenon as our initial 
“prompt”; that is, the first sort of “clue” I just introduced in the above paragraph about 
something being ‘amiss.’  In other words, we cannot proceed from an uncanny situation 
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alone.  Rather, some intuition that suggests a novel thematic must be available to 
provide a “wedge,” as it were, to pry open the gaps in meaning that accompanies the 
uncanniness of alienation.  Alienation alone only provides the occasion for a 
hermeneutic phenomenology; the substance of that hermeneutic can only be unlocked by 
yet another kind of clue about what might be achieved by the investigation, even if that 
clue is initially quite vague.  
In formal terms, the point may be put this way: the transformation that is 
accomplished at (P2) begins from vague insights or clues at both its “borders” with (P1) 
and with (P3).  In our case, this means that the phenomenon of moral friction first 
becomes accessible only in the presence of these two sorts of clues.  However, it is 
important to make a distinction between two movements of the hermeneutic for the 
purpose of illuminating the two tasks implicit in this sort of investigation.  The first task 
is to recognize—to become aware of—a contradiction or opposition between two 
elements that are definitive of a particular way of life.  This “awareness” arrives as the 
anxiety that accompanies the alienation from the familiar flow of one’s everyday 
engagements.  The second task is to thematize that awareness (and thus become 
“substantially” aware) in such a way as to anticipate and ultimately achieve a resolution 
to what is contradictory while at the same time preserving the terms of the contradiction.  
In fact, both tasks are accomplished at once with the arrival of the mediating theme.  But 
such an “arrival” is only made possible by two conditions.  There must be something 
“amiss” in the original position, and there must be some definite possibility of resolving 
what is awry.   From a methodological point of view, these two “conditions” can best be 
thought of as “clues” to the thematic that at once first reveals the contradiction, and then 
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ultimately anticipates a resolution of the contradiction, as that which is to be achieved by 
the arrival of the mediating thematic.  
The first kind of clue (C1) concerns familiar situations that consistently produce 
an uncanniness or awkwardness in the otherwise smooth flow of the “naïve position.”  
At the same time, however, there must also be a clue (C2) concerning what might be 
achieved at (P3); and this requirement is pressing not only as that which provides 
phenomenal conformation of (C1)—as the indication of a contradiction worthy of 
consideration—but also as that which provides a trajectory for how the transition from 
(P2) to (P3) is to be accomplished (or at least what is called for in order for such a 
transition to be possible); and it is thereby the ground for all meaningful interpretive 
activity that constitutes (P2).  Without (C2), the uncanniness of any sort of situation at 
(C1) would undoubtedly be repeatedly lost and overrun by the demands of everyday life, 
we would simply fall back into the “flow.”  Whatever opportunity might be offered by a 
moment of uncanniness is lost if no thematic wedge can keep it alive as an open 
question—as a topic of concern.   
In the course of communicating a theme that has been identified, it is more useful 
to begin from (C1) since it is this condition that first illuminates a potential need—as 
that which first indicates what practical end is to be achieved by an account.  However, 
just as (C1) depends upon (C2) to confirm its significance (as a topic worthy of 
consideration—as a topic we already care about), (C2) will remain a mere fancy—mere 
abstraction or intuition--without the phenomenological substantiation provided by (C1).   
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§2.5 | Moral Phenomenology  
I want to conclude this chapter by giving a formal definition of the form of 
argument I have been calling “moral phenomenology,” as well as to anticipate the 
relationship that moral phenomenology will have to a form of life that I will call the 
“improviser.”  “Moral phenomenology” names the practice of explicitly disclosing 
contradictions within a particular form of life in such a way that the interpretation that 
discloses the contradiction is itself catalyst to the transformation of the background 
context of significance that eventually transcends/resolves the contradiction. 
Hermeneutic phenomenology, when understood as the practice of interpreting how we 
encounter the world prior to rational reflection, in combination with the asymmetrical 
cultural development captured in the notion of “sublation,” together constitute the 
elements that accomplish the task of moral phenomenology.  Hermeneutic 
phenomenology concerns the interpretation of phenomena from the point of view of das 
Man; it is the “way” or “practice” of doing philosophy that is appropriate to the 
relationship between human being as an instance of das Man and the essence of any 
entity whatsoever.  It is on account of the fact that an asymmetrical cultural 
development, produced by the deployment of hermeneutic phenomenology in the course 
of revealing the contradictions first encountered as anxiety, ultimately has the 
consequences of altering the significance of “things and events” as they show up in any 
particular social role, that I call the method I am introducing here “moral 
phenomenology.”   
Moreover, hermeneutic phenomenology has the power to instigate asymmetrical 
temporal development in the background horizon of significance for a whole form of 
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life, with the effect of altering (to varying degrees) what it means to occupy a particular 
social role at any given stage.  As a result it also changes the value distinctions (in 
relation to which strong evaluations are expressed) that are partly constitutive of those 
very social roles.  A change in the background horizon of significance of a particular 
form of life will inevitably alter the meaning and importance of any particular strong 
evaluation.  Once this asymmetrical development is accomplished, the strong 
evaluations expressed may be in conflict with those characteristic of the previous stage.  
However, regardless of whether they are compatible or not, the relationship between the 
strong evaluations and norms expressed from (P1) will inevitably reveal those expressed 
from (P3) as incoherent and threatening. Alternatively, the strong evaluations and norms 
expressed from (P3) can only reflect on those expressed at (P1) as “naïve.”  It is in virtue 
of this substantial development of the context within which strong evaluations are made 
that I call this method “moral phenomenology.” 
From a purely methodological point of view, moral phenomenology is both 
descriptive and normative.  Therefore, the vocabulary it develops will not suffer from 
the ontological difficulties discussed in Part One regarding moral friction; difficulties 
that required delaying the final account until after the framework of moral 
phenomenology became available.   On the other hand, Gadamer is right to say that 
hermeneutic phenomenology describes the inherent movement of culture itself, and is 
thus not properly a “methodology” at all; however, what makes moral phenomenology a 
categorically different concern is the explicit or intentional use of hermeneutic 
phenomenology to expose contradictions when we encounter them as anxiety in 
everyday life.  Culture can—and does—take care of itself.  However, there is nothing to 
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prevent us from seeking out, in a systematic way, redescriptions that have the effect of 
sublating the tensions that characterize our own form of life.  If an account is formulated 
such that older alternative ways of thinking seem both naïve yet necessary as 
foundations or sources of the new account, then the hermeneutic is successful as a moral 
phenomenology. Or, put in another way, the mark of a successful moral 
phenomenological investigation is that its results seem obvious—as if one should have 
always understood this—and yet are substantially different from one’s older ways of 
thinking.   
Moreover, moral phenomenology is not external to culture—-i.e., such that it 
must (or ought) be employed if culture is to “get it right” (descriptively or normatively).  
Understanding moral phenomenology in this way once again confuses it with the 
epistemic structure of an empirical scientific or normative moral argument.  It suggests 
that a methodology is appropriate to an extra-historical form of thinking that can then be 
applied to that history and thereby direct its course from outside.  This is how Gadamer 
uses the term “methodology,” and it is what motivates its rejection when characterizing 
hermeneutics.  However, I want to appropriate the term in a way that recognizes that any 
method of thinking is always internal to a particular historical cultural context of 
significance; and as such, it carries the necessities that obtain within and between the 
ideas, practices, concerns, etc., of that stage of cultural development.   
Understanding that any methodological thinking whatsoever exists within the 
context of some historical situation or other is the consequence of accepting the radical 
historicization suggested above.  When placed within historical development, however, 
we get “methodology” back, so to speak, albeit in a way that limits the significance of 
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the method to a particular historical context.  But this, again, does not diminish the 
necessity of the relationships between ideas, practices, concerns, etc., to which that 
method is appropriate.  On the contrary, the radical historicization of any mode of 
thinking whatsoever reveals the necessity within a context as its internal limits; and with 
regard to a particular configuration of meaning, these limits are ultimate.  Nevertheless, 
those limits can be transformed if and only if the configuration of meaning as a whole 
itself is transformed.  Yet as a structural condition for the possibility of thinking 
(whatever those conditions might be), it is important to note that such limits cannot be 
simply ignored, as if to suggest that because they are contingent, they are not binding.  
On the contrary, within the limits of a particular total context of significance, they are 
absolutely binding.   
When understood to be appropriate to a particular context of significance, moral 
phenomenology must be thought as ultimately self-referential.  But this fact should be 
understood as a virtue.  Once one accepts a radical historicization of the total context of 
significance, any systematic method of thinking should be able to account for itself in 
relation to that context.  As an intentional practice, and in the course of its novel 
illumination of the world, it will undoubtedly ultimately transform both itself and its 
relationship to the world.   
It should be clear, then, that I am in agreement with Gadamer’s assessment of the 
primacy of Bildung.  But I want to go further than he does by suggesting that in 
explicitly accepting the idea that the basic character of human thinking is hermeneutic, 
we are given license to appropriate this insight for a systematic employment of 
hermeneutic phenomenology in the service of actively or intentionally transforming our 
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own cultural context of significance.  And this appropriation and active deployment of 
hermeneutic phenomenology is given philosophical warrant to make claims of necessity 
(rather than deploying it as mere cultural criticism) just in case it actually accomplishes 
an irreversible shift in a background of significance as a whole.
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Part Three  |  The Improviser 
 
§2.1 | Two Clues 
In order that the task of defusing moral friction via the characterization of the 
“improviser” might both be motivated and guided by a sense of what is at stake in 
achieving its end, it must begin by treating a familiar sort of phenomenon.  The example 
I have in mind pertains to situations in which a range of attitudes―what may be 
characterized as a generalized form of “unreflective” or “commonsense moral 
relativism”—works to shape how we think about any more or less explicit formulation 
of the question of the good life.  By the phrase “question of the good life,” I will mean 
any inquiry aimed at establishing an understanding of what kind of life is more (or most) 
worth living.  The example can serve as a clue to what has become objectionable about 
situations in which this question is either explicitly expressed or implied.  
In other words, fully thematizing the condition of moral friction and the 
condition of its sublational defusion must be guided by what is to be achieved via the 
thematization itself.   What is needed, in other words, is a particular familiar situation 
that may or may not be subject to moral friction depending on how it is interpreted by 
those participating in the situation.  With regard to methodology, such an indication or 
clue must suggest a substantive vision of some alternative form of life that opens a space 
in which moral friction is retrospectively the proper theme.  The “negative space” that 
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the problematic of moral friction presents as a “question” in need of an “answer” is not 
enough to justify the kind of redescription of familiar conditions (leveling and 
depression) that the theme of moral friction itself requires.  Only a situation that can be 
exhibited from the view that produces moral fiction and then the view from that of the 
improviser, without fundamentally altering the essential characteristics of the particular 
sort of situation under examination, can justify or properly motivate both redescriptions 
as part of a problem (moral friction) in need of an answer (improvisation).  Providing 
these two clues utilizing the same situation as experienced from different vantage points 
has the advantage of not only justifying both redescriptions, but also of providing a 
phenomenological introduction to the distinctive structural and temporal features of the 
improviser’s form of life.   
My strategy then is to look at a particular situation in which the “question of the 
good life” becomes practically pressing.  Looking at a particular situation, an example, 
makes clear both how the forms of ironist (the decisionist and the suspicionist) and the 
improviser comport themselves in fundamentally different ways.  An examination of this 
situation helps build sufficient phenomenological contrasts to provide for an initial 
formal thematization of the improviser.  In order to build-out this formal account, in 
section 3.5, I turn to the peculiar temporal dynamics of musical improvisation as a clue 
to the temporal dynamics of hermeneutic improvisation.   Finally in section 3.6, I draw 
these temporal dynamics together with the formal structural account of moral 
phenomenology accomplished in Part Two in order to (1) discharge the thesis that the 
improvisational mode of self-interpretation provides for an explicit participation in the 
production of moral norms to which in turn the interpreter feels bound; and (2), that 
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because of the very possibility of this mode, the reactive ironist, and their experience of 
moral friction, is sublated.  
 
§3.2 | The First Clue:  The Problem with Questioning the Good Life 
I want to give a first approximation as to why I think it is worth attending to the 
status of the question of the good life and at the same time convey a sense of why this 
otherwise seemingly uncomplicated question quickly becomes knotty and vague when 
anything more than a perfunctory set of platitudes are marshaled to ward off superficial 
or fleeting everyday doubts and anxieties about the kinds of lives we lead.   An 
indication of both the degree of centrality that explicit notions regarding the good life 
(both in general and in particular situations) have in the unfolding life drama of 
individuals, as well as the way in which putting these notions into question has become a 
conceptually thorny business, can be exposed simultaneously by drawing attention to a 
commonplace public phenomenon in which the question itself is strategically avoided.   
Consider the sort of situations in which the following phrases might be deployed: 
“to each his own,” or “everyone is entitled to his or her own opinion,” or “we should 
agree to disagree.”  Such phrases, or ones like them, are common in the dominant 
discourse in North America and they point to a familiar sentiment imbedded in the 
background “common sense” of the culture.  The sentiment expressed in these sayings 
can most certainly be illuminated by reference to the liberal Anglo-American tradition 
(and western social history, generally), and there is certainly a rich cultural and 
intellectual history to be told about how those expressions have achieved some level of 
common sense.  However, I want here only to draw attention to the way that such 
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sayings actually operate in common parlance to deflect talk about moral topics that 
would otherwise involve the prospects of some agreement about what kinds of ends or 
practices are worth pursuing, what values are most important, or what “truths” merit 
belief.  That such phrases are expected to achieve these topical deflections when uttered 
suggests that there is a range of sentiments that the speaker more or less tacitly expects 
to be common enough that the listener will “understand” and thus subsequently desist 
from pursuing the contentious topic of conversation.   There may be any number of 
psychological, social, or situational accounts that can make sense of why any given 
person may employ one of these phrases in a particular situation; however, because the 
use of the phrase depends upon the presumed existence of a common sentiment, it is 
reasonable to speak about this range of attitudes as having a singular, publicly available 
meaning.  In other words, with regard to their function, such phrases are effective 
precisely because they have a singular meaning; i.e., something like: “I don’t want to 
talk about this topic because I disagree with you and I don’t think a conversation will be 
fruitful in resolving these differences.”  The usage of these types of phrases to express 
this sentiment, as well as to direct conversation, reveals that topics concerning the good 
life (i.e. topics concerning what is most worthy, valuable, or true about the lives we 
lead) are already a matter of concern for us; i.e., insofar as this care is attested to by the 
fact that these strategies have emerged by which conversations about this class of topics 
can be evaded.  There is no sense in strategies for avoiding topics we are indifferent to.  
At the same time, it also reveals that there is something awkward and hostile about these 
topics―insofar as they are often successfully evaded by these very strategies (otherwise 
the strategies would not be commonly employed).  The fact that we all more or less 
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know what it means when someone says that “we should agree to disagree about this 
topic” reaffirms that these topics already hold some importance for us.  And yet it also 
hints at the extent to which a practice of avoiding conversations concerning a moral 
topic that we clearly care about occupies a common sense position in our public 
repertoire of social engagements.   
 The above example offers intimation regarding both the importance that ideas 
about the good life already have for us as well as a hesitation or unwillingness to address 
the question.  Said in a different way, it points to a vague sense that not much insight 
will follow from talking about one’s deeply held ideas about the good life; and a fortiori, 
the intellectual project of actively putting one’s ideas about the good life explicitly into 
question seems pointless or even pernicious.  
 Nevertheless, it seems that no question could be more obvious.  Is it not the case, 
one may protest, that everyone must ask this question at some point, and perhaps even at 
many points?  It may be plausible to consider the possibility that in earlier times, when 
there were fewer social roles available, where roles may have been experienced as more 
clearly and rigidly defined, and/or social mobility was more limited, that such questions 
may never arrive in common attention with much more force than a mere curiosity; but 
it seems implausible that such a question would not arise as a matter of course in the 
contemporary Western world.  In our time, it seems, with the proliferation of vivid 
portrayals of very different cultures and sub-cultures through film, television, the 
internet and alike, there exists something of a smorgasbord of often conflicting social 
roles and cultural fragments from which every teenager attending public education in 
North America, for example, is expected to select, and by which they are expected to 
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compose their own personal identity; e.g., that “personal identity” on the basis of which 
they are expected to coordinate the “tastes” and “desires” that a modern free market 
economy presupposes as the “natural” pump that drives commerce.   And in a different 
way, in a culture in which one’s professional career is often thought less of as a vocation 
than as a coincidental and provisional activity aimed at gathering the resources for the 
purpose of realizing one’s own private self-articulated goals, is not the question of the 
good life inexorably bound up with modern life as the vehicle by which those private 
goals are first articulated?  In our modern liberal society, it is hard to imagine that the 
question of the good life would not emerge often.  
 Moreover, the idea that the question of the good life has been obfuscated in 
contemporary Western life seems less than obvious when we consider the fact that our 
public discourse is riddled with various voices that often explicitly call us to live in 
accord with a particular conception of the good life (as found in religious institutions, 
various manifestations of the “self-help” movement, or political ideology, just to name a 
few).  Or, as is more often the case, we are urged to adopt a particular vision of the good 
life via the tacit demands imbedded in the background of social norms implicit in the 
range of conventions, vocabularies, practices, and norms that populate particular social 
settings (e.g., the constellation of background social norms that compose and sustain 
academic institutions, the implicit moral background that undergirds the narrative 
continuity in films, novels and commercial advertisements, or the moral presumptions 
that tacitly stand behind and motivate topical political rhetoric). With so many voices 
demanding conformity with particular answers to the question of the good life, it seems 
odd to suggest that the question which it is natural to suppose generates the call for these 
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answers is in some way more obscure in the modern Western world than say, in former 
times.   
Such objections to the very idea that the question of the good life has somehow 
become addled seem quite reasonable at first gloss.  However, even though it is 
reasonable to grant that there is a necessary connection between assertions about the 
good life and the possibility of formulating a question for which such assertions could 
count as answers, what such objections nevertheless seem to presuppose is the 
unwarranted inference that, because there is no dearth of answers to the question of the 
good life, it is also unproblematic to explicitly ask the question.  It is just this 
presumption, however, that tends to cover over and obscure the ways that we avoid such 
contentious topics at just those moments when they are most “question worthy”—that is, 
when explicitly posing the question has the most potentially forceful practical 
implications for everyday affairs.  In other words, it does not follow from the fact that 
various conceptions of the good life are reproduced in the images, practices, and 
vocabularies that work to constitute our ordinary everyday way of life, that there also 
exists some antecedent more or less explicit discourse in which the question is framed.  
On the contrary, it is a phenomenon worthy of note that there exists such a discrepancy 
between the prevalence of discourse dedicated to expounding particular visions of the 
good life and the relative scarcity of discourse oriented towards formulating and asking 
questions about it.  
This discrepancy might seem nothing more than a mere curiosity, an interesting 
but inessential cultural artifact, if not for the role that this question plays in 
contemporary Western life.  As suggested above, having a practical answer to the 
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question of the good life is essential for making choices in everyday life.  We must make 
choices about what career to pursue, what political party to support, what toothpaste to 
buy, we must, in short, make all sorts of evaluations (both strong and weak) in the 
course of everyday life as we peruse aims that correspond to some picture of how life is 
supposed to unfold.  To do this, we need some grasp of how these different choices hang 
together according to some picture about how it is that one’s life ought to be lived.  This 
picture, of course, might be fragmented and discontinuous across different contexts 
(work, family, political action, etc.), but in order to participate in any particular context, 
one must have a grasp of—and take a stand in relation to—the strong evaluations 
internal to the meaning of those situations.  
If there is something more to our reluctance to ask the question of the good life 
in public spaces than mere liberal tolerance or conversational courtesy, then that 
“something” is to be found in what we understand strong evaluations themselves to 
involve.   If a strong evaluation is understood as an assertion of truth, then the evaluation 
itself demands criteria that give it warrant.  If one has a general incredulity towards the 
possibility that such criteria can be found to have universal warrant, then strong 
evaluations as such seem to be inherently unwarranted.   And if strong evaluations as 
such are inherently unwarranted, then conversation that would put such evaluations in 
question seems pointless at best.  I would be reluctant to ask the question of the good 
life, in other words, if I believed that there is no possible criteria for resolving upon a set 
of “right” answers to the question in my own life—let alone answers that apply in some 
binding way to others.   
It is important to be clear here that the phenomenon of reluctance that I am 
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indicating is not reluctance concerning an assertion of a vision of the good life, but 
rather of approaching those conversations about topics that may put the beliefs one 
already possesses about the good life in question.  There is no dearth of talk about strong 
evaluations among people who already more or less agree about these evaluations.  
What is remarkably scarce is talk about these evaluations in the mode of an open 
question.   The phenomenon then concerns first of all the terms of our own self-
interpretation; our own understandings about who we are and what sort of lives that we 
ourselves lead or ought to lead.   
In the next section I want to give an example of how this tension might play out 
in a very specific context.  The situation has the advantage of admitting of a variety of 
possible modes whereby the participants might interact without fundamentally changing 
the essence of the situation itself.   As such, it will provide the linkages needed in 
fleshing out how moral friction may be seen to work in the interpretations given by the 
participants and provide entrance to the interpretational mode of the improviser.  
 
§3.3 | The Situation: An Example    
In order to develop the first clue in a particular context, consider the following 
situation.  Suppose that you are entering a new social environment that, while still within 
your wider culture, is nevertheless sufficiently foreign that the encounter feels uncanny. 
You are not at home with either the people that compose the group or the background 
ideas, practices, concerns, etc., that binds the group.  Suppose further that the members 
of the group you are meeting are quite familiar with each other.  Let’s say also that there 
is something at stake, you are meeting the friends and family of your new romantic 
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partner.  It is important to you to make a good impression and develop rapport with this 
group.   Your goal is to be “welcomed in” and as such you are concerned both with 
being accepted and with providing some sort of value to the group.  In most social 
situations, conformity to the group, having the right opinions, practices, concerns, etc., 
has value as a kind of confirmation of the way of life that the group exhibits.  Moreover, 
you recognize that even if such conformity is not of explicit value to the group, some 
amount of overlap with the group is necessary even to begin an interaction.  We have the 
convention of asking questions in our culture like: “What do you do for a living?” or 
perhaps, “Do you follow baseball?”, etc.  The aim is to discover what kind of person(s) 
we are dealing with—what common motifs or forms of life can we expect.   Most 
people, in more or less neutral circumstances—that is, without prior profound 
prejudice—yet in the presence of even a minimal motivation to get to know the other 
person, are willing to assume that others have something in common with themselves.  I 
have charged this example with the stakes of a social interaction in which both the 
friends and family members of your romantic partner and you are motivated to develop 
such rapport.  
Since you are, again by hypothesis, motivated to gain acceptance by the group, you 
are likely to bracket your more innocuous prejudices that might have otherwise deterred 
you from further interaction in a more neutral setting.  You are open-minded and curious 
to know what these people are all about.  It is almost certainly the case that your new 
romantic partner has prejudiced you either directly or indirectly.  You have some ideas 
about who these people are.  Yet the reality of interacting with people far outstrips the 
sorts of prejudices one may have casually garnered from your romantic partner.  Let us 
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suppose that you have not been prejudiced with foreknowledge of any particularly moral 
objectionable past behaviors by the group.  Far more difficult to hold in abeyance, on the 
other hand, are cultural prejudices that you may hold regarding the social group to which 
these people belong.  Indeed, it is on the basis of these richly textured prejudices that we 
have any basis for interacting at all.   
Since you are motivated in this example to “make a good impression” you are likely 
to bracket even these prejudices—or hold them in abeyance—with greater care than in 
more neutral circumstances even as you utilize them as a basis for your interaction.   The 
situation itself calls for this “open-mindedness.” What is crucial to notice here is that 
this sort of “bracketing” involves taking on something of an ironic attitude.  One does 
not do so by “bracketing” one’s prejudices and one’s own strong evaluations as though 
to reject one’s own ideas, cares, practices, etc.  Rather, you simply refrain from asserting 
them bluntly or dogmatically before knowing something about, we might say, your 
audience.  So you ask questions and make guarded assertions, being careful to concur 
with what you in fact agree with and simply avoiding potential topics that you suspect 
would cause disagreement.  What is crucially important to note in your motivated 
disposition is the curiosity and desire to see what is right or good or agreeable in the 
ideas, practices, concerns, etc. of the group that you are getting to know.    
Now suppose that the group has accepted you.  That is not to say that you have 
become fully integrated, but that you have developed a sufficient region of overlap with 
them that you and they have begun to feel comfortable.  Moreover, you have also 
gathered a sense of what topics would be points of disagreement.  In short, you have a 
sense of your audience.  By bracketing your own beliefs, practices, and concerns, you 
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have attuned yourself to another social region that, although overlapping with your own, 
is not identical to it.  You are careful to note the similarities and the differences.  You 
could at this point leave the differences as mere curiosities and when the interaction is 
over, think little more of it.  But now suppose that you strike an attitude in which you 
hold the more or less coherent form of life that you had before the interaction side by 
side with the one that you encountered in the interaction and asked the further question:  
“Which one is better?” Of course, in asking this question, you do not need to suppose 
that you must either choose one or the other.  You could intentionally use aspects of the 
challenging and discordant aspects of these foreign ideas, practices, and concerns to 
challenge your own.  In other words, you might try to integrate the two.   
Now let us suppose that the interaction has uncovered a practical contradiction of the 
following sort.  Suppose that the group you encountered has a very rich conception of 
family life; one that you are particularly attracted to.  It involves, however, spending 
much of one’s time and energy focused on “being a good father or mother” or “being a 
good son or daughter,” where each of these social roles is richly textured with well-
defined ideas, practices and concerns.  Suppose that you are inclined to think that this 
group has something importantly “right” about this conception.  On the other hand, 
suppose also that you have put much of your time and focus into being a good 
“professional.”  You know very well the finely textured flow of life that constitutes what 
being a professional is all about and what exactly it has taken for you to become 
proficient at it.  You feel that these two forms of life are in many respects practically 
incompatible.   As one who has prioritized your professional life, you have a well-
developed vision of what it is to be accomplished “as a professional.” Your mood is 
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generally one of rigorous determination deployed in the service of realizing the 
particular ends to which your profession aims.  From your professional perspective, the 
“family person,” with his or her attunement to the give-and-take flow suited to enjoying 
family interaction exhibits a complex of ordered priorities that are incompatible with the 
priorities internal to the meaning of realizing a life as a professional.  From your 
perspective, that is, spending that much time focused on adopting the moods and aims of 
family life, although perhaps pleasurable and desirable, are simply incompatible with 
realizing the role of a “professional.”  On the other hand, from the perspective of the 
“family person,” your focus on an attunement to the disposition and vocabulary of 
accomplishment comes at the expense of cultivating the relationships that make the 
dynamics of friends and families flourish.   
There seem to be two possible forms of life presently available, each good and 
choice-worthy, but practically incompatible in many important respects.  One way of 
resolving this problem is to assume	  that there exists some basis for thinking that one 
form of life is in principle more choice-worthy than the other.  Perhaps we can look to 
nature or to reason as a basis for prioritizing the values and strong evaluations implicit in 
each.  The idea that there is such a basis for determining the truth of the matter is what 
Richard Rorty identifies as the disposition of the “metaphysician.” On such a 
conception, one looks for the objectively right priority of the roles relative to what it is 
to be a human being and thereby coordinates the two by subordinating one to the other.  
One might conclude, for example, that the professional who is at the “top of his or her 
game,” but who does not attend to family matters, is simply out of sync with nature, 
reason, or history.  On this view, there is a belief that, at least in principle, some 
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verifiable objective order concerning human beings exists and can serve as a basis on 
which to judge and order the strong evaluations that compose the multitude of social 
roles that we take up in the course of life.  But let us suppose that you are an “ironist” in 
the sense that Rorty uses the term.  You do not believe that such an objective order can 
be rationally justified; you do not believe that there is some meta-vocabulary that 
bridges the gap between a non-linguistic objective order and the everyday language we 
use to articulate our understanding of the world and ourselves.  You are left then with a 
sort of smorgasbord of social roles that you gather from your culture and your 
interactions with other cultures that are compatible in some ways and not in others, but 
without any ultimately legitimate means for navigating conflicting demands that follow 
from the strong evaluations that organized each role.  If you are inclined to affirm two 
social roles that are incompatible, then you are left with what might seem like a tragic 
necessity.  This seeming “necessity” consists precisely in the indeterminacy of priority 
between one set of strong evaluations and the other.  Since it seems up to you to choose 
between the “final vocabularies” that justifies each view, and since the strong 
evaluations that those final vocabularies endorse are incompatible—and you simply do 
not believe that there is some larger “final vocabulary” that can get sufficiently outside 
of each and that could command independent legitimacy—you seem to be left with the 
task of accepting the incompatibility as tragic.  You are left with the task, in other 
words, of personally choosing which vocabulary and the values you want to compose 
your life with, but without hope of “getting it right.”  Nevertheless, although life may 
involve a certain tragic element due to the fact that we cannot be all that we would like 
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to be in our finite lives, it may seem that we have nevertheless gained a great deal of 
freedom with regard to poetically composing our own personal lives.   
Yet as I suggested in Part One, there is an insidious element to this condition that I 
have identified with the concept of “moral friction.” That is, the problem of being unable 
to feel the “weight” or “claim” of the strong evaluations we explicitly choose.   The 
ironist, to the extent that they experience moral friction, simply cannot be “moved” by 
the evaluations they have freely chosen.  But if one who makes choices that are 
incompatible with other possible desirable social roles recognizes the seemingly tragic 
nature of being unable to adopt both, and at the same time experiences a lack of 
weightiness regarding the choices they do make, it becomes easy to see that the resulting 
emotive state would resemble something like “depression,” as the term is commonly 
used.  Or as I have use the term in a more specialized sense, it can be seen how this sort 
of circumstance would lead to a lack of enthusiasm or interest in all situations.  
One obvious response to this condition is to “get lost” in the activity of realizing a 
particular form of life; what Heidegger calls “fleeing.”  So, to continue the example 
above, you recognize that being a “professional” in the way that you personally endorse 
and being a “family person” in the way that you have come to admire, are practically 
incompatible.  You decided to follow the life of a professional and you recognize a 
certain tragedy in the necessity of foregoing the life of a “family person.” But rather than 
remain in the state of such an explicit recognition, you immerse yourself in your freely 
chosen form of life.  In Part One, I called this sort of response that of a “decisionist.” 
One simply chooses a particular form of life and immerses oneself sufficiently in it so as 
to “forget” that one has chosen it.   This strategy is post-ironic in the sense that it is a 
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form of life one has chosen without reference to ultimate criteria.   It is similar to the 
response of a metaphysician’s conviction that a particular form of life, or in our 
example, a particular coordination of strong evaluations, is “the best,” but it lacks the 
authoritative rational basis that assures you that you have chosen for good reason.  As a 
result, when in the course of realizing the life that you have chosen, you encounter 
evidence which challenges it as having been the “right choice”—suppose you find 
yourself unhappy despite your professional success—you are put in an awkward 
position.  The metaphysician could simply take this evidence to suggest that one doesn’t 
have it right yet.  If he were sufficiently philosophically minded, he could then seek 
rational means by which to modify his form of life to accommodate the new evidence.   
But the post-ironist decisionist does not have this recourse.  Rather, such 
counterevidence works to simply thrust the decisionist back into the ironic position 
wherein he once again has to accommodate two or more incompatible forms of life; and 
his “having chosen” becomes evident to him once again—his “guilt” for having 
fashioned his life becomes visible.  The decisionist, then, lives under the constant threat 
that his role and responsibility for choosing the form of life that he has will be thrust 
back upon him.  And it is in this sense that the decisionist is essentially vulnerable.   
In addition to the response of the decisionist, there is a second post-ironist attitude.  
This post-ironist attitude is more transparently “ironist” in the sense that Rorty uses the 
term.  In order to draw out the features of this second ironist response, I will again 
continue with the example above.  Suppose that when meeting your significant other’s 
friends and family, you feel “put upon” or “judged” by the standards and norms implicit 
in the form of life they share.  You feel the weight of their judgment not only because 
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you are motivated to make a good impression, but more substantially because you are 
sufficiently attuned to the strong evaluations implicit in their form of life and you are 
aware of the extent to which they are incompatible with your own.  You may even have 
found something “right” in their prioritization of values given their emphasis on 
“family” and because you both understand the coherence of their view and you can see 
and feel what is valuable in it, you feel the implicit criticism of your way of life as a 
deeply committed “professional.” This tension might lead you to a sort of reactive 
hostility.   
If you are an even-minded metaphysician, you might see this as an opportunity to 
figure out what exactly it is that they have right and uncover why you feel the weight of 
their criticism so poignantly.  That is, if you are philosophically minded, you might 
separate out the seeming—or even genuine—hostility and adopt a magnanimous 
disposition in which you earnestly seek to uncover what is right about what is said so 
that you might discover the proper order of things.  Even if a resolution cannot be 
reached, you conclude that it is because you have not reached the truth of the matter yet.  
Even if your investigation ends in aporia, you have faith that the proper order of things 
is, at least in principle, available in the future.   
If, on the other hand, you are an ironist, you might find the seeming hostility of their 
implicit strong evaluations particularly threatening because you have no such faith for 
eventual resolution.  You have no faith in this regard because you do not believe that 
there is any ultimate basis for determining which coherence is the “right” one.   The 
hostility seems like “mere hostility” because you lack the resources to respond to the felt 
aggression except by counter aggression.  The situation is this:  you have chosen a 
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certain coherent form of life, you see them as having either critically or uncritically 
accepted a different and incompatible form of life, and in either case, you feel that you 
are being unjustly judged from what—from your ironist point of view—is an unfounded 
presupposition of moral legitimacy.  In other words, you understand them to believe that 
they are right, and you, from your elevated ironic position, can see why they think so as 
well as why they are not entitled to their judgments on any ultimately authoritative 
ground.  You experience them as being violent and your suffering is either because they 
are either uncritically operating from a presumed authority that you see as unwarranted 
or because they are simply being aggressive.  In either case, you might imagine 
retaliation or avoidance as your only recourse.  If one chooses a course of retaliation, 
then it will involve choosing the same sort of naked and ultimately unwarranted 
aggression that you find so offensive in the first place.  The easiest path is avoidance.  
Whichever path one chooses, it is easy to see how an ironist may be led to a particular 
sort of motivated suspicion regarding the strong evaluations of other groups.  And to the 
extent that one remains an ironist while at the same time retaining a kind of moral 
indignation against those who make claims on them from what are—from the ironist 
point of view—the unwarranted authoritative position given by a particular contingent 
coherence of meaning, the ironist is in the awkward position of attempting to escape 
being “put upon” without advancing a substantial vision of a counter form of life.  The 
reason that one may avoid this “counter assertion” is for the same reason that one rejects 
the offending other—that it has no ultimate warrant and therefore would involve naked 
aggression.  The dominant disposition of an ironist who has this particular constellation 
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of concerns can be characterized as “suspicion.” In order to capture this mode of 
interpreting, I have called this orientation in Part One that of the “suspicionist.”  
The ironist-as-decisionist will have his own form of suspicion, of course, one 
motivated by his drive to immerse himself in a chosen form of life—i.e., suspicion of the 
ideas, practices, and concerns of others that may bring to light the role and responsibility 
that they themselves have played in choosing the form of life they live; a form of life 
they have chosen without ultimate criteria that might make their choice uncontentious.  
The suspicionist, in contrast, is as dominated by a suspicion of his own motivations as 
he is of others.  He is suspicious, that is, not of claims to truth made by others that reveal 
that his own claims may be unfounded, and therefore a product of his own will, but 
rather the suspicionist is suspicious of any claim to truth—including his own.  It is this 
inward-turned suspicion that renders him more transparently ironist and which is the 
basis for his indignation towards the claims that others make on him.  Whereas the 
ironist-as-decisionist is suspicious of potential enemies—the authoritative claims of 
others that disagree with his own—the ironist-as-suspicionist is suspicious of every 
authoritative claim, even his own.  Each of these post-ironist forms of life experiences 
what I have been calling moral friction, albeit in different modes.   
The ironist-as-decisionist is locked into a particular coherence and is threatened by 
any counter-evidence from both his experience and the ideas of others.  In order to avoid 
such threats, he must adopt increasingly thin conceptions of his chosen mode of life.  
Thin, that is, in the sense that words like “professional” or “marriage” become mere 
abstractions composed of principles that increasingly fail to respond to counter-
evidence.  There is no attempt, in other words, to integrate counter-evidence or 
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challenges from the ideas of others because doing so involves either taking up an earnest 
inquiry into the “truth of the matter” (a metaphysician’s strategy) or an ironic attitude 
towards one’s own final vocabulary.  The latter disposition would force the ironist-as-
decisionist to confront the one thing he seeks to avoid; i.e., the seemingly hopeless 
awkward friction produced by acknowledging his role in choosing the moral norms that 
govern his life.  
The ironist-as-suspicionist, on the other hand, comes to a very similar conclusion, 
though from different motivations.  Because he is invested in resisting the unwarranted 
claims of others, he is also unwilling to make unwarranted claims on others.  He must, 
of course, take up particular social roles in the course of life, but when these come into 
conflict with others, he simply says something like “Well, this is the way that I do it”—
with an implied emphasis claiming “and don’t you try to put your norms on me.” But 
almost by necessity the social roles and norms that the ironist-as-suspicionist takes up in 
everyday life must be relatively thin.  To experience them as “thick” would seem 
tantamount to being un-ironic and begin to resemble the attitude of the metaphysician, or 
worse, the ironist-as-decisionist.  This self-directed suspicion is in conflict with the 
strong evaluations implicit in the constellation of social roles and practices that he 
realizes in the course of everyday activity.  An ironist of this sort cannot take himself too 
seriously.  The net result of these two post-ironist forms of life is what I called in Part 
One, drawing on Heidegger, “levelling.” And as I mean to adopt the term, this means 
not only a lack of enthusiasm for any possible life, it also means that the actual life 
styles that we could adopt become thin; the cultural repertoire of possible ideas, 
practices, norms, social roles, concerns, etc., becomes thin.   Thin not in the sense of a 
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reduction in their number, but thin in the sense that each becomes more like a “persona” 
or “facade”—an abstraction—rather than a rich or deeply integrated form of life. 
 I also asserted in Part One that this lack of enthusiasm also has an “inner” 
manifestation, what I called “depression.”  We can see that clearly at work here if we 
consider the above example once again.  In this variation, suppose you are coming from 
the point of view of the ironist-as-decisionist.  To the extent that you are interested in 
making a good impression, you might hold back your strong evaluations, but you are not 
very interested in considering the ideas, practices, and concerns of the group you are 
meeting.  You are likely only to have a very superficial encounter.  Even if they are not 
at all malicious, the very process of making yourself understood to this audience would 
likely itself involve the possibility of disclosing fissures in the coherence of your form of 
life.  Revealing such fissures is threatening precisely because it brings to light your own 
role in interpreting and evaluating features of that chosen form of life in the way you 
do.  The very process of making yourself understood to an audience that is sufficiently 
different from yourself unavoidably involves the threat that the interaction itself might 
show that you are making choices.  If you do not think, in advance, that your own 
position is rationally grounded in some ultimately legitimating source, and to the extent 
that you are an ironist-as-decisionist, it is your immersion in your chosen form of life 
that is your only protection against being forced to explicitly take responsibility in lieu 
of such a source.  The awkward outcome of this situation is a sort of isolationist 
approach to life in which nothing important is talked about.  This strategy may work in a 
relatively isolated social environment, but in a media-saturated culture like ours, every 
communication must seem threatening.  So the ironist-as-decisionist desires to protect 
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his enthusiasm precisely by not interacting substantially with others.  Yet because such 
interaction is hard to avoid, one’s enthusiasm is dampened.  The success of the strategy 
is inversely related to the amount of interaction one has with difference.  It is hard to 
imagine how an ironist-as-decisionist could be enthusiastic about meeting the friends 
and family of a significant other who happen to be sufficiently different from his own 
way of life, even under the best conditions.   
Now, in contrast, suppose that you are an ironist-as-suspicionist, all else in this 
variation of the example being the same.  You may of course get along with a 
magnanimously minded group quite well initially.  But our example has the advantage 
of showing how human life is rarely neutral.  Surely individuals can “mind their own 
business” when they are isolated individuals, but coordinating one’s own commitments, 
no matter how ironist one is about them, will inevitably conflict with the expectations of 
others when the circumstances of those expectations bear on their own experience.  
Suppose that you, as a committed “professional,” expect to take a job in a foreign 
country and also hope that your new romantic partner will join you; which would 
effectively be depriving the friends and family of your partner of their loved one whom, 
given their thick conception of family life, they expect to be present in their everyday 
lives.  If you are predominately suspicionist, you are likely to take offense at such 
expectations regardless of whether or not they are couched in uncritical, traditional 
beliefs about the proper order of family, or if they are nakedly “selfish” assertions about 
what is desired.  One of the more likely responses is to reassert the right of individuals to 
make their own decisions and to give the responsibility to choose entirely to your 
significant other.  Alternatively, you might “compromise” your own agenda in order to 
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accommodate these demands.  The problem in either of these possible responses is the 
sort of attitude that accompanies the tragic mindset.  The seemingly unwarranted claim 
of others is threatening to your own commitments and so it seems to you that you can 
either chosse a life of isolation or compromise.  The result is a sort of resentment that the 
world is not other than it is; i.e., resentment that others have different ideas and 
motivations than one’s own.  It is precisely because you are an ironist that the 
coordination with others seems to involve this sort of tragedy.  Although the dynamics 
are a bit different, the result is remarkably similar to the situation of the decisionist.  In 
both cases, it is hard to be enthusiastic about talking with others about what matters most 
to you in your own life.  
There is a third post-ironist option, however; and this is the mode I have been 
calling that of the improviser.  Consider once again our example.  You take up the “well 
mannered” magnanimous and curious disposition with the aim of attuning to the social 
group.  Just as in the other variations of this example, you track the similarities and 
difference between your view of things and how it is that they tend to talk and think 
about matters.  And again, as before, you discover something you admire—say, the way 
they conceive of family—and as before, you notice its practical incompatibility with 
your own vocabulary, disposition and concerns, which together corresponds to your 
conception of what it is to be an excellent professional.  Like the metaphysician, you 
take this as an opportunity to critique your own priorities, but unlike the metaphysician, 
your aim is not to discover an objectively and absolutely warranted proper order of 
things.  Rather you take this as an opportunity to put into question what it means to be a 
top-flight “professional” or a successful “family person.”  Indeed, your aim in doing so 
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is not to figure out what is the proper way of being either or both, but to use the 
discrepancy as the opportunity to modify the meaning of both in such a way that brings 
them into accord.  Your aim is to arrive at some new conception of each that is well 
coordinated and that presents itself in such a way as to be the “obvious meaning of 
both.” In other words, the discrepancy provided the proper semantic balance between 
freedom and constraint of interpretation, a balance that makes it possible to arrive at a 
third interpretation of the meaning of each that displaces the earlier meanings.  And it 
does so in such a way that when the new interpretation becomes available, it is simply 
no longer possible to uncritically return to either the previous interpretation you held 
regarding what is to be an excellent professional or the unmodified vision of what you 
thought right about the interpretation of “a good family person.”    
Notice that the improviser is fully ironist in the sense that she is able to entertain 
two conflicting accounts at once and to see things through the perspective of each.  
Notice also that, like the metaphysician, the improviser’s aim is to see the discrepancy as 
an opportunity to find the “right” form of life that would properly integrate what is good 
in each form of life.  Unlike the metaphysician, however, the improviser’s aim is not to 
find the “right” answer that could be demonstrated according to some independent 
standards.  Rather, the criteria of “better” or “good” here are drawn from the particular 
tensions that produce the discrepancy that initiated the reflection.  By being fully ironist 
while at the same time looking for the best form of life, she is engaging in what might be 
thought of as a “poetical activity.”  She is utilizing the discrepancy to call into question 
the very meaning of the social roles that are in conflict.  Her aim, in this case, is to 
participate in a modification in what it means to be a professional and a family person in 
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such a way as to see how it is practically possible to be fully excellent at each without 
compromising the other.   If such a reinterpretation is successful, the result has the 
intuitive weight of that coordination as its warrant when compared to the original 
meanings.  And if the reinterpretation of these social roles is sufficiently integrated with 
each other—as well as with other aspects of life beyond the two under consideration—
then the result will have the quality of “looking obvious,” but nevertheless substantially 
different from the older way of seeing things—which, in their time, also looked 
obvious.  The new meaning is preferable in the same sense that the experienced person 
prefers one way of doing things rather than another, not because the other could not 
work, but because it would seem naive to adopt the other way because it simply does not 
fit with a wider constellation of commitments.  The mark of a good hermeneutic that 
arises out of such a contradiction is that the older terms that produced the contradiction 
simply seem naïve.   
What differentiates the improviser from either of the other two forms of ironist is 
her expectation that such a hermeneutic is possible and forthcoming.  This expectation 
undermines what is threatening about explicitly asking questions that reveal 
discrepancies in strong evaluations; and as a result, there is no need to flee into the life 
of an ironist-as-decisionist.  Equally, it undermines the conditions of suspicion because 
it supposes that all forms of life are “unwarranted” in the sense of universal, extra-
linguistic and ahistorical criteria, but it does not suppose that therefore no such criteria 
for “the good life” exist.  Indeed, if a hermeneutic is successful, then it will be rationally 
preferable precisely because it seems to be the “real” meaning of the terms involved—
and it looks so precisely because it fits more clearly within the wider coherence of the 
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constellation of ideas, practices, concerns, institutions, etc. that compose the life world 
in which the improviser resides.   If the interpretation does not achieve this greater 
coherence, then the hermeneutic is not successful—yet.   
It is this anticipation towards a future more integrative coherence of meaning that 
the improviser shares with the metaphysician, and that marks them off in a distinctive 
way from the ironist-as-decisionist and the ironist-as-suspicionist.  Like the 
metaphysician, the improviser is not playing a “defensive game,” so to speak.  Rather, 
she is looking to formulate a vision of things, a coherence of meaning, that resolves the 
contradiction while at the same time preserves what was substantially right about older 
conflicting forms of life.  The key here is that the improviser actively deploys sublation.  
It is this active deployment of sublation in the interpretation of particular contradictions 
in the course of life, understood as a practice of shaping culture, which distinguishes the 
form of life of the improviser.  
One of the key points to notice here is that the improviser is not doing private 
interpretation.  In the practice of interpreting the meaning of public ideas and norms, she 
is impacting the lives of others by participating in the transformation of how they 
understand these ideas and norms.  Improvisation with the meaning of ideas and 
norms—and the meaning of the social roles in which they reside—when two or more of 
these are in contradiction with each other is an active public engagement.  Like the 
metaphysician, the improviser understands that the stakes of her interpretation reach far 
beyond her personal life.  By taking up an interpretation publicly—via her own speech 
and action—she is interacting with the ideas, practices, concerns, etc. of others, and to 
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the extent that her hermeneutic efforts are successful, they will affect the meanings of 
the vocabulary and social roles in which the strong evaluations of others are composed.  
It is important to notice that the hermeneutic activity of the improviser makes no 
important distinction between the understanding that she has and the understanding that 
others have.  As ironist, the improviser accepts that the ideas, practices, and concerns 
that animate her life are the result of being “thrown” into a particular life world; and that 
the contradictions that draw her focus, challenge her, and incite her to explicit 
hermeneutic activity are the product of these contingent historical forces.  But it is 
precisely because these artifacts are not her private possessions—because they are 
essentially public—that reinterpreting them is a public activity.  Self-interpretation is not 
importantly distinct from the interpretation of others.   Both activities use a public 
language.  Moreover, on this way of thinking, there is no important distinction between 
inner (psychological) and outer (sociological) interpretation and, as I argued in Part One, 
moral friction is to be understood as a unified phenomenon.  From the point of view of 
the improviser, allowing such a distinction covers over the very possibility of seeing the 
problem of moral friction, let alone the form of life of the improviser which itself 
sublates that tension.  In the following section, I want to complete the second half of this 
dialectic of “two clues” by looking at the significance of the question of the good life 
from the improviser’s point of view.  
 
§3.4 | The Second Clue: Improvisation and the Question of the Good Life    
In the previous section I described the improviser as one who actively deploys 
hermeneutic phenomenology and the process of sublation as a means for uncovering and 
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resolving practical contradictions imbedded in the total constellation of meanings, 
concerns, practices, etc. that compose his or her life world.  The corollary thought to this 
activity, is to explicitly consider one’s life world as a host of interpretations.  And once 
this basic move is made, the possibility of reinterpreting that life world becomes 
available.   But interpretation itself requires a manifold of ideas and practices both as to 
its content—what is to be reinterpreted—and as to the means by which it is to be 
accomplished.  The crucial thing to notice regarding the improviser as a distinct form of 
life is that since she is fully ironist, she is always dealing with the widest horizon of 
meaning, and therefore the constellations of ideas, practices, concerns, etc. must serve 
both the function of what is to be reinterpreted and the means by which it is 
accomplished.  There is no position outside the horizon of meaning that could provide a 
vantage point from which to do the reinterpretation or verify its results as being more 
right or true in an absolute sense.  This condition produces a peculiar result that can be 
marked out by reference to two of its key features.  The first concerns the criterion for 
accepting a new interpretation and the second concerns attitude or disposition.  I have 
suggested that the problem of the criterion can be solved utilizing the notion of 
sublation.  The structural dynamics of this movement was worked out in Part Two with 
regard to what I have called “moral phenomenology.”  The second feature, however, 
which allows explicit and active participation in the process of sublation in the course of 
everyday life, requires a shift in how we orient ourselves in the temporal dimension of 
projection or anticipation and memory or retention.  This temporal dynamic, which 
involves the expectation of future sublations which we cannot as yet anticipate but 
which will inevitably alter our current understanding of ourselves, needs to be mapped 
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with regard to what might be called its “disposition” or “mode of comportment” as it 
illuminates our situations in the course of everyday phenomenological hermeneutic 
activity.  In the next section I will turn to a formal account of this temporal structure.  In 
the remainder of this section, I want to anticipate this account by showing it in action, so 
to speak, in regard to how we comport ourselves to the question of the good life.  
In moral phenomenology, the criterion for accepting a particular interpretation 
revolves around its ability to displace older meanings that sparked the hermeneutic in 
the first place.  Making this process something active—making it into a practice—
involves taking on a sort of sustained ironist attitude toward the total constellation of 
cultural fragments that compose one’s whole life with an eye towards reconfiguring 
those fragments in ever more coherent ways.  This “ironist attitude” can be thought of in 
the straightforward sense of holding those fragments “in question.” And the total 
horizon of those questions can be thought, in the most general sense, as the question of 
the good life.  But this observation is not a mere retrodictive account.  The hermeneutic 
activities of the improviser need a positive aim and not just the possibility of a 
sublation.  In other words, although a sublation is accomplished as the result of a 
successful moral phenomenological inquiry, a distinction must nevertheless be made 
between this structural or methodological aim and the aim that motivates the inquiry 
itself.  The sublative feature of moral phenomenology only makes the hermeneutic 
activity potentially fruitful, but it does not serve to flesh out what such “fruit” might be.   
Here the idea of envisioning a “better life” or the “good life” can serve as the frame for 
both a specific topic of inquiry and a general frame that marks out what can be 
anticipated as the sort of result that such an inquiry aims at.   For example, if I ask 
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“What is the best way to understand what a marriage is?” then I can anticipate that the 
sort of answer I find will be valuable only because I understand that the answer will be 
“better” than my current understanding because it helps answer the larger question, 
“What is the good life?”  The question of the good life has the advantage of being 
intrinsically valuable, even if it is the most generic and thinnest of all formulations.   
The question of the good life, although so generic as to be an inadequate place to 
start, nevertheless can serve to name the ultimate genus under which all moral 
phenomenological activity fits; and it serves as a convenient way to mark out the 
essential features of this form of activity.  In other words, what one is doing when one 
looks to reformulate the meaning of “being a professional” and “being a family person” 
in such a way that it is possible to be fully excellent with both without practical or 
conceptual contradiction, one is doing so because arriving at such a formulation would 
resolve something problematic—and it is problematic in relation to giving a coherent 
answer to the more general question concerning the good life in general. The fact that 
the tension showed up as a “problem” to begin with indicates this aim.   
The improviser, by actively engaging in cultural and philosophical critique, is 
looking to unearth these contradictions; not for their own sake, but as the condition of an 
anticipated eventual redescription that resolves the contradiction and produces a more 
choice-worthy form of life.  Clearly some contradictions are less “problematic” than 
others.  But what makes something “problematic” in this sense is the extent to which the 
contradiction seems to affect our most basic ideas about what the good life amounts to.  
Yet the whole point of uncovering these contradictions and making them explicit is to 
provide the grounds for asking the question of the good life in a concrete and timely 
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form.  It is this activity of looking closely to the conditions of actual existence that 
makes the very abstruse idea of “asking the question of the good life” concrete and 
practically pressing.  Yet as philosophers are well aware, and what non-philosophers 
find hard to fathom, the sheer generality of the question of the good life is only a 
convenient way of grouping those questions about how we live, questions that concern 
topics which, depending on how we conceive of them, produce dramatic effects on how 
we actually live.  What philosophers sometimes fail to make explicit is that the cue for 
these abstractions is the concrete experiences of life.  And this tendency is in part the 
product of thinking that these abstract, yet crucially important questions can be 
determined according to non-historical extra-linguistic criteria.  The philosophically 
minded improviser would not be tempted to leave the account in abstraction.  For the 
improviser, the generality of questions regarding the good life are themselves 
interpretations of interpretations; and therefore represent just one “edge” of the 
hermeneutic process itself.   The hermeneutic improviser is a hermeneutic 
phenomenologist who looks to “the things themselves” as the ultimate evidence for the 
adequacy of the interpretation.   
One of the most crucial implications of this result for the improviser is that she 
can never expect a final answer to the question of the good life.  Rather, it must remain 
in question; or, more accurately, a dynamically unfolding region of questions.  Although 
the promise of a better life remains the telos of moral phenomenology, that telos can be 
understood as both a practical and structural condition of the activity itself. Every 
successful hermeneutic displaces a previously problematic condition; yet, although a 
move for the better has been made, the moral phenomenologist now operates in this new 
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space looking for new, previously unfathomable, contradictions.  In other words, the 
resolution of a contradiction via a particular sublation only opens up a new space for 
further inquiry. 
What is novel in this mode of life is the extent to which there is a dual activity 
that is both maximally critical and maximally creative while being at the same time 
deeply intertwined with the concerns of everyday life.  It is as much concerned with 
solving everyday worldly problems—contradictions that show up in the course of 
realizing a particular self-interpretation—as it is with poetically entertaining ideas that 
have no obvious practical value.  It is as much concerned philosophically with “getting it 
right” as it is with creatively engaging in the composition of the background horizons in 
which “getting it right” matters to us.  Achieving this form of life takes a peculiar 
disposition.  It involves, most crucially, a sort of “hope,” or even “faith” that a better, 
more coherent, more choice-worthy—from the point of view that cannot yet be 
envisioned—interpretation is forthcoming.   But this is not a “hope” or “faith” that is 
contrasted with having good reason to anticipate an eventuality.  Rather, it is rooted in 
the idea that hermeneutic phenomenology maps the historical process of interpretation 
itself.   To see this clearly, I now turn to a formal account of the temporal structure of 
hermeneutic time and the temporal dynamics of improvisation.  
 
§3.5 | The Temporal Dynamics of Improvisation   
I have been using the concept of “improvisation” to indicate a particular mode of 
self-interpretation.  So far I have developed this idea without reference to the concept of 
“improvisation” as it is ordinarily understood.  In order to indicate why I have used this 
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concept as the primary means to indicate the particular form of life I am thematizing 
here, as well as to distill the crucial temporal aspects of what this form of life practically 
involves, in this section I will give a selective phenomenology of the temporality of 
musical improvisation.  Musical improvisation has the advantage of underscoring the 
temporal dynamics of improvisation in a mode that does not directly involve “meaning” 
or “interpretation” in its ordinary sense; and this fact allows the peculiar temporal 
relationships in the movement of improvisation to shine through with clarity.   But the 
aim of this phenomenology of musical improvisation is to bring into relief these 
temporal features of improvisation so that they can be brought back into the context of 
language, meaning, and value.   
The movement of “improvisation” can be distinguished from what might be 
called the movement of “recital.”  By the latter term I mean any performance of a piece 
of music that is composed in advance.  Whereas the mode of recital begins only after the 
whole of the piece of music is formed, improvisation is distinctive in that it begins in the 
midst of the performance.  Or, in another way, in an improvisational musical 
performance one might be thought to begin “in the middle.” As a musical improvisation 
begins and unfolds, it starts by relating its movement to itself and thereby initiates a 
forming whole; it is, so long as it remains an improvisation, both organized and yet 
unfinished.   
The distinctive modality of improvisation that I want to highlight and draw upon 
in the service of developing this particular form of self-interpretation can be introduced 
in structural terms by indicating two of its central aspects.  The unfolding of an 
improvisational work is first marked by an active freedom to remain open at each 
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moment to accept or receive whatever arrives.  The character of this aspect gets 
communicated as an “unshakable” presence or attention in the face of all challenge.  The 
second aspect involves an active “giving in” to a demand for, at each moment, the 
maximization of excellence of what has already been played and what is projected to 
come.  The character of the second aspect has two complimentary aspects.  The same set 
of notes or phrases, for example, (a) offers something new, and thereby (b) 
simultaneously comments on what has come before and what is expected to come.  Or in 
other words, there is a “creative” aspect and a “critical” aspect of the same expression.  
These two aspects are, in the actual movement of the improvisation, accomplished 
simultaneously by bringing what is novel into accord with what has already been played 
by virtue of a change in what is anticipated to come next.  This “bringing into accord” 
while in the midst of an unfolding improvisational event can only be achieved by an 
attention to, accepting, and incorporating novel developments in the course of the event.  
There is a sort of “alignment” happening in which the integrity of the whole is shifted to 
accommodate the new element.  But this shifting itself needs to be calibrated, in a 
skillful way, by reference to what potential good lies in what has actually been played so 
far.  The alignment is never itself “perfect,” nor does it aim at perfection—where this 
idea indicates a judgment that could be made from an atemporal perspective.  Rather, it 
looks at each new event as opportunity to modify the trajectory of the play as a whole 
toward the “better” as it is conceived from that moment in the unfolding event.  The net 
effect of this, when accomplished skillfully, is that each new element arrives and is 
incorporated as if it had been anticipated all along.  The mark of a good improvisation is 
that its movements are both fresh and unanticipated but nevertheless exhibit a kind of 
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retrospective quality or seeming “polish” that is usually associated with well-executed 
recital.   In other words, the novel element impacts the whole in such a way that as it 
moves forward it “feels like” it was the obvious or “intended” direction all along.   
  A pianist, for example, who at once can actively make space to receive each 
note or phrase—as if to be open to the questionability of what is given—while at the 
same time entertains that expression or phrase as a particular question that stands in 
response—as an answer—to the previous expression or phrase, and entertains that 
response as something to be assessed and reassessed at each successive moment with 
regard to its excellence in relationship to the whole—what is remembered and 
anticipated—such a pianist is one who can be said to be playing in the mode of 
improvisation.  Understood in this way, improvisation can be more clearly contrasted 
with recital.  A pianist who actively performs each note or phrase in anticipation of some 
definite form of the whole from the beginning can be said to be playing in the mode of 
recital.    
Many contemporary Western modes of self-interpretation operate in the mode 
analogous to that of a musical recital.  The form of a particular life is given in advance 
and chosen as if it were analogous to a pianist selecting a piece of music.  And likewise, 
most criticism, therapies, art, etc. are comments on the “self” wherein the self is 
understood to involve particular essential features and where what is most essential for 
self-understanding is that one be a technically well-rounded performer capable of 
accurately rehearsing a repertoire of pre-given forms.  There is of course something 
impressive and deeply compelling about an excellent technician. But the aim of an 
excellent technician is to eliminate just those moments when an improvisation could be 
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born.  The technician, with the aim of getting it right according to preset standards, can 
only encounter a deviation as error.    The recital modality has a fixed teleology and any 
deviation from the steps that are involved in realizing that anticipated form is to be 
avoided.  In contrast, the improviser is one who can be said to be “ready for” deviation.   
The improvisational response to deviation, in contrast to the “closed” response of 
the technician in the mode of recital, is an interpretational openness to the possibilities 
that deviation might offer.  This openness is not in direct opposition to the critical 
impulse implicit in the demand for the excellence of accuracy imbedded in mode of 
recital.  To understand the difference between improvisation and recital in this way fails 
to capture the fact that an improvisation always involves a responsive element.  That is, 
it would be to think that improvisation arises as if from nothing.  But a temporal 
sequence that does not respond to what is given, and thereby starts as if from nothing, is 
not a temporal sequence at all.  Each note stands alone and exists only as part of a 
potential sequence.  To the extent that the next note does not respond to the one before 
it, the potential in each note is never realized—the sequence fails to start.   
The opposition between the temporality of recital and improvisation can best be 
understood as an interaction between differing dimensions of temporal sequences.   The 
nature of the temporal sequence itself, as a projection into the future and retention from 
the past, is the same.  What differs between these two modalities is that the improviser 
operates at two levels of this temporal sequence—levels that interact in a peculiar way.   
This peculiar relationship to time can be illustrated graphically.  In Figure 1 
below, the simple anticipated temporal sequence in the mode of recital is represented by 
line .  If point A represents the beginning of a piece of music at time 1, or t1, and 
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point J represents the end at t3, then point B at t2 indicates somewhere in the middle of 
the piece when one is “underway” in the recital of the piece of music.  
 
 
      
 Figure 1  | Hermeneutic	  Improvisation 
 
From the position of A at t1, one is able to project or anticipate what is to come along the 
whole temporal sequence up until the anticipated completion, J at t3.  Any deviation 
from the sequence is understood as error.   
 In an improvisational mode, however, one begins as if already underway. By the 
time a few notes are available—and it really does not matter what these notes are—one 
can project toward J at t3 only because one simultaneously gives an interpretation to the 
notes already available that one retains in memory.  In figure 1 then, improvisation can 
be said to begin at B.  The notes available between A and B are given an interpretation 
that includes a projection toward J and it is in light of this projection that one “reaches” 
for the next note which corresponds to point C.  I use the somewhat ambiguous term 
“reach” here to capture the sense in which one’s movement to C is not random.  It 
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“makes sense” given an interpretation of the movement from A to B and an anticipation 
of the whole movement from A to J.  But the improviser reaches out to C in a peculiar 
manner.  In acting on the basis of an understanding of the movement from A to J, she 
plays the note corresponding to C, but does so with the anticipation that C may offer 
new possibilities for understanding where the improvisation is going, an understanding 
that could not be anticipated at B.  When C arrives, it comments on what has already 
come before and contains the possibility of changes to its meaning.  This change 
corresponds to a change in the interpretation of the improvisation as a whole.  At point C 
in the sequence, the meaning of what has come before is transformed and 
correspondingly an anticipation of where the improvisation as a whole is going is also 
transformed.  The same notes that were played from A to C now take on a new 
significance, which is represented by the distance from G to C. At point C the total 
temporal projection is transformed which is represented graphically as the transition 
from  to  at point C.  The improvisational event, from beginning to end, has been 
transformed both in terms of the anticipation of the future and the retention of the past.   
 The transition from  to  at C is accomplished only because the note or 
notes played at C challenge the integrity of the projected .  In the effort to 
incorporate C, the projection as a whole must be altered.  Once that projection is 
incorporated, what would be “best” to come next is altered.  The first crucial idea to 
notice here is that the shift from  to  is not arbitrary.  Proceeding along  after 
the arrival of C would reveal C as mere error.  But secondly, it is crucial to notice that if 
one starts afresh from C, which is tantamount to starting from nothing, the music stops 
altogether.  One might just as well pick any note next, or any note after that, with no 
	  	  	   142	  
regard to its contact with what is retained or projected.  Without retention or projection,  
all that is left is noise.  The shift from  to  involves maximizing the integrity of 
what has already been played with what new possibilities are available at C.  The third 
crucial thing to notice at this point is that there is a relationship between what is 
understood to be good or best and the maximization of the integrity of a whole projected 
sequence.  At each moment, the good of the whole must be in question and pursued.    
 Not every note in the musical improvisation accomplishes this sort of transition.  
But each note can be anticipated as potentially holding this power.  The improviser is 
distinguished as such because she is ready for this sort of transition.  One way to capture 
this sort of movement is to mark out two sorts of change.  There is the sort of change 
that corresponds to the smooth flow from one note to the next where the note that arrives 
confirms what is expected in the anticipation of the whole.   Let us call this a 
“diachronic change,” or “DΔ” for short.  DΔ is the normal sort of change that 
corresponds to the modality of recital.  It is the sort of change that occurs in the smooth 
flow along a sequence that is anticipated from the beginning.   
On the other hand, there is the sort of change that occurs in an improvisation in 
which the arrival of a particular note is “discordant” with what was anticipated—the sort 
of note that would be understood as an error in the mode of recital.  But in the 
improvisational mode, this note provides occasion for a transformation of the musical 
event as a whole.  It changes not only where the piece is going, but also the meaning of 
what has already been laid out.  A skilled improviser is one who can instantly respond to 
this opportunity and moves to incorporate the discordant note into what has already been 
played.  This instantaneous acceptance and incorporation of the discordant note is a 
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change, but it is not in the DΔ mode.   Let us call this sort of transition synchronic 
change, or “SΔ” for short.  The key temporal distinction between a recital and 
improvisation, then, is the openness to, or anticipation of, an SΔ.   
This sort of “openness,” however, is not as straightforward as it seems.  It 
involves an explicit anticipation of an SΔ; and this means that SΔ is projected as an 
occurrence in the modality of DΔ.  Considering again Figure 1, if one is at C in the 
projected whole of  and moving toward D, then to say that one is projecting an SΔ is 
to say that one anticipates the SΔ at D which transforms the musical event as a whole to 
a new interpretation represented by ; but without being able to anticipate exactly 
how that change will affect the whole of the musical event.  The exact character of  
cannot be anticipated until D.  Once the improvisational event shifts from  to  at 
D, the trajectory of  seems obvious.  If one were to “look back” and track the 
difference between  and , the former would look “out of sync” with the whole.  
This sort of difference is hard to track when one is improvising alone.  However, in an 
ensemble, the difference can be made evident when one or more of the improvisers fails 
to notice the change.  The resulting dissidence reveals the different understandings of 
“where this is all going.”  Two skilled improvisers can accept this dissidence as 
something to be responded to and incorporated in such a way as to reveal it in a manner 
that makes it feel obvious—as if it where intended all along.  In other words, the 
dissidence produced by the discrepancy between the two improvisers itself can be 
understood to correspond to point E, in which case together they transition from  to 
.   
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However, consider a situation in which an improviser is interacting with one who 
is in a recital mode.   Such an interaction would likely not get beyond C.  From the point 
of view of the technician aiming to realize , the improviser is in error.  From the 
point of view of the improviser, the technician is simply unresponsive to what is 
potentially good about the unexpected arrival of the notes at C.  And moreover, more 
than simply missing opportunity, the technician is doing violence to what is actual by 
holding on to the particular anticipation imbedded in .  The maximization of beauty, 
with regard to this particular performance, is achieved not by stopping and starting 
again, but by incorporating what has become available at C.  From the improviser’s 
point of view, the technician’s rigid attachment to getting  “right,” prevents her from 
doing what is revealed to be best in response to what is actual.  
The technician in the mode of recital is proceeding as if there is some point of 
view, and some standard, external to the musical event that can allow her to assess her 
progress, a position corresponding to point M in Figure 1.  From the vantage point of M, 
the technician can see the whole of  prior to beginning at A.  She understands herself 
to be engaged in an activity that is fully constrained by the excellent execution of what 
can be seen of  as a whole from M.  In contrast, the improviser never occupies a 
position outside of the unfolding event itself.  Rather, she occupies a peculiar modality 
of time that gives perspective because of successive SΔ development.  That is, she 
occupies a DΔ temporal dimension that includes SΔ as an aspect that has both already 
happened and that can be anticipated to happen again.  This perspective corresponds in 
Figure 1 to the bold curved line .  By superimposing multiple SΔ as multiple DΔ on 
a single DΔ-projected whole, one gets what can best be understood as “historical 
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perspective.” Rather than gaining perspective on the whole from a perspective outside of 
the musical event, the improviser gains perspective by tracking SΔ from the perspective 
of a historical meta-DΔ ( ).  Where the musical event should go can only be 
determined from an assessment of what is good given one’s perspective at a given 
moment along a projected meta-DΔ that includes retained SΔ and anticipated SΔ.  It is 
perhaps important to point out that it is the asymmetry between retained SΔ and 
projected SΔ that corresponds to the fact that the meta-temporal dimension is DΔ 
projection.  Projected SΔ is always anticipated in the mode of a question—an open-
ended possibility, the content of which cannot be filled out in advance.  Retained SΔ, on 
the other hand, does have specific content, the specific meaning of which remains in flux 
so long as future SΔ is anticipated.  But it is only on the basis of some particular 
interpretation of that content as a DΔ projected as a whole that one is able to “reach for” 
and “receive” the novel notes as potential occasion for the next SΔ. 
With regard to music, the modality of recital and improvisation can be 
understood as two different activities.  Incompatible though they may be, there is 
nothing inherently better about one or the other.  But when these temporal dynamics are 
used to reveal the interpretational modalities of language, meaning, value and moral 
norms, the result is not neutral.   
In the final section, I want to transition from the analogy with musical 
improvisation back to a consideration of language, meaning, value, and moral norms and 
reveal the temporal interpretational dynamics the “improviser” understood as a self-
interpreter. Next, I want to show how the analogy with musical improvisation helps 
throw into relief exactly why the ironist-as-decisionist and the ironist-as-suspicionist are 
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subject to the experience of moral friction. And finally, the analogy shows clearly how 
the improvisational mode sublationally diffuses the moral friction present in the ironist’s 
form of life.  
 
§3.6 | The Improviser and the Sublation of the Reactive Ironist  
Let me begin by summing up what has been said with a formal account of the  
“improviser.” She is (1) attentive to the fact that her everyday worldly engagements 
involve “acting out” certain social roles and norms—she recognizes the contingency of 
these norms and by so doing entertains them as interpretations.  These activities are 
understood then as participating in durable patterns of behavior and understanding, and 
moreover of conforming to practices that involve implicit goals and standards (strong 
evaluations); and moreover that it is on the basis of her having these understandings of 
what these demand of her that her “actions” can be said to be intentional within the 
matrix of meaning that they provide.   And yet (2) she is also explicitly aware of the fact 
her own social emersion in roles, norms, concerns, institutions and practices, occurs in 
such a way that these understandings are not only incomplete and fluid at any given 
moment, but also that she can only ever occupy but one of many possible perspectives 
within the understanding she does happen to have.   
She is also capable of noticing that the first-personal, second-personal, and third 
personal interpretations of her actions are all part of her own understanding—a self-
understanding that is expressed in an irreducibly public language not originating in 
herself.  She understands all these “perspectives” as part of a wider cultural horizon of 
meaning that she can never fully exit or master.  The incompleteness of understanding 
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produced either by a sense of the partial understanding of a social role, for example, or 
the incompleteness and contradictions produced by the multiple perspectives one might 
take in relation to one’s own actions, open up even the most ordinary everyday situation 
in which an action might be taken to the possibility of active reflection and 
interpretation.  And so, the improviser is (3) attentive to the fact that her actions are 
commentaries on her own understanding which, like the interjection of a phrase in an 
unfolding musical improvisation, alters—sometimes rather imperceptibly and other 
times abruptly and profoundly—the meaning of the social roles, norms, patterns of 
behavior, or practices she is realizing.  In other words, the improviser is attentive to the 
interchange between the meaning of specific acts she takes, and how those acts comment 
on, ultimately, the total horizon of significance that makes those acts meaningful.   
She plays in the give-and-take between the “immediacy” of realizing her 
understanding in an action on the one hand, and the “aboutness” or “mediated” distance 
between the incompleteness of the meaning of her act in relation to the horizon of 
significance in which it is situated; or, to give the point a higher resolution, she attends 
to how that particular act comments not only on the meaning of the sort of act it is, but 
also the relation that that kind of act has to the total horizon of meaning.  For the 
improviser, action is interpretation, and reflective interpretation is a sort of action; both 
of which are circumscribed by the historically contingent public life world in which she 
lives. 
 The crucial implication of this synthesis between interpretation and action is the 
responsibility it implies.  By taking a stand on the meaning of some role, norm, pattern 
of behavior and practice—or some thematized constellation of these—she is altering the 
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claim they make on herself and others.  One cannot interpret the meaning of what it is to 
be a mother, for example, in action without communicating that interpretation to others.   
Interpretation as action is always public.  Even to hide one’s motherly actions from 
public view is to interpret motherhood as a “private affair” and to communicate that to 
others.  The communication of this interpretation to others concerning what it is to be a 
“mother,” a “father,” or a “professional,” conveys all of the normative implications or 
strong evaluations that compose the self-interpretation.  Every act, to varying degrees, 
alters the field of meaning for anyone who takes over this self-understanding or who 
tries to understand others who identify with the social role.  And moreover, since when 
acting as a “mother,” the world is lit up through the prism of this self-understanding, an 
alteration in the meaning of “motherhood” ripples out across the web of meaning as a 
whole.  Accepting the challenge of improvisation, then, involves taking on an 
extraordinary responsibility for others; and it requires this without the anchor of an 
anticipated certainty.  
Such an active synthesis of action and interpretation, and embracing the 
responsibility it entails, requires finally an orientation toward the good—or, more 
particularly with regard to the practical social role, norm, pattern of behavior or practice 
in question, an orientation toward excellence.  Without this orientation, the opportunity 
of interpretation granted by an attention toward the incompleteness of meaning remains 
directionless; and in a dearth of the possibility of direction, attentively accepting the 
responsibility that comes with making an interpretation—which in the case of the 
improviser, is characteristically in the form of an action—is unsustainable.  On this 
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view, then, orientation towards the good—in the mode of a question—is a necessary 
condition of an improvisational action/interpretation.   
Improvisation requires a form of what we ordinarily call “integrity.”  
Improvisational moral phenomenology entails continuous integration of what one 
believes being a “mother,” a “father,” or a “professional” is all about and what one does 
as being an instance of these.  And moreover, the particular pressure of the kind of 
responsibility that comes with attentively acting as an interpretation that potentially 
alters the very meaning of motherhood or fatherhood, etc., and ultimately altering the 
total matrix of meaning in which the idea and practice is imbedded. 
The improviser combines the immediacy of the flow of life when realizing 
herself as a particular sort of person with the “aboutness” orientation of reflection with 
the intention of poetically reworking the public ideas, practices and concerns that 
compose her own self-understanding; and she does this in anticipation of a particular 
meaning of the “good” that she can only anticipate is forthcoming.  She is both the 
“observed” and an “observer” who hermeneutically intervenes as a participant in the re-
composition of the rules of the social and intellectual “game” she is playing; where 
“changing the rules” means changing what it means to occupy different positions in the 
field of play, so to speak.  But since these “positions” (social roles, norms, ideas, 
practices, patterns of behavior, concerns, etc.) are public, she is capable of changing the 
game just in case her hermeneutic activity is received by others, and thereby of revealing 
the new order in such a way for it to seem that it was the meaning intended by a 
community all along.  In other words, the old order can, and always does, retrodictively 
look like it was aiming at the new order.   
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I want to fill out this account of the disposition of the improviser by pointing to 
the sort of “faith” that the form of life requires.  This faith consists first of all precisely 
in acting—which is always itself an interpretation, or what we might call a 
“speculation”—without concern for having it “right” in any absolute sense, or of even 
getting it “right” in an absolute sense in the future.  The improviser is always in a 
condition of incomplete understanding.  But more importantly, it involves the faith in 
the eventuality of a more complete or coherent understanding.  She is willing to act and 
interpret in ways that comment on a particular more or less coherent horizon of meaning 
she happens to live in because this hermeneutic activity stands in anticipation of a future 
coherence that retrodictively will reveal, and pass judgment on, whether she has acted 
well or not.  It involves faith precisely because this evaluation can only take place after 
the phenomenological hermeneutic itself has produced results; i.e. what corresponds to 
what was called in the last section a synchronic change in the historical meta-narrative 
as a whole.  But it is only on the basis of the log of evidence produced by her own 
actions that the phenomenological hermeneutic can be accomplished.  Her active 
hermeneutic activity can only happen if she is in a position of faith in regards to the idea 
that such an SΔ hermeneutic is forthcoming. And she must do so without the ability to 
anticipate with certainty if that hermeneutic will find her actions excellent or wanting.  
But to say this, is not to suggest that there is no guidance at all, as if each act happened 
in a vacuum.  
Rather, we are always “already underway” in an ongoing life-world composed of 
more or less coherent contexts of meaning laden with strong evaluations.  To think that 
one can simply step out of the flow of this larger horizon of meaning is to make the 
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same sort of mistake in musical improvisation whereby one suspects that there is no 
relationship between the previous notes and the ones that are forth coming.  
Improvisation is not the production of noise.   Rather, the improviser is always 
improvising with, and deeply imbedded in the context of, the world or meanings, norms, 
vocabularies, practices, and concerns into which she first finds herself as a participant.  
She has always already been living a particular composition of public ideas and 
practices that she did not herself make and which, to the extent that these roles develop 
historically, and that she is aware of this development, she can never fully master 
herself; that is, produce a final definitive self-understanding.   
 What allows her to live in the gap between the interpretive freedom that 
historical consciousness allows is precisely a concern for the “Good” (always in the 
mode of an answer/question) as disclosed from whatever historical moment or position 
within the unfolding cultural ensemble works.  The primary feature of the improviser 
that constitutes the sublation of moral friction is the continuous speculation or answer to 
the “question of the good life” that itself provides further content and context to ask that 
question again.  The improvisation accomplishes the sublation in a way that shows that 
“improvisation” is the fulfillment of what the ironist form of life promises.  The 
improviser, as I have thematized her, could just as easily be understood as an “active 
ironist.”  Which, understood in this way, retrodictively reveals other forms of the ironist 
form of life (the decisionist and the suspicionist) to be incomplete forms of the ironist 
life.  I think it is worth adopting the terminology of “improvisation,” however, because 
in the anticipation of a better more coherent form of life composed of meanings that are 
more adequate to each other, the improviser lives in a sufficiently different modality 
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than other forms of the ironist life such that to see these as aspect of a unitary “ironist 
form of life” has the effect of continually attaching the possibilities of self-interpretation 
merely to the rejection of a universalizing, ahistorical, and necessary absolute meta-
vocabulary.  This effect covers over a form of life that employs moral phenomenology 
in the course of everyday affairs and understands those everyday activities as potentially 
having deep significance or impact on the whole cultural horizon in which we find 
ourselves.   A “reactive ironist,” in other words, is still attached to the Enlightenment 
and Romantic meta-narrative of liberation; and he is so in a relatively un-ironic fashion.  
From the improviser’s point of view, the reactive ironist is not sufficiently ironist.  And 
the confirmation of this insufficiency is the phenomenon of moral friction.  A full 
appropriation of the historicist understanding of the contingency of language, the self, 
and of culture leads one beyond the liberation meta-narratives of the last half 
millennium, in whatever form it takes, and puts one fully into the self-aware, poetic 
activity of participation in the production of evermore coherent public answers to the 
question of the good life; not only at the far-ranging level of abstract final vocabularies, 
but in the course of ordinary everyday participation in the public “orchestral” 
improvisation of the meanings, norms, and strong evaluations that most concretely 
govern our lives.  The picture we get, then, is a life not unlike that of the Socrates of the 
early Platonic dialogues who professes not to know about “Justice,” for example.  
Clearly he knows something, but in knowing something he earnestly, yet ironically, 
professes that in knowing he does not quite know what he knows.  Only after rigorous 
examination of what we mean when we talk and act can what we think we know come 
to light; but such examination is never neutral with regard to the topic.  What we mean 
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has changed because we have examined it—and so we must examine it again as we live 
it.  It is this active participation in the examination of our lives, with the ever-renewed, 
anticipated arrival of a better understanding, that accomplishes a transformation of our 
way of life—an interpretation of the good life from our own finite limited perspective on 
the whole, which is necessarily open to further criticism from oneself and others—that it 
becomes possible for the improviser to explicitly participate in the production of moral 
norms, according to which, the improviser feels deeply bound.  
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